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ABSTRACT

Cummings, Antonette T. Ph.D., Purdue University, December 2015. A
Phenomenographic Study of How Aerospace Engineers Experience Uncertainty When
Making Design Decisions. Major Professor: William Oakes.
This study investigated the qualitatively different ways in which engineers
working in aerospace-related industries experience uncertainty as they make design
decisions. This study provides insight on how engineers increase their ability to manage
various forms of uncertainty as they design Large Scale Complex Engineered Systems.
The results of this study are valuable for understanding learning trajectories of engineers
beyond their academic experiences and for linking the professional and technical skills in
industry to the undergraduate engineering learning experience.
Phenomenography, a qualitative research methodology, was employed to solicit
varied experiences. Previously published literature on design, expertise, teaming,
uncertainty, and decision-making informed the semi-structured interview. The twentyfive participants were interviewed; their professional experience ranged from senior
design students to individual contributors in private industry to director levels of
responsibility, across corporations of sub-suppliers, suppliers, and end users. The
literature also provided ways to describe and validate the results of the analysis.
The analysis produced five categories of experience of uncertainty in design decisions
which follow the trend of previously identified design expertise levels. There is a

xiv
dimension of quantity and quality of uncertainty that implies degree of design
complexity, another dimension of skill in team engagement, and a third dimension, by
which the categories are named, of an individual’s personal response to encountering
uncertainty. The categories follow the metaphor of a material’s increasing response to
stress: Brittle, Plastic, Tolerant, Robust, and Resilient. These categories provide
complementary insight into the necessity of building large and trusted teams of people as
part of an engineer’s strategy for designing complex systems with varied forms of
uncertainty.
The critical elements that participants identified in their design experiences allows
engineering educators to develop learning interventions to simultaneously enhance a
student’s understanding of designing complex systems and of strategically engaging in
teamwork. This study also supplies engineering educators with more detailed insight into
student’s possible emotional responses to uncertainty as they engage in designing
complex systems. Overall, the impact of this study is to equip educators and students to
take on the grand challenges of engineering design in more comprehensive ways.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1

Design in Aerospace Engineering Contexts

Engineering, while still including the engineering sciences, is increasingly
returning to design as the “art of engineering” (Seely, 1999). Design, an ABET outcome
(ABET, 2015), is considered an activity central to engineering (Dym, Agogino, Eris,
Frey, & Leifer, 2005; Simon, 1996). Researchers have shown that key features of design
problems are being ill-structured (Goel & Pirolli, 1992; D. H. Jonassen, 2000) and coevolving with the solution (Dorst & Cross, 2001). Engineers, therefore, need to be aware
of uncertainty and be capable of engaging in design amongst these realities.
Because of the scale and complexity of the projects, designing systems in
aerospace must be a team effort (Roth, 2007). Therefore, engineers in aerospace need to
have their “professional skills” developed, especially teamwork and communication that
are included in the ABET criteria (Shuman, Besterfield-Sacre, & McGourty, 2005).
Researchers have clearly identified design as a social process (Louis L Bucciarelli, 2003),
which means that the context of the design matters, including the intentions of the
designers and the culture of the users, and the boundaries between them being negotiable.
It also means that design is done in teams and often diverse and multidisciplinary teams.
Investigations into multidisciplinary teamwork in authentic design tasks may guide our
understanding of the social aspects of design (Adams, 2003; Austin-Breneman,

2
(Adams, 2003; Austin-Breneman, Honda, & Yang, 2012; Dym et al., 2005; K. Sheppard,
Dominick, & Aronson, 2004; Thom & Gerbracht, 2008). Especially, expert teams, but
not engineering teams, have been studied and their practices may guide our
understanding of professional teamwork (Ericsson, 2006) in Naturalistic DecisionMaking Environments (Ross, Shafer, & Klein, 2006).
Unfortunately, the aerospace engineering industry is difficult to study in situ
because of the projects’ large scales and complexities (Deshmukh & Collopy, 2010). The
aerospace engineering industry is constrained by the performance measures of safety,
technical, cost, and schedule (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2011).
These constraints are interdependent. At a deeper level, quality and performance can be
constrained by myriad technical parameters that may also be interdependent and contrary
to each other. Aerospace engineering design is fraught with technological limitations that
can be measured as cost and schedule limitations.
The aerospace industry is risk-averse and seeks to reduce risk and cost by
reducing uncertainty (Hamraz, Caldwell, & Clarkson, 2012). The term aerospace will be
used here to include aviation and space applications. Lately, the aerospace business has
taken a systems-of-systems approach to design (Bloebaum & Rivas McGowan, 2012;
DeLaurentis & Crossley, 2005; DeLaurentis, Crossley, & Mane, 2011; Lewis & Collopy,
2012) in order to decompose the design space and to integrate the solutions with
awareness of and planning for uncertainty resolution. Uncertainty plays a significant role
in design, especially in the aerospace industry.
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1.2

Experiencing Uncertainty in Design

Successfully managing uncertainty is a desirable professional skill, and it may
have several names. There is a distinct call in industry and academia alike for engineers
to be tolerant of ambiguity (Altman, 2012; Atman, Turns, & Sheppard, 2011; Crismond
& Adams, 2012; Goff & Terpenny, 2012; Koretsky, Kelly, & Gummer, 2011), to be
flexible (Committee on Developments in the Science of Learning, 2000; Daly, Adams, &
Bodner, 2012; Gorman et al., 2001; Walther, Kellam, Sochacka, & Radcliffe, 2011), and
to be adaptable (Atman, Kilgore, & McKenna, 2008; Committee on Developments in the
Science of Learning, 2000; Gorman et al., 2001; McKenna, 2007; Rayne et al., 2006;
Schwartz, Bransford, & Sears, 2005). These concepts appear to be in contrast to the
Piagetian human tendency to attempt to reduce uncertainty and non-equilibrium (Wankat
& Oreovicz, 1993). How do people, especially designers, move from wanting to reduce
uncertainty to being tolerant of uncertainty?
As the aerospace industry engages in designing Large Scale Complex Engineered
Systems, uncertainty must be confronted by the designers. In particular, Deshmukh and
Collopy (2010) posed fundamental research questions that this work explores:
“Investigation Area 2) Uncertainty and Decision-Making c) Where is the optimal balance
between gathering information to refine uncertainties and making a design decision with
already available information? ... Investigation Area 6) Research in Engineering
Education a) What are the key attributes of a successful engineer in the design of large
complex systems? How can an aspiring engineer acquire these attributes? and b) For
developing engineers, how effective is learning from failure? What is gained in learning
from success?”
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A path of exploration for these research questions is to investigate aerospace
engineers’ design and learning experiences. Previous work has investigated which ABET
outcomes are most important in the professional workforce, where teamwork, data
analysis, and problem solving were top results (Passow, 2012). Passow’s work asked the
questions using ABET outcome vocabulary, but did not ask about uncertainty. This
rigorous research study can shed light into both experiences and cognition of uncertainty
in particular, especially in the professional workforce. Understanding the relationship
between experiences and cognition can have an impact on the undergraduate curriculum
to help students develop these skills more efficiently through the development of
appropriate learning interventions.

1.2.1 Literature Overview
The literature review explores key topics: the context of aerospace engineering
design; the concept of uncertainty from multiple perspectives; and the development of
expertise in design. Here is a brief description of these three topics, and from these
topics, research questions were developed to explore the gaps in the current literature.
There is a small but growing body of literature stemming from recent conferences
and workshops on Large Scale Complex Engineered Systems in aerospace engineering
design (Bloebaum & Rivas McGowan, 2012; Lewis & Collopy, 2012; Rivas McGowan,
Seifert, & Papalambros, 2012). In particular, the authors note a propensity for the
aerospace industry to reduce risk through reducing uncertainty. However, more
knowledge may cost an unallowable amount of money and schedule to obtain. Is it worth
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the cost and schedule to pursue the knowledge? How do design engineers make
decisions in this environment? How do design engineers cope with uncertainty?
A definition of uncertainty is necessary because there are many perspectives, from
engineering (Van Bossuyt, Dong, Tumer, & Carvalho, 2013) to business (Herman,
Stevens, Bird, Mendenhall, & Oddou, 2010) to psychology (MacDonald, 1970; McLain,
1993) to communications (Bradac, 2001). Because of the specific context of aerospace
engineering, a taxonomy of uncertainty in Large Scale Complex Engineered Systems
(LCSES) will be employed here to define and classify forms of uncertainty in design
(Thunnissen, 2003). Mainly, there are four types of uncertainty in LCSES: ambiguity,
epistemic, aleatory, and interaction, which will be further explored in Section 1.4 and
Section 2.5. Because of an engineer’s likelihood of becoming specialized in a subject
relevant to aerospace businesses, an engineer may develop different levels of awareness
and responsibility for different forms or sources of uncertainty as they progress through
their careers, assume different roles, acquire experience and develop expertise..
The development of expertise and the difference between novices and experts
have been studied in various disciplines and contexts, including physics problem solving,
chess, and design (M. Chi, Glaser, & Rees, 1982; M. T. H. Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser,
1981; Ericsson, 2006). The Engineering Education Research Handbook (Johri & Olds,
2014) qualitatively describes students (presumably novices) as having a fear of
uncertainty and expert designers as having the willingness to manage uncertainty, which
seem to be start and end points but it does not provide a path for moving from start to
end. Additionally, Skill Theory (Fischer, 1980) suggests a gradual development of skill
through tasks that require the intercoordination of lower level skills. But there does not
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appear to be an investigation into the experiences and tasks that induced expert designers
to develop the skill to manage uncertainty.

1.2.2 Research Questions
Within the context of design of Large Scale Complex Engineered Systems in
aerospace engineering, there are a multitude of forms of uncertainty that designers may or
may not encounter. Designers may have developed strategies for managing different
types of uncertainty, especially as designers have moved from academia to the workforce.
The primary research questions for this study are:
1. What are the qualitatively different ways that engineers in aerospace businesses
experience uncertainty in design decisions?
2. How do aerospace design engineers develop successful uncertainty management
skills?

1.3

Purpose of Study

The purpose of this study is to investigate the lived experiences of aerospace
engineers who practice design in order to understand how they experience, address, and
manage different types of uncertainty. While there are varied ways designers address and
manage uncertainty, it is reasonable to expect that there are a finite number of ways in
which uncertainty in design decisions is experienced. Identifying and categorizing these
ways is a first step in understanding the progression from novice to expert and the second
step is to develop approaches to promote an engineer’s development toward expertise.
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This study gives voice to working professionals across a spectrum of years of experience
in design, corporations, and responsibility for decision-making.
Within the aerospace industry, there are decision-makers who have made
judgment calls and have seen the consequences of those decisions, even though the
situations were full of uncertainty from multiple sources. It is imperative to include
engineers who have decision-making authority in design and who have been identified by
peers as good designers. Peer identification of being a good designer, including being
promoted to decision-making roles, implies that those decisions had desirable
consequences and that the designer’s behaviors include some measure of successful
management of uncertainty. For maximum variation of understanding skill development,
lesser-experienced engineers were also included.
This research employed developmental phenomenography (Bowden & Green,
2005), a qualitative approach, to understand the variation of how professionals
experience uncertainty in their careers as decision-makers. Participants were identified
through chain sampling. Data was collected in semi-structured interviews, and a whole
transcript was the unit of analysis. Categories of the transcripts compose the outcome
space of results. The attributes of the outcome space are parsimony, logical relationships,
and simplicity.
While the outcomes may not represent a universal truth, the outcomes are
educationally useful. The three corners of the triangle, research, practice, and instruction,
employed with express intent of having each one inform the others, provide a firm
foundation and a practical use for the results of this study. This research will link
professional practice to instruction.
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1.4

Overview of Experiencing Uncertainty

The key concept in this study is uncertainty, further defined in Section 2.1.
Uncertainty can be classified in complex systems as ambiguity (imprecise vocabulary
terms and expressions), interaction (unanticipated interaction of many events and/or
disciplines), aleatory (cannot be reduced with more knowledge; frequently represented as
a probability distribution), and epistemic (can be reduced with more knowledge)
(Thunnissen, 2003). The experience of uncertainty will be framed in the context of
making design decisions in aerospace applications. Because there are many identified
forms of uncertainty and possibly coupled management strategies, it is prudent to include
engineers who have experienced multiple types of uncertainty in multiple projects.
Criteria for maximum variation in sampling of the population include the
participants’ professional responsibilities within the larger scheme of their employers’
relationships to one another. First, the participants have various education backgrounds,
various career trajectories, and various work responsibilities. The participants’ gender,
race, and national origin may also affect their awareness of uncertainty. To the extent
that participants report the effects of these variables, their experience will be included.
Second, the context of aerospace design, namely, system-of-systems, introduces a
criterion for variation. Systems-of-systems considers the companies working aerospace
projects as having various levels within systems-of-systems, such as a raw material
supplier, a subsystem supplier, an airframe integrator, or a primary operator, labeled
“Base, C, B, A, and OES” (Talley & Mavris, 2008). The level at which a company
operates implies different priorities in costs, qualities, and schedules, which in turn may
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become an uncertainty for others at different levels. These criteria from Talley and
Mavris will be identified in the data collection efforts.

1.5

Educational Implications

The foremost contribution of this study is the clear description of actual practices
and behaviors in managing uncertainty in the context of the aerospace engineering design
industry. Up to now, literature proposes ideal design process models with intent to
generalize (Dubberly, 2005; Ullman, 2003), or investigates actual practices and behaviors
of designers outside of aerospace engineering because of limited access for researchers.
The aerospace industry has distinguishing characteristics and its own culture that make
applying generalized models problematic. Aerospace merits its own investigation to
better inform the field and the pathways for students pursuing studies toward this field.
This description will provide aerospace engineering instructors a vocabulary to describe
to students the industry that eagerly awaits them.
A second contribution of this study is the investigation of content and tasks that
may move students from a fear of uncertainty to some greater level of confidence to
persevere in design in the face of uncertainty. From this foundation, content and tasks
can be aligned in order to create interventions and learning modules for the
undergraduate curriculum, whether it is in a design course or in an engineering science
course or some combination and sequence of both. This investigation will tell where
certain tasks and experiences belong.
A third contribution of this study is the future operationalization of management
of uncertainty in order to be measured quantitatively. This study may reveal indicators
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for which a scale can be developed specifically for management of uncertainty within an
engineering design context. This will be qualitatively different from the scales developed
in other disciplines such as psychology and business management (MacDonald 1970,
McLain 1993, Herman et al. 2010). This leads to future research questions:
1. How can an aerospace engineering student’s management of uncertainty in design
decisions be measured?
2. What are effective interventions and classroom modules that increase an aerospace
engineering student’s ability to manage uncertainty in making design decisions?

Primarily, this work focuses on the professional formation of undergraduates, a
topic of national interest (Douglas, 2015). The undergraduate curriculum benefits by
staying up to date with industry practices. Undergraduates have the opportunity to be
more prepared for the competitive high-stakes workforce. They have the opportunity to
practice difficult aspects of design. They have an opportunity to understand the
workforce they are about to enter. Industry gains new employees who are potentially
more flexible, more adaptable, who manage uncertainty well, who tolerate ambiguity
well, and who make evidence-based design decisions.
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

The Cambridge Handbook of Engineering Education Research (Johri & Olds,
2014) and the Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance (Ericsson,
2006) summarize the state of research in those areas and provide key researchers to
review. This framing bounds the investigation of expert decision-making behaviors of
individuals and organizations in real-life situations full of uncertainty. Firstly, the
handbooks describe at a high level how experts behave and think individually inside and
outside of an engineering design context. Secondly, the expertise handbook describes
qualitatively the characteristics of expert teams in Emergency Management roles, usually
in High Reliability Organizations (HROs) such as medical emergency rooms and aircraft
carriers (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). Lastly, these handbooks note a significant need for:
1. An investigation into the context of Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) in which
uncertainty plays a major role (Ross et al., 2006)
2. A comparison of workplace practices to undergraduate work practices.

Table 1.5.1 below shows the themes that I explored in pursuit of understanding
the scope of relevant published research. For clarity, these themes are divided into
categories of context, social process, decisions, skills, and learning. The following
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sections of this chapter provide details of the most relevant results of this literature
review (highlighted in bold italics in Table 1.5.1), identifying relevant results to date, key
areas for future research and unanswered questions. The unanswered questions identified
become the research questions that guide this study.

Table 1.5.1 Classification of themes and key concepts for this study.
Context
Large Scale
Complex
Engineering
Systems
Aero

Social Process
Expert Teams

Decisions
Naturalistic
Decision
Making

Skills
Manage
Uncertainty

Learning
Skill Theory

Narrative

Engineering
Design
Aerospace
Design
Aeronautical
Design
Aviation

Sense-making

Decision
Making
Decision
Theory
Utility Theory

Deal with
uncertainty
Uncertainty

Piagetian
Constructivism
Expertise

Ambiguity

Information
Value Theory
Expected Value
Theory

Tolerance for
Ambiguity
Flexibility

Mechanical
Design
High Reliability
Organizations

Social Learning
Theory
Community of
Practice

Project-based
Learning
Case-based
learning
Cognitive
Flexibility
Theory
Aerospace
Education

Systems-ofsystems

Attribution
Theory

Organization
Theory
Myers Briggs
Type Indicator
Social
Constructivism

2.1

Intelligent Real- Adaptable
Time Design
Decision-based Evaluation
Conceptual
Design
Competing
Assess Risk
Values
Framework

Definitions and Sources of Uncertainty

Uncertainty has different definitions and applications to different disciplines;
therefore, acknowledgment of definitions specific to aerospace engineering design is
necessary for this study. Uncertainty (Thunnissen, 2003) can be classified in complex
systems as ambiguity (imprecise vocabulary terms and expressions), interaction
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(unanticipated interaction of many events and/or disciplines), aleatory (cannot be reduced
with more knowledge; frequently represented as a probability distribution), and epistemic
(can be reduced with more knowledge). Epistemic uncertainty is further classified as
model (approximation errors, programming errors, and numerical errors), behavioral
(design, requirement, volitional, and human errors), and phenomenological (attempt to
extend the ‘state of the art’). Thunnissen’s taxonomy is reproduced in Figure 2.1.1
below. These classifications provide key framing for understanding designers’
experiences with uncertainty.

Figure 2.1.1 Reproduction of Figure 14 Uncertainty Classification for the Design and
Development of Complex Systems (Thunnissen, 2003).
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Some sources of uncertainty have been identified in previous research which also
fit into Thunnissen’s taxonomy. Uncertainty represented mathematically is common
(Fellin, Lessman, Oberguggenberger, & Vieider, 2005). Design as a social process
(Louis L. Bucciarelli, 1994), particularly in engaging multiple perspectives (Rayne et al.,
2006), could be classified as interaction. Design and engineering thinking can be
decidedly nonverbal (Hegarty, 2004) and visual representations can be ambiguous
(Eppler, Mengis, & Bresciani, 2008). Verbal communication at a global level (Downey
et al., 2006; K. Sheppard et al., 2004), at an ethical level (Van Bossuyt et al., 2013), and
at a review and critique level (Cardella, Buzzanell, Cummings, Tolbert, & Zoltowski,
2014) can be ambiguous. Management of ethical uncertainty may include maintaining
the ambiguity instead of simplifying the cases (D. H. Jonassen et al., 2009). Because of
the inclusiveness of Thunnissen’s taxonomy, I selected this construct for describing
uncertainty in aerospace design.

2.2

Context: Design Environments

There are several ways of viewing the aerospace industry and examples that
follow. While the focus is aerospace engineering, it may be reasonable to apply these
concepts, skills, and behaviors to other engineering disciplines. This section highlights
key views and accompanying vocabulary that will be used throughout my work.
Firstly, a Systems-of-Systems view to the aerospace industry provides context for
decision-making based on different company priorities, norms, customers, and suppliers
(DeLaurentis & Crossley, 2005; DeLaurentis et al., 2011; Talley & Mavris, 2008). One
macroscopic view of systems-of-systems includes the attributes of “physically distributed
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systems, prime dependency of overall functionality on linkages between distributed
systems, and system heterogeneity, especially the inclusion of sentient systems”
(Delaurentis & Callaway, 2004), where a single aircraft may be seen as the  level. A
second view will be used here, from Talley and Mavris (2008) to describe various
companies within the hierarchy. At the top are Operational Environment and Scenario
(OES) operators. The intermediate levels could be airframe integrators (A level),
powerplant integrators (B level), and subsystem integrators (C level), whose customers
are each other and the OES operators. The base level (D level) could be suppliers to the
B and C level operators. It is reasonable to assume that aerospace engineers have an
awareness of their relative location within the hierarchy of suppliers, may have been
employed at several different levels over their careers, and may have reflected on
encountering and managing the effects of different company cultures.
A second view of the aerospace engineering industry is the research-informed
concept of Naturalistic Decision Making as a way of describing “the real world”
workplace environment. Key elements of a Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM)
environment include: ill-structured problems, uncertain dynamic environments, shifting
and competing goals, action/feedback loops, time stress, high stakes, multiple players,
and organizational goals and norms (Ericsson, 2006). The aerospace engineering design
environment has all the elements of an NDM environment. Understanding the details and
nuances of these activities in the workplace will be the first step to making a comparison
of workplace and classroom practices. Ultimately, the aerospace engineering design
business strives to resolve uncertainties in order to positively affect their cost and
schedule requirements, especially to avoid failure, rework, and rebuild costs.
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A prime example of research in the aerospace design environment is an
investigation of cross-disciplinary teamwork in the Mars Expedition Rover during the
first 90 Martian days of the mission (Paletz, Schunn, & Kim, 2013). Four researchers
visited the site and captured 400 hours of video data of operations and conversations.
This work uses the high-stakes dynamic environment to explore the use of analogy with
multiple players from multiple disciplines. Analogy by itself is ambiguous (Ball &
Christensen, 2009), thereby introducing uncertainty in communication to uncertainty of
the function and performance of the Mars Rover. This work shows there is a tangential
relationship of their research questions on analogy to my research questions on
uncertainty, and provides insight on the large volume of data that could be collected by
observation of a large scale project.
A third view of aerospace concerns Large Scale Complex Engineered Systems
(LSCES) that require explicit design methodologies in order to be successful (Bloebaum
& Rivas McGowan, 2012; Lewis & Collopy, 2012; Rivas McGowan et al., 2012). One
assumption is that the industry can reduce risk and therefore reduce cost by reducing
uncertainty (Hamraz et al., 2012). Adherence to a design process or method may identify
sources of uncertainty and methods to resolution before rather than after a failure.
Several design methodologies merit mention, since participants may borrow vocabulary
and concepts from these methodologies as they describe their experiences.
One methodology called Robust Design attempts to account for uncertainties and
communicate the associated risks to decision-making parties (Talley & Mavris, 2008).
Originally Robust Design was experimental and focused on obtaining consistently
manufactured parts (Park, Lee, Lee, & Hwang, 2006). The method separates controllable
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from uncontrollable factors that influence the outcome of the process. Uncontrollable
factors are considered as noise to the process, and controllable factors are adjusted to
counteract the effects of noise by designers to obtain the desired output. Robust Design
has been expanded to capture the effect of multiple decision-makers negotiating tradeoffs in design (Kalsi, Hacker, & Lewis, 2001). The design method was once focused on
tangible parts but has now been applied to the people that participate in the design and
production of those parts.
A second design methodology, Design for Six Sigma, part of Total Quality
Management, is popular for aerospace businesses with high volume manufacturing
(McCarty, Daniels, Bremer, & Gupta, 2005). DFSS provides a toolbox for teams of
engineers to gather data and create solutions in prescribed design phases. The Six Sigma
title refers to the statistical standard deviation, where the output of the process is within
specifications out to the sixth standard deviation, or 3.4 defects per million opportunities.
There is a clear emphasis in this design methodology to eliminate mistakes and sources of
deviation, especially in high volume production. High-volume low-error production, or
lean production, may be relevant to some aerospace companies, such as fastener or raw
material suppliers, and may not be as relevant to airframe and powerplant integrators,
depending on the mindset of their leadership team.
A third methodology, Systems Engineering Design, employs probability and
statistics to represent risk (Green et al., 2006; National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, 2011). In particular, NASA emphasizes continuous risk management in
the hands of informed decision makers, stakeholders, and Subject Matter Experts. The
use of probability and statistics implies quantifying risks to compare to performance
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measures. To that end, many methods and tools have been developed to model and
quantify uncertainties (Nikolaidis, Mourelatos, & Pandey, 2011). The general view, then,
is that emphasis has been placed further developing models for forms of uncertainty that
can be quantified. I expect to see the use of risk as an indicator of uncertainty among my
participants.

2.3

Design as a Social Process: Expert Teams

It is significant to practice teamwork at the undergraduate level because it is an
engineering industry reality (D. Jonassen, Strobel, & Lee, 2006). Because aerospace
design of complex systems is a team effort (Dym et al., 2005; S. Sheppard & Jenison,
1997; Thom & Gerbracht, 2008; Wellington, Thomas, Powell, & Clarke, 2002),
successful team behaviors must be explored. Teams are distinct from mere groups in that
teams have goal interdependence, resource interdependence, and member
interdependence in order to succeed (Adams, 2003). While there is a tendency among
engineering students to foster friendships and study groups (Godfrey & Parker, 2010),
friendship alone does not constitute a team. Therefore, educators should provide students
an opportunity to practice interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary teamwork in authentic
design tasks (Austin-Breneman et al., 2012; Borrego, Karlin, McNair, & Beddoes, 2013;
Cooke, Gorman, & Winner, 2007; Fu, Cagan, & Kotovsky, 2010; Hsiung, 2012; Jensen
& Wood, 2003). Next I explore relevant research on teamwork outside of engineering
that may be applied to aerospace engineering.
The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance (Ericsson, 2006)
provides insight into expert team behaviors based on several research methods. The three
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most common research data collection methods are: observations in the field, simulation,
and self-report. Further explanation of research data collection methods relevant to this
study can be found in Section 3.10.3. Key behaviors of expert teams (military,
manufacturing business, aviation flight crews, and healthcare, but engineering design
teams are noticeably absent) are summarized from many research publications in Table
25.1 of the handbook, reproduced in Table 2.3.1 below. Some key desirable items here
for the aerospace business include “make fewer errors”, “make better decisions”, and
“greater chance of mission success”, which are driven by having these nine behaviors
listed in bold font.

Table 2.3.1 Reproduction of Table 25.1. Expert team performance effective processes
and outcomes in (Ericsson, 2006).
Expert Teams . . .
Hold shared mental models
They have members who anticipate each other.
They can communicate without the need to communicate overtly.
Optimize resources by learning and adapting
They are self-correcting.
They compensate for each other.
They reallocate functions.
Have clear roles and responsibilities
They manage expectations.
They have members who understand each others’ roles and how they fit together.
They ensure team member roles are clear but not overly rigid.
Have a clear, valued, and shared vision
They have a clear and common purpose.
Engage in a cycle or discipline of prebrief → performance → debrief
They regularly provide feedback to each other, both individually and as a team.
They establish and revise team goals and plans.
They differentiate between higher and lower priorities.
They have mechanisms for anticipating and reviewing issues/ problems of members.
The periodically diagnose team “effectiveness,” including its results, its processes, and its
vitality (morale, retention, energy).
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Table 2.3.1 continued.
Have strong team leadership
They are led by someone with good leadership skills and not just technical competence.
They have team members who believe the leaders care about them.
They provide situation updates.
They foster teamwork, coordination, and cooperation.
They self-correct first.
Develop a strong sense of “collective,” trust, teamness, and confidence
They manage conflict well; team members confront each other effectively.
They have a strong sense of team orientation.
They trust other team members’ “intentions.” They strongly believe in the team’s collective
ability to succeed.
They develop collective efficacy.
Manage and optimize performance outcomes
They make fewer errors.
They communicate often “enough”; they ensure that fellow team members have the
information they need to be able to contribute.
They make better decisions.
They have a greater chance of mission success.
Cooperate and coordinate
They identify teamwork and task work requirements.
They ensure that, through staffing and/ or development, the team possesses the right mix of
competencies.
They consciously integrate new team members.
They distribute and assign work thoughtfully.
They examine and adjust the team’s physical workplace to optimize communication and
coordination.

The key behavior or skill relevant to this study from the above expert teams is
“make better decisions”. But how are those decisions are developed, presented, and
executed? It is especially important to consider teaming as a factor in design because,
according to Thunnissen’s uncertainty taxonomy, teaming may introduce ambiguity and
interaction forms of uncertainty to the design decision; expert teams’ behaviors listed
above may be strategies for managing uncertainty introduced by teaming. Also, what
constitutes “better” decisions and how does an individual person or an engineer become
better at making decisions?
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2.4

Expertise of Decision-making in Design Environments

A key cognitive process in good engineering design is decision-making and
justifying those decisions with evidence (Crismond & Adams, 2012). Dorst (2004, 2011;
Lawson, 2009) presents the Dreyfus model of expertise in six to eight categories and
summarizes the approaches to design practice associated with each category, shown in
Table 2.4.1 below. The approaches to design practice may be considered here as the
manner in which decisions are made by an individual designer. This research may add a
fourth column to Table 2.4.1 with specific treatment of uncertainty as a function of level
of expertise.

Table 2.4.1 Levels of design expertise, adapted from Dorst (2004, 2011).
Level of Expertise
Naïve
Novice

Approach to Design Practice
Choice based
Convention based

Advanced Beginner

Situation based

Competent

Strategy based

(Proficient)
Expert

Experience based

Master

Create new schemata

Visionary

Redefine field

Approach to Design Practice Description
Consider objective features of situation,
follow strict rules from experts
Situational aspects important, sensitivity
to exceptions to ‘hard rules’
Emotional attachment, trial-and-error,
learning and reflecting, selects relevant
elements, makes plan
Immediately see most important issues,
appropriate plan, reasons what to do
Respond intuitively, perform appropriate
action straightaway
Dwell on success and failure, acute
sense of context, openness to subtle cues
New ways of doing things, new
definitions of the issues, operating on
margins of domain, paying attention to
other domains

Atman and other researchers (2007; 1999) have examined individual designers at
first year undergraduate, senior year undergraduate, and practicing engineers with greater
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than ten years’ experience and peer identification as an expert in design. They compared
five themes across the participants’ age demographic using an individually-executed
design problem for a playground. Key differences include the experts spending more
time than students in problem scoping and in gathering information, but not statistically
different in developing alternative solutions or in solution quality. The relevance of these
studies to this study are a tendency among experts to delay a decision until there is
sufficient information and the time on task required (ten years) to develop expertise as
noted by peers.
It is appropriate to acknowledge “bad” decision-making and mitigation strategies
in an aviation flight crew context as well for completeness’ sake. Flight trainers have
summarized and disseminated research work in psychology to help pilots acknowledge
their unconscious biases and make more objective and safer decisions (Benson, 2015).
Possible culprits of bad decisions include: illusory superiority (overconfidence), optimism
bias (having previous successes elsewhere) and confirmation bias (ignoring data that
contradicts a decision). Therefore, risk mitigation strategies include: a two person signoff (reciprocal arrangement with an uninvolved but informed person), explicit risk
assessment tools (numerical matrices and checklists, for example), and a personal
minimums checklist, individualized to that decision-maker’s aptitude and context. These
same decision traps apply to engineers (National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
2011) and therefore a similar toolbox to mitigate bad decision-making in design may be
necessary.
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2.5

Skills: Managing Uncertainty

Managing uncertainty in design thinking is a necessary skill (Dym et al., 2005)
among many. Good systems designers are characterized by thinking about system
dynamics, reasoning about uncertainty, making estimates, and conducting experiments.
Good designers tolerate ambiguity as part of divergent-convergent thinking. They think
as part of a team. They communicate in several languages of design, including
verbal/textual, graphical, shape grammars, features, mathematical/analytical models, and
numbers. Good designers especially maintain sight of the big picture of systems design
and systems thinking. Therefore, the use of the adjective “good” implies some distinct
level of expertise in design, and by extension, some distinct level of expertise in
reasoning about uncertainty.
In one example of different levels of skill in managing uncertainty, recent
engineering education research has identified management of ambiguity as a facet of
experience of design. In a phenomenographic context, the role of ambiguity in design
may start as something to be eliminated, then something that is acknowledged as part of
design, up to something welcome in design (Daly, 2008). The research results show that
increasing acceptance of ambiguity is a theme with increasing experience of design;
results are shown in Table 2.5.1 below. These results were generated across disciplines
within and without engineering; design within the engineering discipline is the more
pertinent topic, but these results are still useful as another model of increasing awareness
and management of uncertainty.
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Table 2.5.1 Reproduction of Table 4.4 in Design Across Disciplines (Daly, 2008).
Category

Role of Problem

Category 1:
evidence-based
decision-making

It is set by
someone else;
there is no
flexibility
Problem is set by
someone else or
self, but the
designer
discovers and
adds new
problems to be
solved along the
way
Problem is
loosely set at
“start” and
developed by the
designer and
stakeholders
along the way

Category 2:
organized
translation
Category 3:
personal
synthesis
Category 4:
intentional
progression
Category 5:
Directed creative
exploration

Category 6:
Freedom

Designer
develops a
problem to be
solved

Role of
Ambiguity
Gather data to
eliminate
ambiguity

Task endpoint

Goal of outcome

When evidence
supports decisions
the best

the best solution

Tolerant but
seeks to
overcome where
possible

When the solution
achieves the goal
and is satisfactory
for all parties
involved
When the
intention has been
fulfilled

Something that
works

Just part of
design

When it can be
built upon

Something that
can be built upon

An opportunity
for new paths

When
applications, new
paths, and
frameworks for
guiding future
work are evident
Only when
someone else
takes it over; it
always evolves
when it is with the
designer

Something of
value for others

Tolerant

Cultivates it;
transforms
constraints to
freedoms

Achieve goal
and expand
repertoire

Something with
meaning for
oneself or others

In a second example of different skills in managing uncertainty, within NDM
environments, particularly studying military officers, researchers found a set of coping
strategies for uncertainty (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). These tactics fall into five larger
categories: reduction, forestalling, assumption-based reasoning, weighing pros and cons,
and suppression. They conclude that different coping strategies accompany different
types of uncertainty. However, they do not make assertions about decision expertise
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favoring certain strategies over others. Coping strategies may be considered a synonym
for managing uncertainty.
If there are different levels of skill in managing uncertainty, then there is likely a
way to quantify or measure skill level. Older research in psychology situates ambiguity
in social situations mostly and somewhat in problem-solving situations in order to create
a scale for quantifying tolerance (MacDonald, 1970; McLain, 1993). Newer scales for
tolerance for ambiguity have been developed in business and have been operationalized
as valuing diverse others, coping with change, managing conflicting perspectives, and
dealing with unfamiliar situations (Herman et al., 2010). Aerospace engineering design
businesses are still businesses, so Herman’s scale may be useful. Related scales are being
developed to measure risk attitudes (Van Bossuyt et al., 2013). However, to focus on
design, development of a scale for tolerance for ambiguity in engineering design would
requires this study’s investigation of aerospace-specific content and context first.

2.6

Theories of Learning and Development of Skills

If management of uncertainty is considered a skill, then Skill Theory (Fischer,
1980) can describe the development of these skills in pursuit of answers to the future
research questions of this work. In particular, Skill Theory asserts that a skill is
developed only if the environment induces the learner to use the relevant content in a
task, which is a Piagetian concept. Skill development is gradual and continuous. Skills
can be hierarchically arranged because higher level skills require the mastery of lower
level skills. Key vocabulary of Skill Theory is shown in Table 2.6.1 below.
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Table 2.6.1 Key concepts of Skill Theory.
Keyword
Skill
Level
Set

Definition
Unit of behavior composed of one or more sets
Skill structure of gradually increasing complexity
Collection of things (cognition, action, and object that is part of the
environment)
Structure relating two sets
Relation between two subdivided sets
Relation between two systems

Map
System
System of
Systems
Tier
Skills of vastly different types
Sensory-Motor Actions or perceptions on things or events in the world
Representation Simple properties of objects, events, or people; independent of
person’s immediate actions
Intangible attributes that characterize broad categories of objects,
Abstract
events, or people
Intercoordination How the person combines skills to develop from level to level
Compounding
Microdevelopmental transformation to combine two skills at a level
into a more complex skill at the same level
Focusing
Moment-to-moment change in behavior commonly called attention
Substitution
When a person attempts to transfer a skill at level to a similar task,
changing one component of the task
Differentiation
When a person separates into distinct subsets something that was
initially a single set
Uncertainty is abstract. According to Skill Theory, the abstract tier of skills is
likely to be domain-specific, so it is the responsibility of the educators within the domain
to discover the hierarchical arrangement of the skills through research. The practitioners
and educators in the domain must uncover the content, the task, and the logical
arrangement of these items for students. A generic representation of the outcome space is
shown in Figure 2.6.1 below, where Fischer’s original representation is in the bottom left
corner and the center and right columns have been added for completeness.
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Figure 2.6.1 Fischer's Skill Theory: basic notation and visual metaphor of cycles.

Level VII is the starting point for Engineering Education research. Fischer
describes the concept of conservation as first being understood by an individual at this
level. For white middle-class Americans, Level VII thinking starts to appear in the early
high school years. These are not hard and fast rules of human cognitive development,
however; it has been shown that it is possible to have concrete learners as first year
college students (Kalman, 2007). As an example of abstract thinking, “At Level 7, single
abstract sets, a person can for the first time construct abstract identity skills”, such as
relating a father identity to a career identity as a psychologist. He also states “Levels 7 to
10 include moral judgment, the managerial skills… skills required to write an effective
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essay… skills involved in programming and operating a computer” so engineering
sciences and engineering design fit in these higher abstract levels.
The transformation rules “predict specific sequences of development”, which
makes the theory exceptionally useful to Engineering Education research. Fischer found
five but acknowledges that there may be more if future research suggests it. The
transformation rules are represented in the bottom right of Figure 2.6.1, where the vertical
arrow represents macrodevelopmental transformations and the horizontal arrows
represent microdevelopmental transformations. Developmental change may occur in
spurts, with rapid change at the beginning and slower change as the level has been
developed, not unlike product development S-curves (Ullman, 2003).
Several concepts favored in Engineering Education are present in Skill Theory.
Situated Cognition (Brown, Collins, & Duguid, 1989; Orgill, 2007) is a research
theoretical framework that overlaps Skill Theory’s emphasis on task and content as
having a direct impact on which skills are induced to be developed. “Abstract systemsof-systems” is Level 10 in Skill Theory, which is very similar vocabulary to aerospace as
systems-of-systems and global thinking. Like Vygotsky’s Zone of Proximal
Development (Vygotsky, 1986), “the person must initially have the skills required for
application of the transformation and must be capable of applying the transformation
rules to those skills” in order to develop the next higher skill. This is significant because
it may provide clues on why the abstract systems-of-systems skill of managing
uncertainty in design decisions is difficult or why it may take 10 years to develop.
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2.7

Summary

The aerospace design industry, a system-of-systems hierarchy, produces products
and services that operate in or are Large Scale Complex Engineered Systems.
Uncertainty is ever present from multiple sources and is often operationalized by risk.
Engineers in industry must have awareness of uncertainty and successful strategies for
managing uncertainty in order to reduce risk to some socially-constructed acceptable
level. Managing uncertainty and making decisions are necessary cognitive skills in
design, and there is, at the moment, a binary spectrum of “bad” to “good” skill level.
Skill Theory, built on Piaget’s constructivism theoretical framework, asserts that abstract
skills can be learned by intercoordinating lower level skills through the performance of a
particular task in a particular environment. Skills will vary because of various tasks and
environments. Skills may even be distributed across a team instead of simply within an
individual. But the particular tasks in particular environments (Johri & Olds, 2011) that
specifically develop an increasing awareness of and tolerance of uncertainty as it impacts
decision-making are not yet well investigated.

2.8

Research Questions

The existing literature cites many works examining design and uncertainty, but
there are gaps. There are models of negotiating uncertainty in social situations, but not
specific to the aerospace context as a unique culture. There are descriptions of the
context of the aerospace business and Naturalistic Decision Making, but not specifically
focused on managing uncertainty. There are descriptions of types of uncertainty in
aerospace applications, but not accompanying management strategies. There are
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descriptions of levels of design expertise, but missing the element of managing
uncertainty per level. There are models of learning, but not specific to learning to
manage uncertainty. To fill these gaps and provide a framework to inform curricula and
professional development programs, this research seeks to address these two primary
research questions:
1. What are the qualitatively different ways that engineers in aerospace businesses
experience uncertainty in design decisions?
2. How do aerospace design engineers develop successful uncertainty management
skills?

The first set of questions above seeks to stratify the phenomenon of managing
uncertainty in aerospace applications. The implication of having increasing levels of
successful management of uncertainty implies that the skill can be learned and
developed. Development implies the need for assessment to prove attainment of a level.
Therefore, future research questions include:
3. How can Skill Theory be applied to engineering learning environments?
4. What are effective interventions and classroom modules that increase an aerospace
engineering student’s ability to manage uncertainty in making design decisions?
5. How can an aerospace engineering student’s management of uncertainty in design
decisions be measured?
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CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY:
PHENOMENOGRAPHY

In this work, theoretical framework is akin to Kuhn’s (1996) paradigm that
guides the construction of the research questions, the data collection methods, and the
analysis of a study (Bodner & Orgill, 2007). The theoretical framework informs the
methodology (Case & Light, 2011), which is composed of the data collection methods
and analysis of the data. A conceptual framework is defined in this work as the
definition, description, and attributes of a concept or phenomenon under investigation,
such as uncertainty as described by Thunnissen in Chapter 2.1. In other words, it is
possible to investigate the conceptual framework of uncertainty using several theoretical
frameworks, depending on how the research question is written and which attributes are
the most important to study.
The following sections highlight the philosophical stance, goals, and
accompanying methodologies and methods of several theoretical frameworks. The focus
of this work is the Australian tradition of phenomenography as the theoretical framework
of choice.

3.1

Comparison of Candidate Frameworks

There are several theoretical frameworks that could be employed in pursuit of an
answer to the general research questions from Deshmukh (2010) in Section 1.2:
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ethnography (Creswell, 2008), phenomenology (Bodner & Orgill, 2007; Patton, 2002),
and phenomenography (Bodner & Orgill, 2007; Bowden & Green, 2005; Marton, 1986).
The most appropriate framework would be sensitive to the attributes of uncertainty in
design decisions as presented in the literature review. The attributes of interest are:
development of the skill of managing uncertainty over time, variation of experience with
uncertainty, operating in a Naturalistic Decision Making environment, and designing
Large Scale Complex Engineered Systems. Table 3.1.1 below shows a summary
comparison of the most likely frameworks and their sensitivity to the research question’s
attributes. The shadowed boxes in the table represent a mismatch.

Table 3.1.1 Candidate theoretical frameworks mapped to research question attributes.
Attribute
Development of skill
over time
Variation of
experience of
uncertainty
Naturalistic decisionmaking environment

Large Scale Complex
Engineered Systems

Theoretical Framework
Ethnography
Oriented towards
beliefs rather than
skills
Typically focus on a
group’s shared
experience
Well-suited to
describe the culture
of aerospace in situ
(observations in the
field)
Well-suited to
describe the
important artifacts of
aerospace as part of
the culture

Phenomenology
Well-suited to
describe a lived
experience
Goal is to find a
single common
meaning of an
experience
Well-suited to
describe a lived
experience (selfreport)
Well-suited to
describe the
important artifacts of
aerospace as part of
the phenomenon

Phenomenography
Well-suited to
describe a lived
experience
Well-suited to
account for variation
Deep, open interview
allows for reflection
on environment
(simulation and/or
self-report)
Deep, open interview
allows for reflection
on LSCES

The primary goal of ethnography is to describe a culture’s behaviors and beliefs,
and researchers have argued that the workplace is a culture worthy of investigation.
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Ethnography has been employed to study the role of ambiguity and uncertainty in the
progress of design (Louis L. Bucciarelli, 1994). Ethnography has been useful in studying
the physical sciences and engineering as well (Case & Light, 2011; Coley, Houseman, &
Roy, 2007; Dym et al., 2005; Latour & Woolgar, 1986; Rivas McGowan et al., 2012;
Tonso, 2006). The aerospace business can be considered a unique culture, having a riskaverse attitude, having a shared language centered on aviation activities, and having a
shared belief in the importance of teaming. However, its strength is identifying a
common belief that transcends time, so it is not a suitable method for capturing individual
learning through varied experiences.
Phenomenology primarily seeks to find a common essence in lived experience
(Bodner & Orgill, 2007; Patton, 2002). A key element of selecting participants is that the
participant did indeed experience the phenomenon under study. The primary objective is
to find a common experience (the thing itself). In this work, the thing itself is uncertainty
as described by Thunnissen’s uncertainty taxonomy. Phenomenology is not well-suited
to describing various experiences of the participants, where variation originates from
organism, environment, and task as Skill Theory in Section 2.6 proposes.
Phenomenography accounts primarily for variation in experience by uncovering
the relation between the participant and the phenomenon (Bowden & Green, 2005). The
basic premise is that there are limited number of qualitatively different ways that a
phenomenon can be understood or experienced (Marton, 1986). The interpreter of the
phenomenon is the participant, not the researcher. In order to solicit a variety of
experiences and to allow all relevant voices to be heard (National Commission for the
Proptection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 1978), a highly
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varied sampling of participants is necessary. With a proper semi-structured interview, the
participant can unveil the environment, the products, and the processes of their
professional experiences. The creation of hierarchical categories as part of the analysis
may uncover the development of the skill of managing uncertainty. Therefore,
phenomenography is the most suitable theoretical framework for the research questions
in Section 2.8.
Phenomenography suggests a logical relationship among outcomes (typically a
hierarchy) and Skill Theory suggests a hierarchical relationship of skills.
Phenomenography is aimed at application to education; Skill Theory is also for the
benefit of education. The human experience of developing the skill of management of
uncertainty is likely varied, due at least in part to the varied nature of uncertainty in
engineering design and decision-making. In other words, the idea of experience may
include but is not limited to the variety and quantity of uncertainty in design, and may
also include an engineer’s various management strategies. Phenomenography involves
semi-structured interviewing as the primary data collection method. The trade-off for
long observations in the field or short observations around a problem-solving task then is
open, deep interviewing as the data collection method.

3.2

Key Concepts in Phenomenography

The assumptions and the goals of phenomenography align with the assumptions
and goals of this work. Phenomenography is purely qualitative and non-experimental.
Correct and mistaken concepts of the phenomenon are equally interesting to the
researcher, because “A careful account of the different ways people think about
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phenomena may help uncover conditions that facilitate the transition from one way of
thinking to a qualitatively ‘better’ perception of reality” (Marton, 1986). The following
subsections highlight the philosophical stance and goals of phenomenography as the
theoretical framework of choice in this work.

3.2.1 Phenomenon
Phenomenon is defined from the Greek root word as “a thing as it appeared”
(Richardson, 1999) instead of “a thing in itself”. The epistemological and philosophical
stances are described as “The object of study in phenomenographic research is not the
phenomenon being discussed per se, but rather the relation between the subjects and that
phenomenon” (Bowden & Green, 2005):
Phenomenographers are among a range of qualitative researchers who take
a non-dualist stance. We do not focus on hypothetical mental structures
separate from the world. There is no dividing line between the inner and
the outer worlds. There are not two world with one held to explain the
other. The world is not constructed by the individual, nor is it imposed
from the outside, ‘it is constituted as an internal relation between them.
There is only one world, but it is a world we experience, a world in which
we live, a world that is ours’.

3.2.2 Outcome Space
Phenomenography as a theoretical framework and methodology typically has as
its outcome an arrangement of categories, that is often hierarchical in nature, which are
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variations of human experience of a phenomenon. The outcome space often implies an
increasingly comprehensive awareness or increasingly comprehensive experiences (Daly,
2008; Zoltowski, 2010). The outcome space has three attributes: simple and clear,
logically related typically by hierarchy, and parsimonious or few (L. Mann, 2014). The
outcomes must derive from the data and not from the researcher’s preconceived notions
or even from the published literature’s results because the investigation focuses on the
participants’ understanding of the phenomenon. The goal is practical applicability, which
is the goal in this work for engineering education.

3.3

Assumptions of Phenomenography

First, phenomenography assumes that there are a limited number of qualitatively
different ways that people experience and understand a phenomenon (Marton, 1986).
While there is no limit to the number of potential categories, it implies that the outcome
space should include just a few categories. While “few” means different numbers to
different people, recent engineering education outcome spaces generally do not exceed
seven unique categories (Bucks & Oakes, 2011; Daly, 2008; L. M. W. Mann, 2007;
Zoltowski, 2010).
Second, phenomenography makes no assumption of right or wrong
interpretations, which would be some kind of interpretation from the researcher. This
would include concepts about physical phenomena, such as velocity, for which there is a
“correct” answer (Marton, 1986). Applying an assumption of what is right or wrong
would unnecessarily limit the researcher’s understanding of the participants’
understandings.
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Third, phenomenography does not assume a dualist view of the world as
individual constructivism and social constructivism do. “Individual constructivism sees
internal mental acts as being an explanation for external acts and behaviors. The reverse
is true for social constructivism” (Bowden & Green, 2005). Rather, phenomenography
assumes a relational view, a point of controversy to some critics in Section 3.8.

3.4

Propositions and Expectations

Phenomenography takes a stance of having no qualitative expectations. Rather,
the researcher is bound to bracket him/herself from presuppositions and hypotheses, even
from seemingly authoritative sources (Ashworth & Lucas, 1998). Ashworth and Lucas
note that phenomenography suggests bracketing may go against the traditional tide of
reviewing literature before conducting research in order for the researcher not to be
biased. The researchers must bracket themselves (remove themselves from interpreting
the phenomenon) (Marton, 1986). Bracketing in phenomenography derives from
phenomenology’s epoche, meaning “to refrain from judgment” (Patton, 2002). Since
bracketing is almost humanly impossible, it is better to acknowledge biases,
demonstrated in Section 3.9 below and to ensure reliability and validity.

3.5

Key Researchers and Their Perspectives

Original phenomenography, or the Swedish tradition, has been employed in order
to understand students’ conceptions of reality, including forces and optics, and it requires
problem solving before interviewing as part of the data collection (Marton, 1986). As
researchers have employed simulation techniques to expert teams (Ericsson, 2006), so
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problem solving in Marton’s phenomenography could be considered a simulation in order
to understand the participants’ knowing. Observation of the participants’ interaction with
the phenomenon is part of Original phenomenography. Within a Large Scale Complex
Engineered Systems context in Section 2.1, observation is not a practical data collection
method for this application as the development times in aerospace can span many years.
Developmental phenomenography, or the Australian tradition, typically employs
semi-structured interviews to elicit participants’ reflections on their experience, where the
intent is to seek depth in the experience (Bowden & Green, 2005). While original
phenomenography and developmental phenomenography can be centered on learning,
developmental phenomenography does not include the observation of the participant
encountering the phenomenon in a problem-solving task. The literature review showed
that the scale of the design environments being researched does not align well with
original phenomenography because of the complexity of the problems that are
encountered in aerospace design. A task that could fit into the timeframe of an interview
would be a simulation and not an actual design, thereby introducing the question if the
subject would really apply the same techniques to the real design. As a result, only the
semi-structured interview in the Australian tradition was employed here. Table 3.5.1
below shows that the crucial difference between these two methods that affects this
project is the alignment for NDM environments, where the shadowed areas indicate a
mismatch.

39
Table 3.5.1 Two types of phenomenography mapped to research question attributes.
Attribute
Development of
skill over time
Variation of
experience
Naturalistic
decision-making
environment
Large Scale
Complex
Engineered Systems

Marton
Original phenomenography
Well-suited to describe a lived
experience
Well-suited to account for
variation
Prescribed design task or
problem-solving is in vivo rather
than in situ
Prescribed design task or
problem-solving does not align
with time scale or complexity
scale of aerospace

3.6

Bowden
Developmental phenomenography
Well-suited to describe a lived
experience
Well-suited to account for variation
Deep, open interview allows for
reflection on environment
Deep, open interview allows for
reflection on Large Scale Complex
Engineered Systems

Observable Phenomena in Phenomenography

The primary observation is the relation between the subject and the phenomenon
as the subject describes the phenomenon. The researcher brackets his or her own
understanding the phenomenon and of the participant, but the researcher’s deep, open
interview technique causes the participant to reflect on the phenomenon richly (Bodner &
Orgill, 2007). It should be noted here that the participant’s description and the
participant’s actions may be different from each other; therefore, phenomenographers do
not claim that they have uncovered a positivistic truth. Rather, researchers may claim
that they have found something useful for education.
The primary phenomenon is the participants’ varied experiences of uncertainty.
Significant criteria for participant selection include the participants’ education
backgrounds, career trajectories, cultural experiences, and professional responsibilities
within the larger scheme of their employers’ relationships to one another. . The
employing companies can be considered as having various levels within systems-ofsystems, as in Section 2.2, such as a raw material supplier (D level), a subsystem supplier
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(B, C level), an airframe integrator (A level), or a primary operator (OES level). The
level at which a company operates implies different priorities in costs, qualities, and
schedules, which in turn may become an uncertainty for others at different levels. The
goal of this study is to include the maximum variation possible of the criteria listed here
in order to achieve representative variation of the experience of uncertainty in design and
decision-making.

3.7

Boundaries and Limitations

The boundaries of phenomenography are related to the data collection method of
semi-structured interviewing of an individual, but not a group, a team, or a project. The
participants reflect on their experiences, the account of which may vary from what a
researching observer or another participant may observe. From Table 2.4.1, a competent
designer begins to reflect on design (Schön, 1983), making meaning of their experiences.
Experiences for which a person has deeply reflected may be communicated as a wellrehearsed speech, but first-time consideration to a topic may be communicated with
pauses, uhs and ums (Buzzanell, 2012). To the extent of established trust and comfort, the
participant will share experiences with the researcher (Rubin & Rubin, 2012). Within
these boundaries and within the boundary of fatigue of the participant, responsibility rests
with the interviewer to “dig deeply” into the participants’ experiences.
There are several limitations to acknowledge because of the data collection
method of semi-structured interview only. First, this theoretical framework moves the
interpretive work from the researcher to the participant. Also, different researchers may
converge upon different outcome categories with the same data. Second, what the
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participant remembers and how the participant remembers could be limitation. In
learning, people tend to remember best the first thing, the last thing, and the most intense
thing (Thorndike, 1932). The participants, as they tell their stories, are attempting to
make sense of their experiences (Weick, 1995), and will therefore put certain aspects in
the foreground or background as part of their narrative (Bruner, 1986; Buzzanell, 2012).
Third, participant selection could be a limitation, to assume that the participants have
indeed experienced the phenomenon under investigation. In developmental
phenomenography, it is difficult to confirm beforehand without the researcher making
some assumptions about the phenomenon and the participant. The key to addressing
these limitations is ensuring validity and reliability.
There may be limitations in the results from several attributes of participants.
First, self-selection of participants is unavoidable in the design of this study, generally
based on their schedule, their interest, and whether contact information is available to
send a recruiting email. This is especially pertinent in recruiting older female engineers
in a business with significant gender disparity, where the women might be fatigued with
frequent requests to represent the female population. Second, it is unlikely that several of
the participants will have worked on the same project, so while literature shows that
aerospace engineering relies on teams, it might not be demonstrated well in this study.
Third, focusing on working professionals’ experiences may limit the results’ applicability
to the undergraduate curriculum. As with many qualitative studies, top candidates for
inclusion can be identified and whoever is willing will be interviewed.
There are some mitigating steps to address the limitations. First, including
variation in participants’ job titles and employing companies may indirectly influence
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variation of awareness of uncertainty. Some job ranks may be: first level supervisor,
chief, director, technical fellow, and vice president. Second, thinking about systems-ofsystems in Section 2.2, employing companies may be OES, A, B, C, and D levels. Third,
regarding the applicability of professional experiences to curriculum experiences, the
interview protocol has primary questions on the participants’ reflections on their learning
trajectories, so there may be evidence linking the two experiences. Fourth aerospace
students in their last year of schooling can be included as the “starting point”, though the
participants’ age is not necessarily directly correlated to level of awareness of
uncertainty. Each of these mitigating steps has been included in this work.
The biggest limitation is the challenge of rigor (Sin, 2010) in developing the
outcome space, especially to those who are purely quantitative researchers. The first
mitigation is a member check and edit of the transcript from the participant, but not a
check of the outcome space (Cohen & Crabtree, July 2006). The second mitigation is
multiple readings of the transcripts as a whole after all the data are collected,. The third
mitigation is team analysis that welcomes challenge, critique, and revisiting assumptions
(Bowden & Green, 2005). The fourth mitigation is to be transparent in the data
collection and analysis process; each of the steps of the process will be documented as
appendices for further review by the research community at large. The fifth mitigation is
to validate the results with other published literature, and to justify any discrepancies that
may arise. After all of these steps, the outcome space is reliable and valid.
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3.8

Controversies

Richardson provides a thorough critique of phenomenography, including its
incomplete development as a research methodology and its increasing application in
education (Richardson, 1999), as do Ashworth and Lucas (1998). Richardson claims that
original phenomenography lacks a conceptual basis and epistemological foundation that
other social-science research methods have, primarily compared to constructivism. He
contrasts phenomenography’s interviewing as shallower than ethnography’s or
anthropology’s interviewing, especially because the analysis “depends on other people’s
discursive accounts of their experience”. He shows phenomenography as being similar to
grounded theory and phenomenology in analysis. The positive aspect of
phenomenography is that the results are easily accessible by professors and students, so
that pedagogy can increasingly be based upon evidence-based methods.

3.9

Researcher Biases, Role of the Researcher

In Section 3.4, one of the requirements of phenomenography is to bracket oneself
in the analysis, or to not let biases mask key results in the study. Since that is a near
impossible challenge for most humans, I will acknowledge the perspective I bring to this
study instead. I am a half-white female engineer and pilot with industry experience, and I
did not cope well with uncertainty for at least the first two years of my employment, and
still may not, if imposter syndrome (Brems, Baldwin, Davis, & Namyniuk, 1994) is an
underlying factor, which drives this research project.
I worked as an aerodynamicist on tiltrotor aircraft for seven years (A. Cummings,
2014). My supervisors and coworkers told stories of the development of the aircraft.

44
Books were published by authors on the outside, either enthusiasts or technology
naysayers within the helicopter business. My coworkers ridiculed news articles that were
fraught with inaccuracies. I participated in flight test, which was considered the truth
source against which the mathematical models were measured, but experiments have
their own uncertainties. It became clearer over time that no one person knew everything
about this aircraft and that there are multiple stakeholders with conflicting priorities who
have decision-making responsibilities and influence on the design. It is this lengthy
experience that drives my research questions.
My industry experience may be a foundation of trust in recruiting participants.
My connections to my former coworkers may build a pool of potential participants
quickly, but perhaps not diversely. It may also impede my follow-up questions on word
choices because I think I have the shared aerospace language but the participant may be
thinking about a topic differently.
My industry experience may also cause me to have a laser focus on elements of
the data that echo my own experience and I may ignore significant elements of the data
that I did not personally experience. For example, I learned the Earned Value
Management System, which tracks cost, schedule, and deliverables as metrics comparing
planned to actual performance. Therefore, I realize that there are cost and schedule
uncertainties in addition to uncertainties in making some design function according to
specifications.
Another bias goes against the grain of the Engineering Education research agenda
of diversity and inclusion ("The Research Agenda for the New Discipline of Engineering
Education," 2006). Knowing that engineering has a persistent gender disparity, even
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exaggerated in the population of pilots (4% of the workforce (U.S. Bureau Labor
Statistics, May 2014)) compared to engineers, I should make every effort to include a
representative percentage female sample in my study. Yet, I have no personal evidence
that competence with engineering skills or experience of uncertainty in design is
dependent upon gender. Therefore, I do not wish to show in my study that a variable of
interest is gender. I defer to my study participants, then, on highlighting whatever factors
they think most significant.
My tendency to analyze qualitative data in fine and detailed cuts has its roots in
my industry experience with quantitative data. Fine cuts of flight test data provide more
independent variables for correlating the mathematical models, which have many
interdependent variables. I would naturally opt for finer cuts of experience of uncertainty
according to Thunnissen’s uncertainty taxonomy in order to explain the outcome space.
This tendency may be in direct contrast to the parsimony of phenomenographic outcome
spaces.
Antidotes to these biases may be more than three iterations categorizing the
transcript data and analyzing as a team of researchers (Bowden & Green, 2005). Records
of each iteration of analysis are warranted as an appendix of the final report of this study,
though only the final defensible outcome space merits a chapter. Iteration and
collaboration with a larger research team ensures validity and reliability.

3.10 Methodology
Certain decisions for the method are driven by the purely qualitative methodology
of phenomenography. The design of this study is non-experimental, so any changes of
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behavior or skill noted in this work are not the result of a controlled intervention. The
data collection method is semi-structured interview only. The accompanying analysis
will be the creation of categories of qualitatively different ways that the whole transcripts
reveal of experiencing the phenomenon of uncertainty, where within a category,
participants have commonalities, and between categories, the participants have distinct
differences. I make no assertion, claim, or hypothesis at the start of data collection what
those distinct differences might be, but only that there are unnamed differences.

3.10.1 Population
The population of interest is individuals who 1) earned an engineering degree, 2)
have done engineering design as a part of their careers, 3) are empowered to make
decisions and 4) are employed in aerospace businesses, whether in the US or abroad. It is
implied from the literature review that if a person engages in engineering design in the
professional workforce, then that person will encounter uncertainty of at least one type.
Participants were also included who are upper level undergraduate aerospace engineering
students to represent a starting point of professionals entering the workforce.

3.10.1.1 Sampling Frame
A sampling frame is a “source that identifies members of the population for
purposes of possible selection” (Blair, Czaja, & Blair, 2014). The sampling frame
includes employees of businesses for which the researcher and close acquaintances have
connections, also called chain or snowball sampling. The aerospace businesses are those
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that are airframe integrators, primary operators, or those suppliers who directly identify
airframe integrators or primary operators as their customers. The attributes of the
potential participants include a job title that indicates design and decision-making
responsibilities.

3.10.1.2 Purposeful Sampling for Maximum Variation
Women compose 52% of the workforce in the United States but only 9% of
employed aerospace engineers are women (U.S. Bureau Labor Statistics, May 2014).
Women were purposefully over-sampled to insure their voices were included in the data.
In Figure 3.10.2 below, there are six female participants, also represented in red circles in
Figure 3.10.4. Eight participants have connection to Bell Helicopter, see Section 3.9, but
the majority of the participants come from other businesses.
Attributes of the participants are demonstrated in Figure 3.10.2 below. Job titles
are reported according to the participants’ descriptions during the interviews. Education
parameters were also reported by the participants at the beginning of each interview.
Military experience, pilot experience, and international experience were reported by
participants as influencing factors and so are reported here.
Different companies have a level of Systems-of-Systems applied, where company
websites for “About Us” descriptions were used in order to make an assignment. There
are four main S-o-S classifications: operators, airframe and powerplant integrators,
subsystem suppliers, and materials. Because of the variation of experience, researcher
and undergraduate are added in Figure 3.10.2 below. The employers could be (or might
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not be) but are not limited to: the customers NASA, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast
Guard, Air Force, DARPA, FAA, and militaries of other nations; the large prime
contractors Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Bell Helicopter, Sikorsky, AgustaWestland,
Airbus, Eurocopter; propulsion suppliers Rolls Royce, GE Aviation, Pratt & Whitney,
and Lycoming. Each of the prime contractors and propulsion suppliers have their
“second tier” suppliers. Researchers could be but are not limited to top tier research
institutions and universities. Some of the more experienced individuals merited being
classified in two levels of S-o-S because of greater than five years’ experience in two
different levels, but the majority of individuals have one primary level.
Figure 3.10.2, Figure 3.10.3, and Figure 3.10.4 below show the morphological
chart (L. M. W. Mann, 2007) of pertinent participant demographics. Figure 3.10.4 shows
the chain sampling of 13 participants as my personal contacts, and 8 contacts as my
contacts’ contacts, and four contacts as recruits through a professional society roster. The
five gray arrows are the researcher’s personal contacts that did not participate but
forwarded the recruiting emails. The participants all have pseudonyms assigned after the
interview and member check of the transcript.
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Figure 3.10.3 Participants' demographics of years of experience, gender, and systems-ofsystems level.

Figure 3.10.4 Chain sampling of actual participants.
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3.10.2 Recruiting
It is typical to reach saturation around 20 to 30 participants (Bowden & Green,
2005) and it is more prudent to seek more than 20 interviews due to the anticipated
variation of uncertainty. The reality of human research is willingness and availability of
participants. Personal contacts were recruited first, with not more than two emails
separated by two weeks. Actual participants were also asked to forward the recruiting
email. Other personal contacts that did not fit the profile were asked to forward the
recruiting email to any and all of their contacts that did fit the profile. Professional
societies and clubs were asked to forward the email. At least 175 unique email addresses
received the recruiting email from February to June 2015. The recruiting email for
working engineers is in Appendix A.

3.10.3 Data Collection
3.10.3.1 Schedule and Budget
Time commitments and constraints for this study require some consideration. It is
an appropriate plan to have a maximum of two face-to-face interviews a day to account
for researcher fatigue, writing memos, and transcription (Rubin & Rubin, 2012), where
the reality was one interview conducted per day. Because of conducting interviews
online or remotely, travel for face-to-face interviews was not considered.
Transcripts were purchased through the vendor Rev.com at $1/audio minute, with
about 33 hours of audio recorded in total. Six audio files were corrupted with excessive

52
background noise, requiring me to transcribe them. The total expenditures for
transcription were approximately $1,400.
Small incidental costs include purchasing a Skype phone number and minutes
($28), renting a Mac product to use FaceTime instead of Skype ($20), and purchasing an
audio recorder ($40) which did not to have a USB port for file transfers, thereby making
it less useful. Using a university software subscription for Camtasia to record
audio/video of the Skype call and convert to audio only saved about $300.
After a one day turn-around for transcription, one cycle of analysis was reading
and correcting the purchased transcripts. Transcripts were de-identified and emailed back
to the participants, asking for a return with any corrections within two weeks. The
majority of participants (16 of 25) complied, including one participant that requested a
paper copy through mail.
Lastly, Figure 3.10.5 shows an ideal situation in blue of interviewing two
participants a day, transcribing for one day, and sending out the transcript for a member
check, where the red line shows actual data collection for this study. The positive slope
represents completing an interview. The first data point represents IRB approval, and the
next data point represents the first participant’s interview. In between those two data
points, for about one month, was the pilot study, in Section 3.10.4 below. The data
collection effort for 25 interviews was about 5 months.
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Figure 3.10.5 Planned and actual data collection for interview, transcription, and member
check.

3.10.3.2 Instrument Development
A typical semi-structured interview protocol in phenomenography consists of
contextual questions, open primary questions, situated example primary questions, and
follow-up questions (Bowden & Green, 2005). Contextual questions provide an
introduction and some understanding of a participant’s current situation, encouraging the
participant to reflect on their experiences. Open primary questions solicit the
participant’s understanding and meaning of the phenomenon. Situated example primary
questions solicit concrete examples of the participant’s own experience with the
phenomenon. Follow-up questions encourage further elaboration of the experience, such
as motivations and decisions related to the experience. Even though the literature review
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of CHAPTER 2 has many definitions of concepts and constructs, none of them are
included in the interview protocol because of bracketing in Section 3.4.
Previously published work conducted provides some guidelines for constructing
an interview protocol. One phenomenographic study of design was crafted to elicit
participants’ understanding of design, and the participants came from different disciplines
(Daly, 2008). Another phenomenographic study focused on experiences in designing for
others, or human-centered design (Zoltowski, 2010). A grounded theory study
specifically asked working professionals about the problems they encounter at work (D.
Jonassen et al., 2006). The grounded theory study provides questions to understand a
participant’s current workplace and responsibilities, and the phenomenographic studies
provide questions worded particularly to elicit the participant’s understanding of the
phenomenon under study.
For this work, the contextual questions include the participant’s workplace
description, the participant’s education, and the participant’s current role in the
workplace, including design projects. The open primary questions and situated example
questions are the center of this work:


The participant’s experiences in making design decisions with uncertainty



The participant’s description of sources of uncertainty and the participant’s
management of identified sources of uncertainty



The participant’s reflection on the learning trajectory he or she experienced related to
his or her awareness of uncertainty in design.
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One aim of the contextual questions is that the participant’s description of the
workplace and his or her role within the workplace will match a Naturalistic Decision
Making environment within a systems-of-systems environment. The open primary
questions aim to uncover what participants recognize as sources of uncertainty, how to
manage those uncertainties, and how they learned or became aware of those uncertainties.
Follow-up and probing questions, highlighted in italics in Appendix B, will be asked if
the participant needs prompting. Lastly, the aim of the entire project is to elicit words of
wisdom from practicing engineers to upcoming engineers.
These questions were deemed exempt from human research governance in
Appendix A. Minor changes not requiring review may be sent to IRB as an amendment
to an approved study; however, in the execution of this study, no changes were necessary.
The full instrument (interview protocol) is displayed in Appendix B.

3.10.4 Pilot Study
There are several reasons for pilot interviewing (Bowden & Green, 2005). I as
the novice interviewer needed practice in setting a comfortable and natural interviewing
environment. I also learned to bracket myself in the interview, avoiding comments and
debates with the participant. Very importantly, the instrument needed to be tested for
obtaining data on the intended topic, especially to see if there is variation in experience of
the phenomenon. The recording media can be tested and note-taking for follow up
questions can be practiced. I recruited several of my personal contacts for the pilot study.
Pilot study participants include individuals with varied experience at my home
university. In the aerospace engineering department, there is a former Deputy Associate
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Administrator of NASA. NASA may be considered an OES level operator in system-ofsystems language. In materials engineering, there is a professor of practice with 30
years’ experience. Materials businesses may be considered a

level operator in system-

of-systems language. There are also quite a few aerospace engineering graduate students,
and one should be included in the pilot study. With just these three potential participants,
there is variation in experience that may test the validity of the interview protocol.
The time commitment of the pilot study was one month. I transcribed the
interviews for practice to test time to transcribe. Notes from the recorded interview were
used for preliminary assessment of the validity of the protocol. Two iterations of the
pilot study were scheduled as a good engineering design might include, but a second
iteration was not necessary, so there are three pilot study participants.

3.10.4.1 Pilot Study Results
Per Section 3.10.4, the interview protocol of Appendix B was piloted in January
2015. One key difference in the pilot study was the ability to interview face-to-face
rather than using online meetings; otherwise, the pilot was conducted as planned to
conduct the full study. The objectives were fourfold:
1. Determine the effectiveness of the interview protocol for uncovering how a person
experiences and manages uncertainty in design in an aerospace engineering context.
2. Provide practice for the researcher as an interviewer.
3. Investigate the alternative of conducting the interviews online or remotely.
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4. Begin to uncover characteristics of participants that lead to greatest variation of
experience with uncertainty.
The study started with individuals who are geographically close to me. Professors
of practice were contacted for face-to-face pilot interviews. A graduate student with an
aerospace engineering undergraduate degree was also contacted. Two were
acquaintances and the third was recommended by an acquaintance. The primary
characteristic of variation among these was years of experience. The professors of
practice have worked in industry for more than 30 years; the graduate student worked for
less than two years.
Per semi-structured interview, I practiced staying engaged with the interviewee’s
line of thought as I asked more questions from the protocol. Two of the interviews were
about one hour; one of the interviews was almost two hours. It happened that the
professors of practice drew diagrams and sketches on their available whiteboards in their
offices for about five minutes of their interviews, while the graduate student did not
create any visible artifacts or significant gestures during the interview.
Immediately following the second and third pilot interviews, the interviewees
were asked if they felt comfortable in the interview and whether they felt that I listened to
them or interrupted their thoughts. They reported that they felt comfortable and that they
had the full opportunity to say everything they wanted to say.
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3.10.4.2 Pilot Interview Summaries
Interviewee 1 views uncertainty as an everyday occurrence in the job, though he
did not view himself as a designer broadly. His role as a director in the company was a
“buck stops here” decision-making job. In Systems-of-Systems description, his company
is a base level raw materials supplier. He told a story about investigating a design
specification that he was certain could not be achieved by his company or any of its
competitors. He was puzzled, then, as to what party defined that specification. He
continued to ask questions until he found the designer in the Airframe & Powerplant
Integrator company who admitted that “I just didn’t like it” and wrote this unachievable
specification. Interviewee 1 recognizes that uncertainty exists all the time and he seeks to
reduce it through continued communication with other parties.
Interviewee 2 views uncertainty as an everyday occurrence in the job, that his
company’s role is to explore the unknown, to do things no one else has done before, and
that is the fun challenge of the job. His company, as an Operational and Environmental
Scenario level in Systems-of-Systems, managed Airframe & Powerplant suppliers and
was subject to major political shifts and hidden agendas. His decision-making roles
included Director and above. He told a story about the hidden political agendas being the
greatest unknown on whether a certain project could even begin, and he was confident
that the technical parameters could be met within the desired budget constraints. He also
described that budget constraints play a larger role in deciding on designs than the
phenomenological (“state of the art”, not a research methodology) uncertainty of
operating in an unexplored environment, which was not the case 40 years ago. Overall,
Interviewee 2 recognizes and manages uncertainty from multiple sources.
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Interviewee 3 recognizes uncertainty in design, including not knowing what
process to follow, not knowing what resources to leverage, not knowing which questions
to ask of experts, and uncertainty in cultural differences. From her senior design
experience, the team struggled because they did not know of a process to follow and they
did not know where to start, though they knew the end result was to have some device to
participate in a competition. This experience was frustrating and the uncertainty
regarding a design process was “debilitating”. She told another story of taking a class in
her master’s degree that culminated in an international trip, which both made her aware
of and comfortable with cross-cultural differences. Interviewee 3 recognizes some
sources of uncertainty in design and is beginning to develop management strategies for
some of those forms of uncertainty.

3.10.4.3 Strengths and Weaknesses
The achievement of the objectives is assessed here. Firstly, from the above
summaries, it seems that the interview protocol collects the intended data, namely,
variation of a person’s experience and management of uncertainty in aerospace design.
Other follow up questions to investigate motivations should be included:
1. Why is that important?
2. What were you trying to achieve by doing that?
3. Why was that difficult (or other word the participant uses)?
4. Can you think of an experience that prepared you to handle things you don’t know?
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Secondly, from the post-interview interviews of two participants, it seems that my
interview technique is adequate and possibly improving. The participants reported felt
comfortable and felt like they had a voice. The older participants appeared to have
forgotten that the recording devices were present. However, the younger participant
mentioned the fact of being recorded even as far as half way through the interview. The
transcripts were provided to the participants for their opportunity to edit.
Thirdly, the evidence in the three interviews suggests that the desired data is
primarily in the audio trace of the interview. The participants infrequently used gestures.
Two participants drew pictures to illustrate their points, possibly because the room
included a large writing space. One participant referenced documentation filed in his
office in order to refresh his memory. One participant had a sample part of poor quality
to illustrate the ambiguity of written test requirements. In all these instances, I took notes
and drew similar sketches for future reference. The substantial verbal evidence collected
here suggests that online or remote interviewing will not hinder data collection.
Lastly, the significant characteristics highlighted here that may affect a person’s
experience and management of uncertainty include: years of experience and job title.
The higher job titles may indicate an increasing level of expertise in and responsibility for
decision-making. Higher job titles may also indicate more opportunities to interact with
other stakeholders in design. There is not yet enough evidence to support a gender
difference, but there is room in the study to investigate this further. These key
characteristics guide future purposeful sampling of participants for maximum variation.
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3.10.5 Analysis
3.10.5.1 Method
Phenomenography can take at least two paths of analysis: 1) place the whole
transcript into a category or 2) extract the quotes specific to the phenomenon into a
category. In this work, I decided to place the entire transcript into a category. This is
because the protocol is structured such that the beginning questions on design necessarily
situate the experience of uncertainty within that design project. Therefore, most of the
transcript focuses on one design project. Either way, “In the analysis stage, the controls
involve:


The use of no other evidence except the interview transcripts



The bracketing of the researcher’s own relation to the phenomenon



The use of group analysis in order to ensure the first two controls are effective, and



The analysis of the structural relation between the categories of description being
postponed until after the categories have been finalized.” (Bowden & Green, 2005).

3.10.5.2 Unit of Analysis
The unit of analysis in developmental phenomenography is the whole transcript,
fit into a category. The researcher must be careful to say that the transcript and not the
participant fits into a category, because it is unjust to categorize an entire person in only a
two hour conversation (L. Mann, 2014). Transcripts within a category have marked
similarity to each other, and categories must have qualitative differences among each
other.
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There are factors to consider in analyzing the data, according to the literature
review. Firstly, there may be a range of responsibility for managing uncertainty, from
individual to distributed responsibility across a small team, even up to a whole company.
Secondly, at any systems-of-systems level, all of the participants are likely describe
themselves as functioning in a Naturalistic Decision Making environment, though they
may not use these words directly. NDM factors include organizational goals and norms,
so it would be good to capture the influence of the levels at which the participants operate
in complex systems-of-systems. Thirdly and most importantly, the level of awareness of
the different sources of uncertainty for each participant is the driving factor of the
outcome space.

3.10.6 Outcome Space
The outcome space of this study will primarily include some description of an
individual’s awareness and management of uncertainty. It is possible to use Dorst’s
levels of expertise in Table 2.4.1, but not so early in the analysis that it violates the first
and second principles of analysis in Section 3.10.5.1 above. It is possible that the
outcome space will have one, two, or three dimensions, but it would be difficult to
visualize more than three axes of variation. More than three dimensions of variation may
indicate another iteration of analysis is necessary. A category will have participants with
common experiences, and different categories will highlight different experiences.
The resulting categories shall have substantiating evidence only from the
transcripts (L. Mann, 2014). Each category will have a name or handle, hopefully
condensed to one word. There will be a one sentence description. Following will be a
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few paragraphs of researcher interpretation, including supporting quotes from the
transcripts in that category. Also, as mentioned in Section 3.2.2, the categories should be
few, clear, and logically related.
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS: WAYS OF EXPERIENCING UNCERTAINTY IN DESIGN
DECISIONS

The analysis resulted in identifying five categories of experience of uncertainty in
design decisions. Several key pieces of literature provide the vocabulary to describe
these resulting categories. The categories are shown graphically in Figure 4.5.1 with the
horizontal axis indicating forms of uncertainty based on Thunnissen’s taxonomy. The
second vertical axis represents skill in team engagement, where the elements of expert
teams in Table 2.3.1 are identified. There is a third dimension of the participants’
responses to uncertainty by which the categories are named.
Even though phenomenography has no expectations or propositions at the
beginning of a study, it is still essential to the analysis that the outcome space refers in
some way to the phenomenon under investigation. Therefore, there is a necessary
dimension of uncertainty in the outcome space. There is also a dimension named here as
response to uncertainty, where in the preliminary stages of the study, I called it
management of uncertainty as an answer to the second guiding research question of this
work.
The most surprising dimension of experience is the pervasive response “talk to
people” to the protocol question “what was your process for making those decisions”,
which upon analysis, I developed into discrete team engagement behaviors. Even though

65
I presented expert teaming in Section 2.3, I did not specifically ask or lead the participant
with any of the identified team behaviors. Since participants specifically elaborated on
talking to other people, it must be represented in the outcome space.

4.1

Process of Analysis

The execution of data collection and analysis merits a brief description here for
reliability and validity purposes, with further details of the iterations of analysis provided
in Appendix C. The first cycle of familiarization with the data after obtaining transcripts
from a third party service was accomplished by my listening to the audio and correcting
the transcripts. The corrected and de-identified transcripts were sent to the participants
for any and all edits they wished to make; 16 of 25 participants returned edits and
comments. These member-checked transcripts and the other transcripts appear in the
final analysis.
I alternated between electronic and printed versions of the transcripts, keeping the
electronic versions as the full archival record of my analysis. I printed, read, and
highlighted paper copies of the transcripts. The handwritten notes and memos were
transferred into an nVivo10 project. I put paper copies of transcripts into groups; I
created nodes for the groups in nVivo. I wrote memos explaining similarities and
differences among groups of transcripts. I shared the groups and memos with another
researcher familiar with aerospace and phenomenography for further review, questioning,
and perspective. As the appendix shows, I conducted at least 13 iterations of
categorization before converging on the final results shown here.
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Part of the evidence of having reached a valid outcome space is that subsequent
cycles of analysis result in the same groups of transcripts (Bowden & Green, 2005).
After 12 rounds of creating categories, the same transcripts converged into clusters for
each perspective considered. The second piece of evidence is that the explanations of
categories were reviewed by another researcher and found to be logical and consistent. A
third piece of evidence, though less emphasized in phenomenography, is that there is no
obvious and unjustifiable contradiction in this outcome space with other published
literature. The reliable and valid results are presented as common elements and varied
elements in the sections below.

4.2

Themes Common to All Participants

The main objective of phenomenography is to identify difference of experience,
whereas the main objective of phenomenology is to identify the common experience.
Because of the common context of the aerospace industry, there are common elements to
all transcripts. Several of these items were delineated as the context of the study in the
literature review CHAPTER 2. These common elements help to describe the backdrop of
each participant’s story, which backdrop is mostly a Naturalistic Decision Making
environment as presented in Section 2.2.
The aerospace field is data-driven, including negotiated and written contracts with
tangible requirements and specifications. The participants describe alternating between
“big picture” and “smaller pieces” as they work through problems, leaning towards a
systems thinking view of requirements to product design (Defense Systems Management
College, 2001). The top three are cost, schedule, and performance, where performance
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cannot compromise flight safety. The matter of flight safety and cost align with the
aspect of high stakes in Naturalistic Decision Making environments, and the matter of
schedule aligns with the aspect of time stress. Because of these major criteria, engineers
are encouraged to document lessons learned, and they encourage each other to learn from
failure as well as success, touching on the research questions posed by Deshmukh in
Section 1.2.
The corollary of being data-driven is the expectation that most things have been
tried before; it is just a matter of finding the data or the analogy so that the engineer can
set the expectation or the baseline. The participants describe documentation review as a
key part of the design process. Having a baseline helps participants apply structure to illstructured problems in a Naturalistic Decision Making environment.
The participants describe review cycles where they genuinely want someone else
to validate their work. First, the engineer does his/her own work. Second, the engineer
seeks an informal peer review. These two steps may be iterative between themselves.
When the engineer converges on a decision with conviction, then the engineer is ready to
present to their bosses or team leaders formally. This element aligns with the aspect of
having feedback loops and having multiple players in Naturalistic Decision Making
environments. Since these all are common elements, the following sections below will
highlight the variations of the participants’ experiences.

4.3

Categories of Description

The metaphor of materials’ responses to stress (Callister, 2000) is used here to
name the categories, symbolizing an internal response of the engineer to encountering
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uncertainty. Brittle materials fracture rapidly without appreciable macroscopic
deformation. In other words, brittle materials have a dramatic reaction to stress. Plastic
deformation is permanent or non-recoverable shaping after a load has been applied and
released. In other words, a plastic response moves one way and stays that way. Tolerant
materials do not fracture quickly under stress and are also called “forgiving”. Robust
(Park et al., 2006) materials are ready for the load for which they have been designed and
will perform well. Resilient materials have the capacity to absorb energy when deformed
(Callister, 2000). In other words, resilient materials can recover quickly (Hollnagel,
2011).
The participants are grouped by their similar responses to uncertainty and the
groups are aligned along two dimensions representing the other aspects of the
participants’ experiences that differentiate them from one another. The first dimension is
the complexity of the design tasks they undertake, as indicated by the quantity and
quality of forms of uncertainty they are aware of. The second dimension is their skill at
engaging their teammates and other stakeholders as they work through design tasks. The
engineer’s internal response to uncertainty is the unifying dimension. So, there are three
major aspects to each category of description.
I describe each category below by discussing each of the three aspects of their
experiences. There were three primary questions explored with the participants in
Section 3.10.3.2. They were: 1) an experience of decision-making in design; 2)
experiencing uncertainty in design; and 3) reflections on learning about uncertainty.
Example quotes from participants of each category are provided to illustrate each
particular way of experiencing uncertainty. For uniformity of flow, quotes of each
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transcript will present significant themes of experience elicited by the primary questions:
1) forms of uncertainty; 2) team engagement; 3) personal response to uncertainty; each
category is summarized with participant reflections on personal growth in managing
uncertainty. The following sections answer the first research question in Section 2.8.

4.3.1 Category 1: Brittle
The first category is named Brittle. The engineers in the Brittle category are
uncomfortable with uncertainty and their teaming mechanism is to push the decision
responsibility to someone else, typically a boss or team leader. Their being
uncomfortable with uncertainty can also manifest as being afraid of the consequences of
being found ignorant by their superiors. The form of uncertainty these engineers
experience is only epistemic, where they are aware that there is subject matter that they
have not yet studied. This aligns well with Baillie and Johnson’s findings that fear of
uncertainty is a reason that knowledge may be troublesome to some learners (Johri &
Olds, 2014). The tasks they have undertaken are typically managed as individual work
and possibly soliciting informal peer review.
Negative emotions frequently appear in these transcripts, some of it stemming
from an unsuccessful attempt at engaging stakeholders in the design and associated
decisions. The level of support and attitude of their bosses or team leaders is highly
influential on the emotions these engineers expressed. Unsupportive leaders cause the
engineer to hold a negative view of the project while supportive leaders cause the
engineer to have confidence in themselves and the completion of the project. Yet the
engineers in this category have all completed assigned tasks satisfactorily.
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The participants whose transcripts compose this category are Margaret, Philip,
Ross and Silvia. These participants are primarily speaking from the experiences of senior
design projects or internship design assignments. Two, Margaret and Philip, are in their
first full time assignment and included those experiences.

4.3.1.1 Forms of Uncertainty
The participants whose experiences categorized the Brittle group only identified
epistemic uncertainties. In particular, the participants describe ignorance of subject
matter that they think is crucial to the success of their design projects. Partly, the
ignorance may be perpetuated by another stakeholder’s apparent unwillingness to share
this information, thus linking the participant’s personal response to uncertainty to
someone else’s influence.
For Margaret, the largest uncertainties in her research project are understanding
her customer’s needs, which even her customer had a difficult time defining, and
obtaining the customer’s historical data in order to validate and verify any new models
she may develop. She considered her possible solution space as borrowing models from
other disciplines, but her unfamiliarity with what other disciplines have developed has
hindered her progress. Her solution paths, or her uncertainty management strategies,
include what she describes as a randomly organized literature review, presentation to her
immediate boss, and presentation in professional conferences for feedback. She said:
When I do my literature review actually it's more random… It's kind of
you start it very random. Then you find something interesting or closely
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related to what you're doing… Then you do some more reading about this.
My difficult part is I have hard time to set the stop line of your literature
review…Then my adviser tells me, 'Okay, you can stop now. You can just
do this.' At least he will give me a deadline... I need some external power
to let me make the decision more efficiently. The conference is also
another external power for me…since the conference is coming I need to
have something to have stop those random literature review and I need to
think of what my work is.

Philip’s industry experience has included flight simulation, flight test, and
manufacturing. Philip had two primary epistemic uncertainties for his simulation task:
“to be able to do it on time” and “to be able to do it at all”. Philip described how he
decided what coding language he would use to create a simulation model:
Some people still love Fortran. You just have to ... It's all good. You can
do it in Simulink, and it will be fine. You can do it in C, and it'll be fine,
but I prefer to do in Simulink, and he prefers to do it in C, so you just have
to argue a little bit. Then ultimately, whoever yells the loudest usually gets
the final say in things like this, because this is a lower level thing…I've
already started on it, and this is what we're going to do. I put my foot
down. Sometimes you've just got to talk over the guy.

Ross, currently a senior design student, primarily spoke of one of his internship
experiences. His task in his internships was to automate data acquisition in the
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laboratory. He described his problem solving process as “trial and error” and “you’ll get
a problem and just be completely overwhelmed... break it down into sections that seem
more manageable”. He saw two solution paths: “really advanced costly accelerometers
for vibration, as well as just cheap Arduino do-it-yourself”.
He described his decision based on individual work: “I came to the conclusion
that I would just do it myself, plus that way if there were issues, I would know, I wouldn't
have to wait for someone or go through anyone…I would be the one fixing it and
knowing everything about it.” His work was successful: “As long as they didn't touch the
code, they were fine. They were pleased with it just because at the end, he told me
honestly he didn't expect me to finish it.”
The uncertainty in this design task was “all of it”. He said:
I came into this knowing nothing about this specific programming area,
circuits, I've never worked with Arduinos…It was a daunting task at the
beginning because I was uncertain about the whole thing. I've never done
this, I broke it down a lot… I didn't realize the Arduino has a little
community in itself… each day, there was a tiny little accomplishment or
large frustration…It was more about what I could do and learn in the time
frame then the best, not always the best solution but what worked for me
at the time…I've never finished a project and say okay, I can explain
100% of what's happening here and we're done with it…I've never
finished a project and say okay, I can explain 100% of what's happening
here and we're done with it.
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Silvia’s responsibility in her senior design project was an opportunity to explore
emerging technologies as potential components of the final solution. She spoke generally
about keeping a customer in mind, about managing a budget and schedule to finish the
project, and about the trade-offs between the technical parameters of batteries’ weight to
power density. But as for these new technologies, she had epistemic uncertainty:
Sometimes when we look into internet and we see a lot of theory that's
available to us, we only see the good sides because when a company is
trying to put a product into the market, not every bad aspect ... industry
secrets they would not let us know…Sometimes we look at the technology
and wonder why they haven't been installed and why they haven't been
used already because it sounds so perfect, but then if you do more delving
and more research and you talk to people specially your professors or your
TAs, you got to know that, oh, there's the side effect to the technology.

4.3.1.2 Team Engagement
Participants here tend to start work individually, and seek help infrequently.
Participants here tend to see their team leaders as judges to whom they must show and
defend their work. In this category, participants accept the relationship that others,
whether bosses or team leaders, are final decision-makers on their work.
Margaret’s team engagement is informal and infrequent, but she notes an
improvement. She said: “I usually discuss with my group mates. I don't know why but at
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that time I get afraid to discuss with my adviser. Then last year, yeah, last year, I discuss
more with my adviser.”
Philip described his process for management approval as moving from casual to
formal conversations:
You feel good about this decision. Then you try to defend your choice. If
other people can't shoot it down, then that's it and you're going to make
this choice…I talked at them about it, and I bugged them about it, and I
talked to them some more, then used a lot of hand gestures… It's like
grassroots. You've got to build it up. You've got to get people on your
side. Eventually, there's going to be a design review. Then that's like the
formal decision where you've got to speak in business talk to people. But
before that, you try and convince everybody that you've got the right idea.
That's casual. You can be standing in line, like at lunch.

As Ross described his aerospace senior design project, he noted that his senior
design team’s responsibilities did not require him to make decisions. His task was “most
of the sizing code in terms of figuring out what the weights are, what numbers need to be,
not so much trade studies…I'm not doing a lot of the actual physical choosing the exact
designs”. His investment in the project’s success he described as “NASA won't see
anything until the final week of the project, but throughout, we all are doing presentations
and just for the grade…We want to do the best as we can but the NASA thing is just an
extra bonus, if ours is the best, I don't know what comes of it.”
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4.3.1.3 Personal Response to Uncertainty
Participants in this category described a strong link between their feelings about
uncertainty in the design to their leaders’ perceived feelings. Participants also have
waves of positive and negative feelings as they progress through their design projects. If
they perceive that something is not going well, at least according to the supposed judge or
decision-maker, a negative feeling can be quite apparent.
Margaret described her personal experience of uncertainty as a process of
emotions. She said:
You're afraid, you have the fear. You have something, probably there's
something unknown that will completely destroy your research. It might
mean your research don't make any sense… You kind of reject it; you kind
of unconsciously then you have to gradually just accept it…I discuss more
with my adviser…you have more confidence to okay, he's good with it ...
Feedbacks from group member they're also good. Sometimes it's very
diverse. You cannot address all of them…I feel like I'm more of risk
averse.

Philip described his personal response to uncertainty as an emotional cycle as he
moved through his design project in a trial and error fashion:
It would take too much money and too much time to go back and redo it,
so it will be what it is… didn't know if it was going to work or not…you
just face the consequences of it and afterwards you find out what
happens…Part of it was acknowledging the fact that if it didn't work, then
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you're going to have to push the schedule back, and the company's going
to lose some money. Then I'll probably get fired. That's the mental part of
it…You just get thrown into the mix, and then you've got to learn things as
you go, which is the [company] way. They throw you in, see if you can
handle it.

Silvia described her strategy for managing uncertainty as soliciting judgment calls
from her superiors:
I think uncertainties are inevitable in a design…the only way to do it is to
test it and the only way we can test a conceptual design is by talking to our
professors…I think the only way to deal with uncertainty is to rely heavily
on people who are experienced… Like [professor1] who is working with
us on senior design…seniors who graduated and who are actually working
in these industries…usually TAs have a lot of internship experience…go
into companies like Boeing, Lockheed, Airbus, so we get a direct review
of our product from the people who are already in the system and who are
already working with these products.

4.3.1.4 Reflections on Learning to Manage Uncertainty
All participants were asked to reflect on their growth in ability to design, but only
Silvia had a marked opinion. Like Margaret, Silvia explained about gradually accepting
uncertainty will be present and cannot be eliminated. She has gained some theoretical
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knowledge from systems engineering classes: “I think when we deal with uncertainty
when we were taught in the class was to make a fail-safe design. Even if you fail, you
assume that you're going to fail but you're going to have something so that you know that
you're going to fail safely.” For now, Silvia described her personal response to
uncertainty as growing a little from life-changing events:
I hate uncertainties, personally, because I have always like things
planned…I think moving from a different country to the United States…
being by myself was a big way of knowing that life is full of uncertainties
and you need to just work through it…you're allowed to have these ideas
and you're allowed to dream... You're made to believe that you can
achieve anything…gave me a lot of confidence that there are things that
you need to say you believe in and then prove that you believe in it and
why you believe in it.

4.3.2 Category 2: Plastic
The engineers in the Plastic category find comfort in the “fact” that most things in
aerospace have been tried before, so they just have to move in one previously-proven
direction to finish their design tasks. Because of their adherence to a single solution path,
their behavior may look like design fixation (Gero, 2011). They acknowledge that they
are young so there must be someone more experienced to assist them as they explore the
design solution space and make decisions. These engineers take some initiative to gather
new knowledge as identified by more experienced engineers. They take a cycle of
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decision-making to justify their solutions to themselves first, or to convince themselves
first.
They present their solutions to their bosses and team leaders for further review
because they are beginning to view projects as team efforts, but it is a limited view. They
acknowledge that other engineers have unique and complementary knowledge. They
solicit peer review. They especially solicit Subject Matter Expert opinions and they do
not demand data-driven justification from the SMEs.
Plastic engineers encounter epistemic uncertainty, such as topics they have not
studied before. They also describe the new responsibility of creating or predicting
schedule and budget of projects. Technical, cost, and schedule knowledge for Plastic
engineers is best discovered by asking others directly to provide their opinions and to
continue on the trajectory suggested by this resource.
The participants whose transcripts compose this category are Bernard, Diana,
Edmund, Luciana, Miranda, and Vincent. Luciana and Diana have the least amount of
experience at two years. Bernard has the most years of experience in this category; he
hails from the pre-space-flight era of aerospace engineering but made a career change out
of aerospace into self-employed handyman services after about 15 years, due to his
uncertainty of the financial situation of his aerospace employer.

4.3.2.1 Forms of Uncertainty
The participants whose experiences categorized the Plastic group identified
epistemic uncertainties as the Brittle category did, but with added schedule and budget
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impacts. The Plastic group, compared to the Brittle group, has a quicker tendency to ask
others about these uncertainties, since they presume that the more experienced coworkers
or the ones who went before them have correct insight into these uncertainties.
Bernard’s transcript included four unique design experiences where he was given
the task, he made drawings and prototypes, his idea was approved by his management
team, and the idea was implemented with no apparent iterations or problems. His tasks
were executed in a linear design process from problem definition to implementation.
Bernard seemed to be sufficiently competent at designing that none of his ideas needed
revision, so the “trial and error” mentality resulted in no errors. One of these experiences
occurred over a very short time frame:
There was a change in hydraulic systems of the airplane. One afternoon,
the panels, the switches, had to be redesigned. They wanted, it was sort of
a critical time element here, to get these parts designed and get into
manufacturing. That night, that evening at home, I came up with a new
arrangement for the controls of the hydraulics systems. The next morning,
I gave the way I thought it ought to be, and they could go ahead then with
getting the final design papers drawn up and get this into manufacturing.

Bernard’s most memorable design experience for the cockpit layout he drew from
his pilot experience even though he was a young engineer at the time who felt humble in
the presence of senior design engineers who worked on some of the first commercial
airplanes. It is memorable to him because his design was used later in spacecraft:
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I made the comment that this was going to be a short range airplane. There
would be a lot of visual flying into airports. The pilots would really need a
horizontal reference to fly the airplane, a reference to the horizon for level
flight. To do this, the glare shield over the instrument panel could be made
flat across the top as much as possible before it curves…the project pilot
said to make a glare shield over the instrument panel in the mock up that
we had of the cockpit and he would take a look at it… when he saw it, he
thought it was a good idea and the design should be that way.

Later, Bernard’s former boss participated at least tangentially in the design of a
space shuttle. His former boss told Bernard that he recommended the flat glare shield
idea. Even young engineers, as Joel in Category 4 points out, can have great ideas that
older engineers need to learn to solicit:
Because [the space shuttle] was basically a two man cockpit, “they came
to us to go over the design of the [AIRCRAFT1] to see how they might
incorporate some of the features of the [AIRCRAFT1] in the space
shuttle… the space shuttle crew might like to have for a horizontal
reference to fly the airplane and land it” …and that's the way they
designed the space shuttle.

Bernard described a sense of uncertainty in design in only one of his experiences.
He designed an external camera mount that would be used for a very short time as a oneoff situation while he was employed at an airline (OES). He had only his calculations
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and no test data before the design was installed. Here, he followed a linear design
process with no prototypes or bench tests where the actual use of his design was the one
and only test. He did, however, have the airframe and powerplant integrator engineers
review his design:
There were speed restrictions on the airplane because of the tail camera
that [company1] said we should not exceed… It was like a cold sweat
flying to [location1] with the camera because of any unknowns on how the
tail was going to react on the airplane… the first thing I did was look out
the airplane when we landed to see that everything was still in the right
place on the airplane. We did.

Edmund talked about a recent design experience that he thinks could have gone
better if his management team had a different risk attitude. He was part of a
multidisciplinary team looking at a particular system, where the designers belong to the
propulsion group, the dynamicist studies vibration, and Edmund owns electronic
monitoring systems that can detect vibration. Here, Edmund encountered epistemic
uncertainty regarding whether the propulsion system would have unacceptable vibration
or not. His response was to engage higher management in the decision process:
The dynamicist was stating that he believes the drives need to have the
option to be balanced and we should have the ability to measure the
balance of them and to modify the balance of them on the aircraft and to at
least measure the balance of them in case we have problems. That was his
side but then the design side, the transmission side stated that they don't
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feel that it needs to be balanced. The vendor will balance them before they
will deliver them. They will be fully balanced. There won't be an issue… I
was stuck in the middle because I have the system that actually measures
the balance of the drive shafts… I don't not trust the dynamicist guy but I
worked with the designers more… We put together a risk. We talked
about it. We had 2 different sides that were completely in disagreement
with each other. We brought it to management.

Luciana had both senior design experience and internship experience but her
transcript focused on her senior design experience primarily because the interview
protocol questions focused on experiences of her making decisions. The most difficult
part of the senior design experience was the fly portion, in which the pilot experience can
be classified an epistemic uncertainty:
The biggest problem was we had to fly it ourselves. None of us in my
team had any experience with flying an RC aircraft… It crashed pretty
much immediately and a lot of teams had the same problem but it was a
little disappointing to not really get to see if our airplane really was able to
do all of the things that we said it would do... We didn't know how our
friend was going to be able to fly the airplane... I think that was the thing
that I was most annoyed about in the whole thing… that was really
frustrating. I felt that we were on an uneven playing field due to that.
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Decisions on Luciana’s team were emotionally driven even though there were
more objective tools at their disposal, such as a decision matrix:
We thought it looked better so we wanted it… It was we'd recognize that
they all were fairly good and we just had to pick one… I felt like a lot of
times it was out of frustration… I felt like we were making the decision
matrix the way we wanted it to be… which one would be the right
decision? A lot of times you just have to wait and see or like pick one and
see how it feels… There was no way, with the knowledge that you had at
the time of the decision, that you could have known any better.

There were design configuration and sizing epistemic uncertainties that Luciana
encountered: “how would our battery last the longest. What was the least weight? What
was simplest to build also is a big component.” So she and her team conducted a few
bench tests:
Helping us decide what wheels we wanted. We would test a bunch of
different wheels and see how long they took to stop in order to be able to
calculate the takeoff distance …we tested a couple things out with how
much power did our motor and propeller system really have… we were all
a little concerned because our tests all came back fairly different… We
tried it out a couple of times in terms of we would turn it on and drive it
around the hallways in the basement but not fly. Sometimes we would turn
it all the way up to capacity and hold it to see what sort of force we were
expecting.
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Miranda experienced simultaneous and interrelated epistemic uncertainties in
cultural differences, data management, and schedule management in one of her first postdoctoral assignments in a research laboratory in a foreign country. She was trying to
decide whether to include a baseline experiment or to use some form of previously
measured data, and this was an agonizing decision for her:
It's been a really big cultural difference for me learning how information
flows… No one wants to give you information… lost information because
of legal reasons …my primary responsibilities are designing the human in
the loop experiments… I was trying to figure out whether we'd run a third
[experiment]… Do we have a reference point? How are we actually going
to say that our [design] is super useful if we don't have anything to
compare against. … It was a really big deal though, because it also meant
increasing the amount of work that we had to do. It also meant delaying
some of the real actual work that we were on the hook for …first time I've
dealt with a moderate level of responsibilities… I have regretted and
rethought this decision 1,000 times, because this is the biggest one I've
made so far on this project. It also shaped everything because it was made
so early on.

In an event that Stephen in Category 4 describes as the “gotcha” moment,
Miranda discovered a resolution to an epistemic uncertainty that she had not considered
during the planning stages. She found out in the execution of her experiment that there
was baseline data that she could have used:
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[Experiment participant] said ‘I don't understand why we need to have this
discussion because there's a whole project already devoted to answering
all these questions. You are effectively redoing all this work’… It was so
tense in this meeting room because everyone was looking at each other,
and then [experiment participant] looked at us and he said ‘do you know
of [project3]’... My first reaction was I've never heard of this project… It
never occurred to me to really look at all the other projects that had been
done. I just put the information that was given to me from the project
manager because I started on the project late.

Vincent has a few years of professional experience and has been assigned
schedule and budget responsibilities in addition to technical cognizance responsibilities.
He spoke of two incidents, one having a pressing schedule requirement and the other not
as urgent.
For the urgent issue, Vincent faced two epistemic questions: “number one, can
this part even be installed on the aircraft… second question being, how is going to affect
the way other pieces interface with it.” His solution strategy was first “, rel[ying] on my
expertise on that point and knowledge of how things are fitting together. With that
particular component, I own the other pieces that are around that component.” Secondly,
he “got with my designers and I said ‘CATIA support,’ and then I had them help me draw
up a worst case installation… Also talked with a couple of manufacturing folks that
actually do some of the installation on the floor. Those guys are a great resource… We
were able to use that, put a case together, and present it to engineering management”.
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4.3.2.2 Team Engagement
Plastic participants give the design their due diligence and then ask for informal
peer review quickly. Sometimes, their due diligence includes checking their work
through a checklist or process that someone else created or established. That someone
may be within the company or team, or it may be a broader pool of knowledge from a
professional society. This two-step process gives them more confidence to take their
recommendations to higher management to make the final decision.
Bernard engaged his superiors and teammates to review his designs after he gave
the design his best effort, but not before or during his design work. He mentioned
generally his engagement with his superiors and teammates:
You try to be as thorough and try to get other people's feelings on what
you're doing and see if it is the right design… When you try it out, you see
if it works or not… the main thing I think is important is to try to get as
wide an outlook, as wide a view, with other people, get as much open
view, of what's all involved, what other people are doing, how they're
connected. Good communications… Be more thorough, you just learn,
you never stop learning in most anything.

Diana earned an electrical engineering degree and went to work at an aerospace
company, so she needed to learn the company’s product line in addition to understanding
the responsibilities of the job, which primarily includes defining requirements for
contractors and then verifying the contractors’ work. Her company abides by a clear
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decision process, including large meetings to prioritize problems to fix, and more
discipline-specific checklists to verify fixes:
I need to make sure that my change is not going to somehow mess up their
whole system or their system design is not going to somehow negatively
impact my change, so we do have a lot of checklists and a lot of
procedures to review all the changes and make sure that we've focaled
with the right people, and we also have a lot of meetings with the supplier.

Edmund’s management team decided to take the “wait and see” route. The
consequence of “wait and see” on performance and schedule was clear when they found
unacceptable vibration later. The solution from the management team was to do
something quickly and move on, and this annoyed Edmund:
The risk was actually realized where they ended up having a really bad
issue of unbalanced drive shafts on the aircraft. It delayed ground testing 2
months… It was not an optimal solution that we could pull together
because we didn't have the amount of time to pull it together and do the
usual design paperwork… We had to band aid something on to try to
continue ground testing… we spent more money than we would've
because it was emergency fashion instead of normal planned work.

Miranda considered several options for obtaining or creating the reference point
data and summarized the data in a decision matrix, a tool that Edmund and Luciana chose
not to use. In addition to leveraging her own knowledge of running experiments, the
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biggest decision making steps to populate the decision matrix were cycles of
conversations and approvals from stakeholders:
I talked to people in the group. I talked to my boss. I relied a lot on my
own experience because I had done a similar validation study… big
meetings with the head of the departments here and there, or all the big
players, the bosses of everyone who had an investment in this project…
Then we're going to try to clear this with the [government office 1], which
they said they were okay with. Then we went ahead with it.

Much like Philip, Miranda wants to talk to her teammates as her uncertainty
management strategy: “our lunch hours are a good hour long and we have breaks, there's
a lot of exchange of ideas that happens and enriches all our research… Talk to other
engineers who know the field.” She noted that there are hindrances to having effective
conversations “when you want to leave good impressions on people you are so stiff and
unlikely to admit when you're wrong, or when you're not sure, of when you don't know.”
Much like Margaret, Miranda noted external influences can mitigate uncertainty:
Conferences, or had to give these talks. I've had to take 2 or 3 steps back
and try to express to someone who's never seen it, and it gives me a little
bit more reassurance that the decisions that I made, or we made, were
worthwhile…you make the decision and then you talk to a lot of really
smart people about it. You get everyone's perspective, and at some point
you have to make a decision. You have to have some conviction.
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Like Miranda, Vincent has improved in his engagement of peers and engineering
superiors to mitigate his uncertainty:
I ran it through a peer review as well to make sure I wasn't losing my
mind… I use a lot of peer review. I rely very heavily on my peer's inputs
and opinions… the analysis was very well received because everybody
was already in the loop, everybody knew it was going on already. Again,
that goes back to reaching out to folks that know a lot more than you do…
just having everybody in the loop, everybody knowing what's going on,
and you're kind of presenting the analysis as you go, and everybody's
giving their input and helping to make corrections… Doesn't mean that
every suggestion is right or can be implemented, but at least you're not
flying solo… You've got some backup, you've got people that are more
experienced than you are by doing that for you.

Vincent continued to note the value of more experienced engineers, seeming to
take their word at face value: “Getting coordination, coordination's key. Making sure you
got the right people on the project is key… people that are far older, people have been in
industry a lot longer, and you ask around. You ask your peers in your immediate group,
you ask your supervisor, they'll point you to the right guys because they've worked with
them before.” He values the more experienced engineers’ tacit knowledge: “I think a lot
of it has to do with the history: has it been done before?”
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4.3.2.3 Personal Response to Uncertainty
Plastic participants have gained some proficiency in asking for help and
overcoming the hurdles of being unfamiliar with a subject or topic. Equipped with
information from others, a Plastic participant has a subdued emotional response to
uncertainty. There is comfort in following someone else, and it may even be confidence
to finish a design project well.
For Diana, the second part of the design process is specific to her job. Following
predefined processes is her management strategy for uncertainty; the completion of the
checklist is the signal that her work is complete:
We update our requirement documents and send it off to the supplier and
the supplier will update the software based on those requirement changes,
send it back to us, we test it, we make sure everything's good, catch any
problems, make updates, test it again, and we're good to go… There's
always some uncertainty, and it's really following the processes, getting a
lot of input and support from other group members, and we've got all of
these checklists to follow and so forth to try to limit any uncertainties.

For Edmund, his management strategies for uncertainty include leveraging his
knowledge first, then following the program procedures of apprising superiors, and then
consulting with Subject Matter Experts, but not formal design process management tools.
What the lead engineer chooses is the path to follow:
I think about my past experience, my knowledge of the systems, of the
physics involved, not equation based but past experience, and your
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engineering intuition. Then you follow the procedures the program laid
out… Give them a one slide quad chart presentation. If you put green on it
they're happy, if you put red on it they're not happy… they said use ace or
six sigma tools but we don't use any of that stuff. We just ... get a small
group of knowledgeable people, not in a room but in a conversation, and
brain storm together and have the lead pick what he wants to go forward
with… We usually don't debate too much on various options because they
cost more to debate than just to pick one and go forward.

Edmund prefers his individual work to get an approximate solution based on his
prior knowledge and make progress, but he still leaves a little room for new ideas from
other teammates:
They just want us to make an 80% solution and not make sure it's going to
100% work. They just want to get us 80% solution with the cost of 80% or
40% and move on to the next thing. Then not have to make a science
project out of it and just pick something and move on. … We don't want to
sit here bickering about which way were going to do things… I've done
this before, I know which way will get us complete on the project. Might
not be the most efficient but I know it will work, but I will listen to what
you have to say so please give me your opinion… You don't know what
their opinion is unless you actually tell them what's going on so they can
give you their opinion.
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Luciana managed her uncertainty by relying on other teams’ previously proven
work and by relying on the approval of her superiors. Luciana even expressed
confidence about her task:
We didn't have a huge concern about it because the kits had been used for
years. This project was something that had been done over and over again
every senior year… I felt almost like no matter what decision we made it
would be fine. That was pretty comforting. I knew that there wasn't one
absolute killer decision… there were lots of solutions and that no matter
what we did, we could optimize it… [Course professor] was extremely
involved. He was at all of our design presentations and gave feedback. He
was often down in the senior lab helping us design our aircraft and build
them… Also just having our professor and our classmates all see what we
were doing. It gave us the feeling like what we're doing makes sense…
Everyone was able to ask questions and challenge you on your decisions.
Sometimes from those presentations you make changes and things like
that. I found that really effective.

Notably, Luciana mentioned the matter of gender as non-negligible. She was
inspired to pursue engineering by a female science teacher in high school. But
particularly in her senior design project: “it was the very first all female team at
[university1] that had existed. What was interesting was that our professor was really
excited about it… All of them had on their goal list to beat the girl team… Our professor
got really upset with all the teams and he gave us this big ethical and gender speech in
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class.” While this did not appear to have an effect in her team, it seemed to have an
effect in other teams.
Miranda described her emotional process of making these decisions and executing
on them, including confidence in a decision because of justifiable evidence: “Personally
I felt really good about our going forward… It was very classic. I knew I could justify
why we had certain results. … lot of times we really, really regretted this decision,
because it felt like we were stagnating on something that wasn't even critical to our
project… It's not fun because you are essentially redoing and emulating work.”
Vincent is not afraid of uncertainty; rather it is a warning that the design is not
complete: “I would say be aware of it and learn from it, but don't be scared of it because
it's always going to be there. You're never going to get away from it, so stop trying to get
away from it… Uncertainty is a good warning that maybe you don't have the right answer
to the problem… you have not been able to convince yourself, then maybe there's still a
problem.”

4.3.2.4 Reflections on Learning to Manage Uncertainty
All the participants were asked to reflect on their growth in ability to manage
uncertainty. Edmund thought his process has not changed. However, Diana continues to
learn: “a lead, actually once a week or twice a week, would take all of the new hires and
interns and just talk about airplanes. He’d just start teaching you about the system and
held classes… I had started taking on more responsibilities and you start at square one
again. It's like ‘Okay, well, let's learn this system now’.”
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Now as Luciana has moved to other projects, she has reflected on her growth as a
designer: “I notice a lot of iteration in my research… just taking the time and being
patient is really important to move forward and to trust that you'll continue informing the
problem as it goes on, which is something I like… Just being willing to know that your
answer might change.”
Much like Luciana, Miranda noted her growth in appreciating the complexity of a
problem: “Obviously you can't control everything. Obviously you cannot control who is
going to talk to you, who you're going to get information from… the process is iterative.
There is definitely maturation when it comes to understanding the nature of a problem…
Fully having an appreciation for the complexity of a problem comes in stages.”
Vincent noted his growth as a designer in completing this design project:
Give me a little bit of confidence having never really done it before… my
transition to the [AIRCRAFT1] program, was a big one. That was a big
confidence booster for me… For me it was getting thrown into the deep
end there, and then just practicing executing on it… I relied a lot on my
peers, and I think they're largely responsible for my growth as an engineer,
for the success I had making that transition… The design process is the
same, the decision process is the same. You're just executing some things
a little bit faster… I would say that the majority of engineering problems
are, you never reach certainty.
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4.3.3 Category 3: Tolerant
Tolerant engineers have a good awareness that uncertainty is ever present and will
never be eliminated in the physical parts and systems that they are designing, and there is
another source of uncertainty as they engage customers and teammates more deeply in
the design task. Tolerant engineers are trying to understand the goals and concerns of the
other stakeholders, which may remain undeclared. Though they describe projects as team
efforts generally, they simultaneously express a significant sense of ownership or
investment in the design task. They are guided by foundational scientific principles, an
expert behavior of deep conceptual understanding (M. T. H. Chi et al., 1981). That deep
investment and deep understanding may be the signal to others that they are Subject
Matter Experts.
Tolerant engineers use almost no emotions to describe themselves, other than
taking an experimental attitude, which is to acknowledge that some solution paths may
fail and that is better to know than not to know. However, they may use emotional terms
to describe the components of a system interacting with other components, and viewing
the component and the “owner” (another engineer) of the component as being happy
when the components and their interaction satisfy all specified requirements.
The complexity of the design task requires careful planning and long term testing
and experimentation in order to reduce epistemic uncertainty. Tolerant engineers are
confident that there is an answer to the problem, whatever the problem may be. It will
just be a matter of schedule and budget constraints on whether they will proceed to
execute the tests to gain the knowledge. Tolerant engineers may describe uncertainty as
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risk, where the attitude is to manage risk rather than manage uncertainty; risk is
frequently thought of by the indicator “critical to flight safety”.
The participants whose transcripts compose this category are Abraham, Bertram,
Jacques, Nathaniel, Oliver, and Viola. These participants are spread across research
institutions, propulsion companies, and airframe and powerplant integrator companies.
Abraham is the most experienced participant in this category, having 34 years’
experience. Viola is the least experienced participant, having 4 years’ experience.

4.3.3.1 Forms of Uncertainty
Participants in the Tolerant category have a deep conceptual understanding of
scientific principles that govern the performance of the systems they are designing, and
that knowledge equips them to explore epistemic uncertainties well. They are now aware
of aleatory uncertainties in their respective subject matter areas. They have a broader
view of their peers as teammates who share decision-making authority, and
communication with peers concerning design introduces ambiguous forms of uncertainty.
Abraham’s most recent design task is conceptual development of a new aircraft
configuration. He describes his responsibility as an iterative converging design process
to find a compromise solution among multiple systems that meets the key aerodynamic
and manufacturing requirements. Some portions of the work are individual and other
portions are collaborative:
Individual engineering tasks or items to do myself, but also have the
responsibility to consult with our various flight technology engineers to
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design and solve numerous problems… basically I'm allowed to observe
all aspects of a design… so I can spread my experience around. to make
sure that each designer is following the 4 basic rules or requirements to
minimize: 1.) drag, 2.) weight, 3.) cost, 4.) schedule. I go around and
check on every part to meet the requirement for that part as well as the top
four items. It's a continuous iterative process to keep checking on all the
designers until you find a compromise solution that works... Most
engineers think you can cycle through this process once, but it's not true.
You have to go through it about every six months because you're evolving
the design and narrowing in your requirements.

While most of his work focuses on four basic rules, Abraham cannot ignore
anything that is a flight safety risk. Part of his Subject Matter Expertise focused on flyby-wire controls for the pilot. Silvia had classes on building in triple redundancy, and
Abraham is actually using redundancy as part of mitigating risk of safety critical designs.
Abraham has a clear process of identifying and prioritizing flight-safety critical items:
If you're wrong on drag, it's not going to kill anybody. But flight controls,
if you have a failure mode that you haven't thought of, don't know how to
account for it, it could be a disaster. Those are the ones, that ambiguity,
are really more important to catch them, there has to be no question as to
how it's going to work… then it gets down to creating the failures and
making sure you've covered all the possible paths. And then you
categorize them, these are critical, these are not so critical, and these are
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benign. There are many failures that are in the nuisance category. If you
have enough redundancy, it's okay. Then you come up with , after you
solve the critical ones, make sure those that are life-threatening or aircraftdestroying but still nobody hurt, take care of those first… keep working
the most critical ones first, and work your way down to the nuisance ones.
Then flight test and you’re ok.

Abraham describes his experience of uncertainty as an awareness of ever-present
uncertainty and long-term management strategy. His strategy is to focus on the four big
requirements, to spend some time doing textbook analysis, and then moving to small
scale testing before full scale testing. His process follows government and military
product development (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2011):
Ambiguity is everywhere, and what you have to balance is how much,
kind of back to the basic four, drag, weight, cost, schedule. You have to
determine how much trade study or analysis is enough. Because you never
get a 100% answer… Analysis has reached its end and the only way to
reduce ambiguity further is to do some sort of small bench test… that gets
you close enough to go forward with the design and then you would go to
the small test (like wind tunnel) to remove further risk before you get to
the final design decision… get further into the full aircraft simulation
model, and run through scenarios in that. That part's pretty important,
because you get a total aircraft simulation model, that has integration of all
subsystems.
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Bertram has nearly the same years of experience as Abraham, but with
considerably more variation, first in running a family-owned manufacturing business and
then moving into the customer support side of engineering and design. He views the
engineering drawing as the final design authority, but that it is clearly a team effort:
“engineering drawing or overhaul, there's always more than one signature at the
bottom… You can look at drawings and who worked on the team that developed the
part… no one person has all the answers. We have become so specialized. The breadth of
what I work on is a lot and there's very few of us that do that.”
The forms of uncertainty that Bertram encounters are more schedule-oriented for
repair and overhaul responsibilities: “I think that's the biggest difference, that there's a
little more uncertainty about what tomorrow's going to look like on the repair side.” He
gave an example of finding an unexpected failure and providing key in-service
information to the design teams about that failure:
If all of a sudden a gear has come apart and they don't know why, they
will ground the fleet… As overhaul and repair, we might be going back
and looking at those parts that have come in on an engine for repair, even
if it's not in there for that part, we might get an order to pull those pieces,
whatever they are, and do an analysis… they look for historical
information if we have it… We keep a lot of data to mine. We will supply
whatever they need… When you absolutely have to get something done,
you'll find whatever resource you need in order to get your parts made or
get them moving and find the resources.
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Jacques’ most recent experience included “redirecting the program and rebuilding
the program… reconstruct the design of the whole research project program to find a way
that we could use these [components] in a value-added research context so we can do
some research that will be valuable with the [components] without scratching all the
work that's been done on them.” The goal of his effort was to “Improve communication
along all lines, improve transparency” because “it's my job to make sure the sponsors get
what they want” from a supplier with whom the sponsor had a “history of a pretty poor
working relationship”.
The uncertainty Jacques encountered most was epistemic, the volitional
uncertainties of the supplier and the sponsor. His action to this was “collecting
information, getting every party's point of view, understanding the stakeholders,
understanding a little bit of the history of why things were the way they were. The first
thing was fact- finding and information gathering, and the second part is to take action
based on that information”. He noted behaviors such as “People have their guard up and
you're going to get a lot more opinions and negative comments.” He noted several
sources of uncertainty: “You're still dealing with people, personalities, attitudes, time
constraint, budget, and there's someone supervising you. You have a customer.”
Nathaniel’s most recent assignment occurred because of sudden personnel
changes that are expected in the aerospace business: “When he got laid off in one of the
big layoffs that happened, they dragged me off of the project I was on to come replace
him as the experienced technical oversight… At the time, there were about 5 people on
the project. Now, we’re coming really close to completion and we’re down to three
including me.” Nathaniel was assigned technical cognizance responsibility where he saw
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multiple systems related to propulsion interacting, and he led the converging design
process to a compromise solution:
The challenge of moving it all over the place is that each system has an
environment that it has to live in…creating an environment for all the
different systems, electrical, hydraulic systems, fuel systems, pneumatic
systems… Everytime we moved it to a new location, there may be
components that had to move along with it that really didn’t want to be
what we were taking and having to rebalance all of those compromises
just to try get a happy system and an efficient structure. That is the
challenge that the designer is tasked with solving.

Nathaniel’s design process included balancing trade-offs, where he describes
encountering design uncertainty that Thunnissen (2003) defines as “variables over which
the engineer or designer has direct control but has not yet decided upon. An example is
the choice an engineer has in selecting a given component among a set of possible
components. Design uncertainty is eliminated when a system is complete as all choices
have been implemented”:
You typically start with ... I like to call them blobs. They’re space
holders… So I don't go model that starter in great detail. I’ll model it as a
cylinder that gives me a physical shape… We went through many
iterations of exhaust configurations to produce the right amount of
pumping to get the right kind of mass flow rates. We moved inlets around
based on the shape of the contour… We struggled with at least 4 different
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iterations, major significant iterations of engine mount systems and
actually wound up using an example of an old [aircraft2] to build what we
termed a space frame, which is actually a pretty old concept… That came
from a much older and more experienced design engineer that I’ve been
pretty fortunate to work with several times in my career. He was there just
for such an occurrence.

Oliver describes his flight test responsibilities as preparing and executing flight
tests: “It's writing test plans, it's executing the flight tests, it's writing the reports, doing
the post processing analysis…Working with the pilots…Have them use the charts and
make sure that they're comfortable doing it before it gets out to the pilot
community…Make sure that you meet the contract.” He describes his goal as: “You're
trying to flight test the aircraft. You're trying to make a good product that's reliable,
repeatable, and safe of course.” He is also balancing his superiors’ expectations:
“Program management is jumping on top of us to say whatever way is the shortest time
and the lowest cost.”
Oliver emphasizes that the goal of flight test is to obtain repeatable data to support
the designers who will support the end-user pilots: “you need to repeat some of those
points or open the envelope a little bit deeper and the other pilot can't repeat it, what's the
sense in even trying it…you've got to think strongly about the repeatability…If you can't
get that repeatable on a conservative level from all the pilots that have ever tried it and
know how to fly emergency maneuvers, then you're doing it wrong.”
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Viola considers the design of aerospace curriculum as design. She faced a
decision point of re-envisioning the whole course apart from other seasoned professors to
stay with the incumbent routine that she felt was not meeting the need of the customer, in
this case, the student:
Do I go with the path of I should probably get along with my colleagues
and just work with them and the way they're doing it?... or... Design the
course I really want, which is very engineering design heavy? Introducing
students to the problem solving process, very student driven, more my
style… if I designed the course the way I wanted to it would look very
different from the last five sections of the course, well the other two that
the faculty was doing.

4.3.3.2 Team Engagement
Tolerant participants view themselves as an owner of a system, and they see their
peers as owners of systems that interact with their systems, so communication and
coordination are valuable for the success of the whole project. In this context, a system
could be an engine or avionics, or it could be a process such as flight test or a learning
environment; the key element is that the engineer has responsibility and authority for
whatever happens. They view other engineers and their systems as one entity or the
engineer as the spokesperson for the voiceless system, so to make the engineer happy is
to have found a desirable solution to the design problem.
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Abraham describes a sizeable list of stakeholders in the design process, with
particular emphasis on his engineering team, which are his peers and his superiors.
Marketing coworkers are expected to interface with the customer:
Every IPT leader, every group involved in the design, as well as chief
engineers, and/or folks like me, tech fellows, and/or staff engineers. There
are regular meetings between different groups, to keep everybody
collaborating… we're going out with different mockups at trade shows,
CGI kind of stuff, trying to get the product reviewed by the customer
before we make it. Our marketing folks see what the customer wants…
The customer was pleased enough. The customer is invited to all of our
meetings, even internal design decision meetings. They don't always
participate, but, the invitation is always there… it's mainly up to us to
meet our own requirements, to get a demonstrator out the door.

Bertram’s response to uncertainty is reduce or eliminate uncertainty because of
flight safety, but not as an individual: “there's a little more uncertainty about what
tomorrow's going to look like on the repair side… we can't live with uncertainty in
aerospace. We spend every hour of everyday trying to make that people are safe when
they fly… If there is something that is uncertain, we need to make it certain, that we
understand everything about it.” In particular, he coaches younger engineers to get
comfortable with the team environment, noting that being uncomfortable can lead to
problems with career longevity: “hasn't spent any time working on the shop or working
with mechanics, it can be very intimidating. We lose a lot of people because they're not
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comfortable and it is so challenging… And you're not going to be on your own. You’re
going to learn from everybody else.”
Nathaniel’s attitude about teammates is positive, where he seeks informal peer
review as a check on himself and appreciates that engaging others may accelerate the
convergence to a compromise solution:
The difference, in my opinion, between an average designer and a good
designer is the good designer knows who he needs to talk to to get what
kind of information… A good seasoned eye will take at least one, maybe 2
iterations out of a design cycle... All opinions should be welcome because
there is something to learn pretty much from everybody, even the people
that are hard to work with…We’ve got another very experienced engineer
who probably doesn’t need my oversight technically, but I provide for him
a sounding board, same as he does for me… I just need somebody to look
at it and give me a sanity check.

Oliver relies on previous work documented after flight tests and others’
experience in planning flight tests: “design these test plans, a lot of it is history based so
what did we do before. Look at the reports, look at the test plans that were done
before….History-based is one way but then talking to all the experienced people
obviously… experience and the history. Those are my primary two things.” For example,
“The pilot will come in there and tell you if it's safe, if it's viable, if they could fly it.”
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Oliver iterates almost individually on his design of test plans, acknowledging
trade-offs of schedule, cost, and volume of data, in preparation to present to the other
stakeholders, especially his management, for their approval:
PowerPoint slides, called the quad chart review process, but you come up
with different options and you lay out the options. You try your best to not
be biased when you're trying to make this… think about the positives and
the negatives of doing each individual one… review that presentation
material with the people that did have those ideas… That's what you want
to convince yourself of when you do this exercise. You want to see are
you making the right choices even though you might not believe that the
other choices are the right choices you've still got to put them on the table
… laid out in such a way that the tradeoffs are very well expressed…I'll
go though that process a couple times until I feel that it's at a point where I
could present it in front of a large group of people. At that point we will
try to conduct a meeting with everybody that's involved.

Oliver experiences phenomenological uncertainty in flight test because his team is
testing new configurations, new software, and new maneuvers. So he and his team have
to be prepared for surprises:
If it's a new helicopter design … we're going to get different results and
we've got to be totally open minded about that …we tread on a lot of new
turf… developmental testing. We find out surprises… in the performance
group you don't see too many surprises…Structures, propulsions, they're
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going to see other things that are very characteristic to each individual
aircraft.

Oliver’s toolkit for measuring the uncertainty includes documentation review and
consulting with other Subject Matter Experts. Troubleshooting of data collection
instrumentation is another popular option, including consulting with SMEs specific to
that instrumentation. As well, he thinks about the newly recorded flight data in
comparison to the textbook analytical data he already has:
Try to research it… we go back to the subject matter experts… I've had to
dig into old data to see if on other aircraft… We tend to hunt after the
instrumentation systems first … At first we thought maybe the
instrumentation something got knocked and maybe we need to recheck the
calibrations… getting the engine rep out to [city6] to do some
inspections… then that's the revealing point of, OK, we've learned
something new… we document this well… instead of looking at the
instrumentation first, we might go re-brief, make sure that we're safe, and
do a mid-point… something that threw the trending off a little bit and let's
just repeat the point… that you didn't screw up a formula. If you're still
uncertain you repeat the point as long as it was safe.

Viola’s design process included a significant amount of data collection from
stakeholders and then to try a few prototypes, both are human-centered design tools
(IDEO, 2009; Maguire, 2001; Zoltowski, Oakes, & Cardella, 2010):
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I typically talk to other people. So I try to get feedback from lots of
different individuals… got feedback from my boss, I got feedback from
my fiancé, I mentioned it to him. I got feedback from a colleague of
mine… I did some very, very, very little rapid prototyping. I'm using the
word very loosely, of what would the course look like… I attended
meetings with the other faculty to see how they were thinking about
designing the course. So I tried to understand that design alternative as
well… I actually emailed all of my students from when I taught the course
in the spring of 2014… I got responses from actually about 12 to 15
people out of a forty-seven student class giving me feedback.

The implementation of her idea has some areas of behavioral and schedule
uncertainty from the users, and Viola viewed these uncertainties as risk. Another element
of risk was not getting feedback from the user about the design meeting expectations:
I had no control over the topics that the students were doing for this
project. This is the most risky part of my design… I was a little nervous
because it was hard to predict. I didn't know how long these things would
take… making sure my users understand that they should tell me if things
aren't going well. That's been really hard with this group. To get them to
complain unless I push a lot… knowing that I'm not going to get all the
information that I need even if I ask for it in class and needing to find
other ways of gathering that information… you're working with a user
group that has a life outside your class.
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Like Oliver, Viola encourages questions: “I know many many people who don't
ask for advice. They just don't ask questions. Who don't talk to people when they're stuck
and they just get in a worse and worse place.” Like Abraham, Viola notes a particular
view of uncertainty: “Uncertainty is less of a fear as much as a problem.”

4.3.3.3 Personal Response to Uncertainty
The Tolerant participants have an almost neutral emotional response to
uncertainties they encounter, because they are comfortable with the notion that some
ideas or paths will be productive and some will not. They are confident that an answer
exists to the design problem, and that it will take resources and iterations to find it. This
is in marked contrast to a Brittle participant’s low confidence that a task could be
executed at all.
Abraham described his personal response to encountering uncertainty as a
welcome challenge to be addressed as a team:
Have patience. There is ambiguity and uncertainty at all levels…
Ambiguity should be something to look forward to… something not be
feared, but it's a challenge to go figure it out. try to be clever enough to
solve that uncertainty …an answer that's either 80% good, or design a
trade study that you can deal with that ambiguity in a manner that won't
take forever… you should never think of it as something you have to solve
yourself… Collaboration is being encouraged more these days.
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Jacques’ personal response to encountering uncertainty is much like Abraham’s, a
welcome challenge: “I took it as a challenge and opportunity… Get everyone's
perspective and to really be patient and make sure I understand things very well before I
took any action… maybe that's the way you manage risk: you take the middle ground.”
Primarily in this design situation, “Understand the risks, not only to you but to the
stakeholders and to the other entities that are involved in any decision. Also, timing. I
think there's a time for action and there's a time for fact finding and information
gathering.” He re-emphasized patience while converging on a solution like Abraham did:
Understand or quantify risks. Understand what the risk of a certain
outcome would be. Understand the possible outcomes. Understand the
risks associated with those outcomes. Make sure that you have a good
understanding of the situation before you take any action because
sometimes it can be harder to undo a wrong action. You have to be patient
and wait for the right time to take action. Believe in yourself and have
confidence in yourself. Know also that it's okay for things to go wrong.

Nathaniel’s overall summary of his job is: “I’d say uncertainty to me is anything
below about 95% sure. I spend most of my time dealing with a tremendous amount of
uncertainty… not certain that it’s going to function appropriately. We mitigate the
uncertainty with experience, interactions with other groups, to help us make design
decisions.”
Nathaniel’s personal approach to managing uncertainty includes a “good air of
humility”, like Jacques and Abraham mentioned about patience:
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It helps me when I come into a project early enough in the design process
that I can grow and learn the particular peculiarities of the design… The
most important difference between me and a new hire is I'm experienced
in dealing with problems that I have created on my own. At this point in
my career, I'm not so proud or so sure of myself that I'm right, that I have
balanced all of the compromises appropriately, or that I even am aware of
all of the compromises, all of the requirements that I have to actually
meet. I'm very active at seeking out the people that I do know I need to be
working with.

Oliver’s personal response to uncertainty includes comparing new data to some
baseline, expecting data to look like the baseline, but not ignoring the data if it does not
follow the baseline:
Every other helicopter that [company3] had has been pretty much the
same design when you think about it. It's one rotor blade system with a tail
rotor blade. We kind of know what to expect for the most part…
performance testing, you go by a lot of trending… Don't ever, ever assume
that things were supposed to happen the way that they have in the past…
make sure that you always expect the unexpected… Try to have a plan if
deviations come up.

Viola’s personal approach to uncertainty is experimental: “I treat them very
carefully. I don't take things personally which I think is very difficult as an instructor…
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my attitude had been more experimental… I'm testing it in the classroom… I check in
with them a lot… We're prototyping constantly as an instructor.” She noted an adherence
to foundational principles as a mitigation of uncertainty:” with the uncertainty is really
sticking with what you know … underlying principles are still working for them… I'm
going to stick with what I know works. Those underlying principles and then test little
incremental things as opposed to large scale changes.”

4.3.3.4 Reflections on Learning to Manage Uncertainty
Tolerant participants look back on their supposed failures as teachable moments.
They have had enough time to find that they can recover from those failures and that the
next time they will be more thorough now that they have expanded their awareness of
sources of uncertainty.
Nathaniel noted his own growth in managing his emotions towards design
projects: “you feel very overconfident and you come out of school… lacking the
fundamental understanding that the complexity of what you’re about to do and the
number of compromises that you’re going to have.” Like Miranda, Nathaniel mentioned
“compromises that are made early in a project can haunt later aspects of a project.” Like
Ross, Nathaniel mentioned “to start taking apart into its simplest pieces, to start dealing
with those pieces as they pertain to the requirements, and to begin balancing those
compromises.”
Oliver noted his personal growth as a designer, including learning from failure,
breaking problems into smaller pieces, and managing his own feelings toward failure:
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My senior design project was totally something that we've never tried
before… you had to pick apart your problems, know how to attack them,
figure out the options of the paths to go, what the best choices were, and
make sure that everybody is in agreement … It was disappointing. We did
fail. We learned a lot... you can't look at anything in engineering as ever a
total failure…So ask the right questions, because without experience you
can't ask the right questions all the time. Getting rid of the fear of not
asking the right questions I think is the important key here.

Viola notes her growth in accepting that there might be failures and those can be
learning experiences. She also notes getting her emotions under control as she works
through successes and failures:
You think you know what you're doing and oh no you don't… I'm going to
just try and we're just going to see what happens and it's going to be okay
if it doesn't work out, and so with the uncertainty part you're saying it is
totally uncertain because you haven't had the experience yet… definitely
being more flexible and not taking things personally, because I think there
is so much uncertainty in where their projects are going to go, what their
interests are, how busy their going to get… not taking things personally
which was very hard after last semester and as I mentioned, standing my
ground.
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4.3.4 Category 4: Robust
Robust engineers anticipate the unexpected, which makes them willing to try new
methods, new processes, and new solutions. Novelty requires real data instead of opinion
to verify and validate decision paths. Because of the complexity of the design tasks, they
must have significant engagement with their teammates and other stakeholders. Team
engagement, because of the demand of actionable data, may become confrontational.
Epistemic uncertainty is the uncertainty that can be reduced when their teammates
produce actionable data within their subject expertise. Aleatory uncertainty (irreducible
uncertainty) is now a fact of life because the goals of the complex design tasks they are
working on may include dealing with the fact that no two people do the same thing the
same way, whether a manufacturing task or a pilot task. Additionally, because of
confrontational team dynamics and because of engagement with customers, partners, and
suppliers, the ambiguity of volumes of verbal communication is introduced (Daft &
Lengel, 1986; Eppler et al., 2008; Philippo, Heijstek, Chaudron, Kruiswijk, & Berry,
2013). Even if a requirement is written and agreed upon, it is still open to interpretation.
Robust engineers hint at strong emotions tied to the apparent success or failure of
a large design project, but they also describe their confidence and their willingness to
persevere even though there is a high risk to completion. It is in this category that
engineers may use the word “intuition” as they create new methods, processes, and
solutions, an intuition that is supported by years of experience in completing similar
projects. They also amass large enough teams that they must manage others’ emotions
and uncertainties in addition to their own, because they are carrying large decision
responsibility.
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The participants whose transcripts compose this category are Curtis, Frank, Joel,
Ronald, and Stephen. It is this category of participants that have handled their complex
design tasks well outwardly and have some inward struggle. The robustness manifests in
handling the stress of the task well, accomplishing the goals they set out to achieve. Part
of the credit for handling complex design tasks well is following some prescribed process
for which the participants received formal training or have a reference text, such as Six
Sigma, Systems Engineering, or test pilot training.

4.3.4.1 Forms of Uncertainty
The participants whose experiences categorized the Robust group identified
epistemic, aleatory, and ambiguity uncertainties. They mostly described design projects
where they were exploring phenomenological uncertainties (pushing the boundary of the
state of the art, trying something for the first time), which are mostly high-risk endeavors
that need a lot of data to confirm that the new ideas are safe and useful. To do this well,
the Robust participants need many teammates with their respective specialties to examine
the new data, and that introduces ambiguous uncertainties as they communicate their
findings and their opinions.
Curtis very much defines his role as a test pilot, a surrogate end operator. Flight
safety is the driving reason he participates in design. He had several design tasks that he
called efficient and straightforward, such as inserting previously proven attitude
indicators from one aircraft into another. He also participated in more complex design
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tasks, such as designing threat displays, which involves human interface or how a pilot
interprets data, and how to classify and prioritize detected threats. He said:
What we did know, what are the general capabilities of what those sensors
could determine about a threat, and what information about the threat they
could display to the pilot…But what we didn't know was how the threats
were going to be encountered in theater, so then that makes the
prioritization a little more difficult task. How many threats do you want to
display at one time?

In a different design project, Curtis and his team found a new phenomenon during
flight test where they should not have “poke[d] that monkey in the eye again”:
We were testing the wind condition, we were coming in to land, then it
happened to be next to the superstructure of the ship. We didn't know
what's going to happen, that's why we were testing it…The more he stayed
up there, the more difficult it was for him to land, until finally, he got into
this big pilot-induced oscillation and just waved off…and not wanting to
have his manlihood questioned, he came right back and landed in the
same, exact spot before the engineers could tell him, "Don't do it," or right
before anyone could kind of figure out what just happened. In retrospect,
probably wasn't the smartest thing to do, as I talked too about build up and
understand the next point and all that, but - added to the mystery - because
then he came back and landed perfectly.
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As a materials process engineer, Frank has steadily improved his technical
cognizance. He designs and delivers materials to aerospace customers with particular
requirements. Frank has consistently demonstrated his design abilities and his job now
requires him to exercise these skills even more: “a process engineer. It’s more for
seasoned engineers, advancing engineers, who are more keen towards problem solving
and long term problem resolution. That’s kind of where I’m at right now.”
Frank had a particular design task where he was uncertain of the customer’s
design requirements at first, which researchers have shown to be troublesome for design
and implementation (Philippo et al., 2013) : “They wanted different properties within the
same material… we needed to go back and ask the customer ‘is this what you really
want?’ that really drove the decision to push forward with our process evolution… It was
more about how do you design a fixture or a process around the material. It was more
driven around material requirements and customer requirements versus our existing
process how we manufacture a material. It’s kind of a game-changer.”
Joel as a director-level test pilot had engineering responsibilities: “technical
conscience totally on my shoulders… my name goes on the flight clearance, so the
technical conscience resides with me. I've got to make sure that we have done our due
diligence.” Here, he switched from singular voice to plural voice to indicate his team.
He described his job as: “leading very smart people” and “it turned very personal for us”
because of the conflict between engineer and pilot having different interpretations of the
same phenomena:
No pilot’s going to love an engineer… There's always pushbacks, because
there's some capability [engineers] want to take away from [pilots] that
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they know better, whether it’s pride or whether it’s just because they see
from a different perspective. [Pilots] know Bernoulli, because they interact
with them every day. [Engineers are] just plotting them out on a chart.

Ronald worked in a small company with a specific culture of taking risky projects
to demonstrator prototype phase. Ronald described it as: “the company has a reputation
for doing a lot innovative thought… So there's not a lot of entrenched knowledge that
people have. It was strongly encouraged to investigate new ideas and different ways of
doing things.” To that end, Ronald said of the company, like Luciana, Abraham and
Nathaniel desiring to stay with a project start to finish: “Engineers in that particular
company were strongly encouraged to take a given area of a project all the way from
conceptual through planning through detailed design and then some manufacturing
engineering.” The company attitude was still grounded in production reality: “we,
working the engineering field, were very strongly encouraged to spend a third to half of
our hours on the floor, working with the techs… If you couldn't build the product, you
weren't allowed to release the drawing.” This company culture probably accelerated the
growth of his attitude toward uncertainty compared to his peers in other companies.
Partly driven by his uncertainty about his qualifications to get an engineering job,
Ronald took the initiative to study beyond an engineering degree to earn a pilot’s license
and an A&P license to be an aircraft maintenance technician. He followed a conceptual
to detailed design process as he designed a control cable out of a new material. He said:
I was responsible for conceptual and detailed flight control design of this
particular part… Initially it was me by myself. Several months into it they
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decided that the scope had gotten too large… worked with a few design
engineers familiar with that area… hand calculation analysis for thermal
expansion…handbooks and FAA advisory circulars… existing guidance,
rough sizing for characteristics like handling qualities… Not analysis
specifically, we went to testing. We did do physical testing. We built
samples of the cables.

In particular, Ronald leveraged his A&P knowledge efficiently: “FAR part 23 and
25 laid out maximum pilot effort. So you design for what an average human pilot is able
to exert on the control input. You assume that that is the highest load that the system will
see.” Then he applied the company ground rule of getting to manufacturing: “we had
tried a few different manufacturing methods and had come up with a way of building and
assembling these, and testing them that made us comfortable that we could manufacture
in a reasonably cost effective manner.”
Ronald, like Oliver, had baseline expectations about the performance of the
control cables out of traditional materials but had an eye out for different sources of
uncertainty:
Steel cables have been in existence for so long that everyone knows how
to check for damage… Carbon tends to be more unknown and more
intolerant of minor damage, in that a small amount of damage doesn't
necessarily progress at a predictable slow rate to failure… is this going to
be a system very intolerant of maintenance work, very intolerant of other
damage?
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Stephen has held a variety of engineering responsibilities, some less exciting than
others. In some roles, he described himself as a designer and in other flight test director
roles, he described himself as an editor. The flight test role required due diligence much
like Joel described: “Pretty high stress job. You have to do lots of simulations and be
fully prepared for any emergency… Lots of room for risk and because you're going
supersonic, you've got to fly pretty far from where you could land, so there's lots of
danger there.”

4.3.4.2 Team Engagement
Participants in the Robust category need many teammates to help them make
sense of their design tasks as they gather new information. However, it can be
uncomfortable to confrontational when teammates offer opinions instead of analysis.
Robust engineers have demonstrated success in managing uncertainties from systems,
and are now taking on larger responsibilities that involve people more deeply so that they
can move collectively to a secure stance to make a good decision.
Curtis described the design process he followed, with significant emphasis on
early involvement of the user: “I did some research… access to battle damage reports…
design team had to make some decisions on how to display [threats]… We have operators
involved in the design… scribbling things on the wall, we had operators involved in the
design, and resource managers.” He advocated prototyping early for all the stakeholders
to see:
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Through modeling and simulation, in [company2]'s [simulator], we're able
to actually utilize those in an operational scenario, and I have to say that is
hugely important in making design decisions, getting whatever your
decision is to as close to operational representative as possible….might be
cartoons on the wall…you can get some really good animation in a
PowerPoint slide now… the point is prototype early and often-- there's no
prototype that's too primitive.

Curtis, again referring to ideas that have been proven, along with his team,
converged upon a layout of the display: “So we separated the threats into immediate
action required and not immediate, more advisory nature…Those are similar to how the
aircraft emergencies are categorized, and we wanted to remain consistent with those.”
There were some decisions that felt arbitrary, such as how many threats to show to the
pilot in command: “everybody in the room including the operator and the design engineer
said, ‘Okay, three.’” He noted the complexity of designing a display as an ambiguity,
particularly a visual one (Eppler et al., 2008): “where a human is involved, that adds a lot
of complexity to the design. Like five pilots, six opinions, especially when interpretation
of displays is involved.”
Curtis summarized the design process as the management strategy for uncertainty,
using the plural voice exclusively, because Robust engineers need their teammates to
create and interact with prototypes and simulations:
That's how we handled that unknown, and I would say that that was-- we
made it as little-- we eliminate as much of the unknown as possible -
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researched, brought the user in who was kind of the expert, and then-- but
at some point we had to make a decision. There again, this is where the
PowerPoint slide came in. We did have some real prototypes on a
PowerPoint slide… They set threats up in the simulator; we'd fly through
them and we'd go and look at them… this incremental approach. When the
design was young, we had options. Then as the design matured, we'd
narrow those options.

However, as Robust engineers may experience some confrontation, Curtis
described reactions to design changes by the operators, whom he feels he represents: “But
then it gets out to the operators and they don't see the agony, they don't see the whole
decision making process. And they just see a warning… they have some unknowns and
they started putting their own safety factors on their operations, not fully understanding
that that's not their job.” Another change: “pilots were freaking out a little bit when they
could sense their controls moving. That was kind of an assumption that we thought a little
big of ourselves as, ‘Oh, I'm a test pilot. I'm so smooth, I can detect it but they won't
know,’ and move on. There is nothing special about us.”

Even with intuition working for him, Frank still follows a prescribed design
process of simultaneous exploration of possibilities, where he deployed several of his
teammates to gather data:
Six Sigma Black Belt. We have a "toolbox", a set of tools that we use. One
of those is a thought-map process. We go explore all the different
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opportunities and options that you have… you look at the pros and cons,
and the variables that you have that are controlled and uncontrolled… it's
more an evolution in the [company1] methodology, like the thought map
process where it's more an exploration phase. We may go down a path that
leads to a dead end, for example, but at least you learn something… you
get to a path that gives you some promise, then you start setting up
scenarios, different outcomes … it's more about the broader scope and
once you get the thought mapping done, and then drive down into
specifics through process mapping and [Design of Experiments]… I had to
manage different trial work, different paths, if you will, trying to figure
out what made sense. So I was more the wheel on the hub and we had all
these different spokes going out that you get information from the outer
spokes… six or seven people. they had different projects, mini projects…
those types of six or seven different areas we worked, it kind of gave us a
direction of ‘the process has to be change’ to give us better material.

Frank further reflected on the indispensable need for his teammates as owners of
resources necessary to solve a problem:
It’s a matter of making relationships and communicating with others in
trying to avoid reinventing the wheel…It goes into a spiral where you can
ask them why and get to the root cause, they're going to help resolve that
issue…who is the person who can help me with resources…it's a matter of
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going to the people who actually control those factions and getting those
resources secured.

Frank now manages other stakeholders’ uncertainty as part of his job by
producing reliable data to prove a concept:
We're an industry that thrives on standardization, that thrives on
consistency, and anytime you throw a change in that process, it meets with
resistance right away. It was more about me as the manager of the project
trying to sell this solution to others that would buy into it once I proved
success…Our customers generally require a regimented program in order
for us to produce material for them under contract…we have to build
between 3 and 5 lots of materials, which goes through the full regiment of
testing…we have to build between 3 and 5 lots of materials, which goes
through the full regiment of testing.

Because of the deep personal investment in decisions, Joel demands tangible
evidence: “you have to put yourself on trial… There's got to be some breadcrumbs trails.
There's always that ‘go test it’… I'm always scared of intuition… tell me the history…
developmental tests community is really good at is documenting stuff… then operational
test… deficiency reports… facts should back it up.”
One of the problems Joel notes is the loss of facts among teammates as a design
matures even though they follow a well-defined design process, where “seams” between
phases are the culprits:
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If I'm moving from systems readiness review or a developmental to
operational test to production or to in-service, each time there's a seam for
that transition, I can guarantee you the people that are in position are the
wrong people… there's collateral damage there, because so much tacit
knowledge left with them, and that stuff you just can't get from a report.

In response to this, Joel took on responsibility to gain defensible knowledge:
“joint discrepancy reporting system… so I was a big fan of that, because I could read all
this stuff… this really established my technical credibility… I think from a discipline
standpoint, is that people get away with how long they’ve been on a program or what
their credentials are and they never have to reference a fact or a report.” There were
consequences to his confrontation of other Subject Matter Experts: “They hated me, and
sometimes, people went silent on me. You have stuff like that.”
As Joel’s team attempted to solve the unpredicted failure mode of a flight-critical
component, his team suggested a short term solution to buy time to find the root cause.
The inspectors implemented a frequent visual inspection, which inherently has high
variation (aleatory uncertainty). Joel called in a particular Subject Matter Expert,
“They're specific engineers, and when you're going from failure management strategy,
you have to have reliability engineering there… the unsung hero of all of this.” He noted
the team dynamic: “nobody double checks his information. That’s the value of me sitting
there going, I haven't done anything in three days. Let me go check this out. I think
there's not enough teammates that actually help do that.” Here, Joel demonstrated that he
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is as much a teammate as a boss, even though his double-check of the work could be
construed as another confrontation.
In a second design experience, Joel found teammates’ behaviors hindered
progress of integrating aircraft with aircraft carriers:
I have competing egos… I am always conscious of guys that know too
much, the ones that are over confident in their position before we've
assembled all the facts and put the body of evidence out there… guys that
are taking a look at it from a shipboard compatibility standpoint.
Multidisciplinary, multi-background, but we have to get on our ship within
two days… even though it’s the same class of ship. Each one was
different… they now think it was missing was the thermo-analysis piece.

As Joel once took responsibility to gain defensible knowledge, in this shipboard
compatibility test, Joel took charge to find the right SME, who was rejected by the rest of
the team:
He's like the head thermo-dynamicist for [COMPANY8] and he didn't
charge any money for it or anything… [he] offered some suggestions… It
really mitigated the effects that were happening out there… some of this
ego stuff getting in the way and no one accepted… they just were very
resistant into incorporating his opinion... most of these engineering events
are huge emotional events.
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Joel handles so much information from so many teammates that he has to have a
sense-making strategy of a concise narrative:
You're not going to veto the guy who’s done the most homework or make
some more sense. You're probably going to veto the guy who’s the most
emotional or the guy that wants to give you the doctoral dissertation on
[failure mode]. You want to veto those guys, but the one that comes in and
says, ‘That’s a story I can wrap my head around.’

In a second design experience, Ronald encountered epistemic, aleatory, and
behavior uncertainties when he and his team were tasked with deciding whether and how
to repair an expensive part that was dropped accidentally. He said:
We really don't know anything about how it was damaged, the manner it
was damaged, where it was damaged. That was a case of uncertainty just
showing up unanticipated… coordinating the diagnostics to figure out the
extent of the damage that was in place, coordinating with our own
company and the other company their repair methodology that they
accept… coordinating the diagnostics to figure out the extent of the
damage that was in place, coordinating with our own company and the
other company their repair methodology that they accept.

Ronald’s team temporarily integrated with the customer’s team to solve this
problem, and there was initial skepticism on the part of the customer:
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The company we were working for actually had assigned about 6
engineers and a dozen or so shop technicians that were temporarily located
at our company…the customer was more familiar with higher level
manufacturing production, and we were more familiar with the materials
we were working with… Within our own company on my previous
program, we generally got overwhelming support for trying a new idea.
Working with the customer's engineers, there was more skepticism on
their part that we could accomplish what we said we could…from a larger
company, a more conservative mindset, not really as willing to try new
things.

Ronald and his team worked through the problem thoroughly by leveraging each
company’s strengths in the design process where it made the most sense:
Not an unusual repair, it was more no one had ever talked about trying to
do it on a 1 foot by 12 foot disbond area. We were relatively confident that
we could map out the extent of the damage and make sure that we got that
area that was cracked glued back together. The customer was not as
confident that would solve the problem. If that repair didn't work, there'd
be no way to know… we did some subscale testing, the test article
verified that we could use pressure to force in lots of small places far away
from where we were injecting it. We did testing and we were able to
document to the customer… use their x-ray and ultrasound to verify that
our repair was complete.
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Stephen noted where the difficulty is in his job, not the technical side but
convincing others of the quality of the work: “hardest part of a lot of engineering is
actually not doing the work, but communicating your effort and why you made your
decisions and why it's the best approach.” Communication is continual and
confrontational through the design process like Joel:
You do have to keep close meetings with all the parties that are affected.
It's not just what you want. You've got to make sure, because you have to
a give and take…sometimes the first answer they'll say is no, it can't be
done. Then you need to say prove it to me…I believe you, but you
sometimes have to be a little bit confrontational…so you've got to talk
with a lot of people. You have to go up to them and let them know that
they know more about their topic than you'd know about their topic…have
meetings often. Show your progress to somebody. For one thing it keeps
you on track, it forces you to be good about what you're doing and it also,
maybe somebody didn't speak up in the first however many meetings and
now they want to give you something…There's going to be push back in
the beginning. There always is, so in the first few meetings as I was saying
what I did, there was a whole lot of smirks and giggles and that kind of
thing in the room…You may be mad at that person, but hey, they just
helped you do the solution correctly or as correct as possible.
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4.3.4.3 Personal Response to Uncertainty
Curtis’ personal approach to managing uncertainty is to redefine uncertainty as
risk in order to create measurands: “uncertainty is binary, you either know or you don't
know… Risk, you can manage… what changing uncertainty to risk does is allows you to
measure it… Measure it and manage it and budget for it.” Here, Curtis also describes
technical risk as influencing cost and schedule risks, and he is responsible for all three.
Curtis described his test pilot training as the key procedure for mitigating risk of
phenomenological uncertainty, starting from a known point and methodically stepping
towards the unknown:
It's called build up and they pound this into your head at test pilot school.
You don't go straight to the cliff. You incrementally approach an
unknown. You start from an area of known, and then you slowly work
your way into the unknown… even if things are going perfectly, stop,
watch the trend, try to predict where the trend is taking you, look for
things that you're not looking for.

Frank has deployed his intuition on recent design tasks: “I’ve run across several
times where I add more heat, I will speed up the process, for example, based off of
internal instinct from my previous experiences.” For this most recent design, Frank
exercised his intuition to reduce the design time: “My decision was to change the process
to fit the material. And that was what drove everything. My gut feel was not to try
different parameters in the producing process that would not work out.”
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Like Oliver, Frank looks for repeatability of a phenomenon to confirm that it is
real: “like the experiment you set up that then reveals two factors that you never thought
would be important, but they are…The proof is really in what the data is telling you that
drives you in a direction that you want to go…they go through repeatability trials just to
confirm what we've learned the first time wasn't a fluke.”

Joel noted his uncertainty management strategy of applying a conservative factor:
“data points are hard and expensive to come by, and there was a lot more uncertainty
with that and I think that your level of conservatism goes up with the level of
uncertainty… you don't need to do that, look, yeah, 50%, and at some point it is
cultural… they've been living the culture forever and they're okay with it.” Because
uncertainty can never be eliminated, he added: “You just live with uncertainty… there's
informed risk and you need to be comfortable taking risks… we talk about failure
management strategy, but it is really about risk management… both consequence and
occurrence.” He noted others’ learning to manage uncertainty: “what I sense from people
is that they would rather rely on somebody else's experience."
Joel also has the same strategy as younger engineers for breaking problems into
smaller pieces: “Before it had been a bundled risk and so what we did and so what we did
is we dissected different parameters so they could run the risk model on only those
separate parameters… I didn't know that you could reduce the risk by breaking it down
into smaller ones.”
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Ronald’s personal management strategy for uncertainty is to explore possibilities
and to base decisions on real data, like Joel advocated. Those possibilities come from
other teammates, and Ronald brings a technician perspective that other participants do
not mention:
Always good to hear everyone's input. Some different ideas, different
perspectives… add more options that you can easily come up with,
evaluating each on their own merits, testing whatever is feasible to verify
areas where uncertainty is… exhausting all the different possibilities and
doing whatever testing is available to you, talk yourself into it… generated
data is something you do you yourself or tie in research that other people
have tried or you reach out to other organizations or companies that may
have done testing in a similar way…A lot of things have been tried before
by someone, and you can find it somewhere… design manuals…
approved structural repair manuals… The FAA's own documents, they
have advisory circulars, the FARs, you have design, testing, and repair
manuals in A&P. we relied on those a lot… It’s been tested, it's been
approved, and we’re very comfortable that if you do the repair the way it's
been prescribed, you're going to meet or exceed the original strength of the
product.

Ronald has a thorough approach to managing uncertainty, exploring depth and
breadth in a prescribed incremental build up flight test process:
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Flight test itself is a very well regimented step in increasing capability,
checking it in flight. Uncertainty is dealt with by procedural process of
their rigorous testing, from benign conditions to severe…uncertainty itself
makes you more likely to checking more things, makes you test more and
inspect more… The uncertainty makes you more likely to make the load
cyclical, hundreds of thousands of times, repetitive, cyclic… it could be
prone to cracking and failing and corrosion. So I think that uncertainty
drives you to do a lot more of and varied test than you would do if you're
using traditional solution. Presumably, someone 10 or 50 years ago has
done that testing for you. The long track record gives you that, if removes
the uncertainty just by it's been in service for so long and people assume
it's able to do the job…you start thinking about all the other possible
variables it could have and should address. It makes you think about
additional testing that you want to do to try to eliminate unknowns. It
pushes you towards more testing before production.

Stephen takes spends considerable time triangulating the truth with biased sources
of data to create or understand a baseline, just like Miranda’s experiments needed a
baseline, but Stephen doubts his results:
You start with the back of the envelope so I went to the textbooks… so
you might start with asking around… you calculate the numbers that you
have on the baseline of the aircraft. Something that you know. You start
with something that you know and you build… You need a baseline…
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how do you know that your work is right? You don't know. The only way
to know is to test it against things that you do know…I started with these
textbook designs. Got what we thought were the results for other versions
of the [aircraft1], which is only one. I looked at that. I looked at what the
[simulation1] model of that gave me and I looked at what the wind tunnel
test of that gave me.

Stephen’s personal approach to managing uncertainty is to confront his emotional
response and move on to obtaining a team consensus:
Uncertainty is really frustrating. It's one of those things that can really
bother a designer… Now you question everything. Now you wonder what
is truth… there's error in everything. Uncertainty runs and there will
always be uncertainty so you just try to mitigate it… if you look at as
many different aspects of your design as possible, you can get confident in
that and then you get that uncertainty level to a small enough number and
you show that number to people. You let everyone know and then you
design the safety factor into that. Then you've got to run it by everyone
again and make sure everyone is happy with what they need out of your
design.
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4.3.4.4 Reflections on Learning to Manage Uncertainty
Curtis specifically self-educated by reading The Goal (Goldratt, 1992) and using
the concept of Theory of Constraints for budget and schedule management as they relate
to test and development risk. He said: “Plan well inside the buffer, and then things will
come up unexpected-- the unknowns, that's how you account for the unknowns. That's
your buffer.” He also said:
If you set a target - and especially in challenging, complex systems - it
always moves right, it never moves left because people kind of work to the
target but don't try to exceed it… let's back up until we find where the
known is, and then draw a path from the known to the unknown and figure
out how you're going to get there… in flight tests, there's pretty severe
consequences to walking off the end of the cliff, so you take a very
deliberate approach.

Frank reflected on his growth of ability to manage uncertainty and, like Abraham,
welcomed a challenge: “Don’t look at uncertainty as a bad thing; it's an opportunity to go
exploring more into why is it uncertain… The mystery and going digging and doing some
research, the answer is going to be there.” Now, he has internalized his thought process
to the expert level where he does not express it verbally (Ericsson, 2006; Hoffman,
1992), which he calls intuition: “it's really driven based on Six Sigma principles is what I
do, that I’ve learned to expect the unexpected. That’s always there. But the more I do
this, the more I get instinct, or mother's intuition.”
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Joel had several suggestions for learning to anticipate uncertainty, primarily to
follow a prescribed process: “Whether it is a failure management strategy or system
engineering V or you're moving from one acquisition process or phase to another, you
don't to have to reinvent that.” Also:
I need to isolate the scenario for the learning objective and be able to kind
of tweak it based on the learner and then see that multiple times until he
gets a pattern of recognition down so that he can go ahead and deal with
uncertainty, because he has a pattern of recognition, he knows what it
looks like and he knows what the possible outcomes can be.

Stephen noted his personal growth in anticipating uncertainty, especially after
having to recover after a failure or embarrassment:
You see an older designer and they look really confident and they look
really sure of themselves and they look really relaxed…being put on the
spot a few times. When you go out and you present something and you
didn't put too much time into it and you didn't really fully prepare to
present it and you show this to somebody who's been there and done that,
they're going to ask you questions that start off really benign and then they
circle it…They're leading you into the gotcha question. Then you just sit
there and you have nothing to say. It's a pretty horrible feeling. You feel
really stupid and unworthy, but they know because they've been there… In
real life where we live, you're going to make mistakes. Just don't let it get
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you down. Just try to learn from your mistakes… you learn how you work
best.

4.3.5 Category 5: Resilient
For Resilient engineers, uncertainty is a fact of life in the business, and for the
items within their control, they know how to get the right data at the right time at the
right fidelity from the right people in order for them to make the big decisions. They may
even be in a position to “lead the market”, or make company-culture-changing moves,
because they have increased their engagement with key stakeholders, a key habit of
human-centered design and empathic design (Zoltowski, Oakes, & Cardella, 2012).
Their emotional response to big moves is that they “have gotten over it”, referring to the
criticism and resistance that typically follows project changes.
Resilient engineers describe a trusting engagement of their teammates and other
stakeholders, making sure their teammates have the resources, authority, and courage to
investigate parallel solution paths. The engagement of their teammates and stakeholders
is early in the design process and significantly sustained throughout the process. In most
of these transcripts, the participants used “we” instead of “I” to describe the path to
solution. The complexity of the design projects is such that epistemic, ambiguous,
aleatory, and interaction uncertainties are all present, and the best management skill is to
engage large teams because an individual Resilient engineer cannot do the work alone.
The participants whose transcripts compose this category are Alonso, Duncan,
Malcolm, and Peter. Alonso has 16 years’ experience and Peter has 32 years’ experience.
They all have very definite leadership roles, which we can assume they earned because of
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their continued demonstration of proficiency in managing people and projects
successfully.

4.3.5.1 Forms of Uncertainty
The participants whose experiences categorized the Resilient group identified
epistemic, aleatory, ambiguity, and interaction uncertainties, with the greatest
concentration on interaction of stakeholders inside and outside the design projects. In
these transcripts, whole businesses may be interacting, with their own agendas and
resources possibly in conflict or being kept confidential. Wherever data is available,
Resilient engineers expect their teams to do their best to make sense of it.
Alonso describes his role as: “Leader of the Analytical Integration Team, that is a
team that manages all the different design aspects such as handling qualities, dynamics,
aerodynamics and simulation.” Because of the new configuration of aircraft, Alonso’s
team encountered phenomenological uncertainty in a new maneuver that necessitated an
investigation: “We have had specific problem in a certain maneuver and we experienced
very high load unexpected… almost like an accident… What we have to do is go back
and find the cause.”
Alonso speaks about boundaries of the problem as a guide of where he should
concentrate his efforts: “you have many different areas that you can follow. Another
important part is to limit or cut at some point, the boundary of your investigation and then
solution of the problem…I have to do these three because this will give me the maximum
and the minimum.” Here, he is referring to pursuit of the largest influencing factors

139
under the control of the designers to mitigate the consequences of this new maneuver as
the boundaries.
In particular, Alonso reflected on experiencing interaction uncertainty when his
organization moved between countries: “we had to restructure the company…
organizational wise because that was a lot of uncertainty in how to manage the problem
and now we are in a different country with people on both sides of the ocean…in the US
I’ve seen that there is more work then separate and then going together…We did away
almost with the word meeting because people are meeting all the time and there is a
continuing interaction but sometimes it can be chaotic.” This is different from Miranda’s
and Silvia’s experiences, as they were individuals moving between countries, and Alonso
moved an entire organization. So Alonso is aware of more varied forms of uncertainty
here.
Duncan describes himself as having a systems view of design: “you've got all
these people who are specialists in all these different things and they're great at that, but
some task are just better handled if you looked at it from our systematic standpoint.” His
high level view of design allows him to see how his company and his customer may
interact: “you're waiting for some new program to come about or you're actually trying to
form the business in the first place and you're working with a potential customer… you
can get the requirements tuned to the strength of your company.”
Duncan described his design process as a mix of textbook processes and a
personally-styled approach of making decisions in what concepts to pursue and develop:
After the requirements, of course they'll eventually turn into
specifications, but then it's trying to get those bounded enough so that you
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can then come up with what your initial concepts might be… at the very
beginning then you do make a conceptual design you make the decisions
that I would be making as the designer ahead of time before I really talked
to anybody else, assuming they all have a general understanding of what
the requirements are… Then there's a whole other set of decisions that
would then come up is when you start showing your things to management
and they make their call. Then there's the whole decision that pops up
when we as [company3] will be talking to the government or the customer
and what happens then.

Duncan noted the indispensability of iteration like Abraham mentioned because
an engineer can get fixated on one’s own idea, like Nathaniel mentioned:
The initial concepts, you're testing those out. I guess the biggest thing for
us is the iterations with it… More often than not it's not usually the best
answer so then there's different iterations trying to optimize to get a better
solution… From a designers standpoint maybe there's some technical
judgement calls about things you might want to do, because it's kind of
your baby… there's a distinct style… the artistic part of it.

Malcolm described his career trajectory as being in the right place at the right
time with the right willingness to take the work. He experienced several transitions as
aerospace companies acquired other companies. He found himself entering programs at
various stages of completion, such as conceptual design, developmental flight test, or
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close to transition from engineering development to manufacturing. Now Malcolm
describes his senior program manager job as: “to make sure that we execute to, we have a
statement of work, and we have a procurement spec. I have to make sure that the overall
team is meeting those objectives…We have to have a structure in place to make sure that
ultimately we fully meet these requirements that we signed up to deliver.”
Malcolm typically presents several options and associated assessment strategies
for meeting design requirements: “Usually, we present multiple options; usually they
want to see a risk posture of choices… at the beginning of the project, you identify ‘these
are our requirements’ and then you map out ‘how am I going to verify every requirement
that I own?’… Some of them can be verified with analysis, some of them will be
similarity from similar programs, some of them can be in simulation labs, some of them
will require flight test or other type of test data.”
Malcolm specifically noted the “risk posture” of companies and the uncertain
interaction of risk posture with the buyer:
You have to understand the risk posture of your company and of the
various divisions within the company and the various players. [company4]
as a company is extremely risk averse. They will not lean forward hardly
at all; they're always going to take the low-risk answer… This culture,
which usually starts at the very top, the CEO level, tends to flow down. If
the CEO is risk intolerant and profit is everything and they don't want to
risk that, they want steady cash flow and so on, it's going to flow down
through all the levels and it quickly becomes known that you do not
tolerate risk… take those risks and assume they happen, which means

142
baking them into your plan. What you do is you increase the cost… You
got to be careful here because you could put yourself out of business.

Malcolm, like Curtis, thinks of uncertainty in terms of risk, and risk is divided
into the typical top three constraints: cost, schedule, and performance or technical
aspects. He is not the only one making the decision on these constraints. He said of
technical or performance risks: “If it's a technical risk, what we tend to do is bring in our
technical teams… if there's a technical problem, I’ll work with my engineering managers.
And we'll assess, ‘do we have the necessary expertise to answer this?’ ...sometimes we
had to hire external SMEs.” He said of cost and schedule risks: “that's more in the
domain of the program management team. Just based upon experience and knowledge,
you know what works, you know what doesn't because of your time and working over the
years. You’re able to make schedule assessments.”
Peter advanced from engineering into leadership roles quickly, first taking
technical responsibilities as a manager and then transitioning to leader responsibilities.
He obtained a breadth of experience within a company: “I actually worked in the factory
also which I think really helped shape me as a leader… how decisions are made in other
parts of the business really help shape you for making decisions as a leader.” He
obtained further breadth of experience between companies: “took a great opportunity
here at [company3] to be the CTO at [company3] which has really shaped me as a global
leader not just as a more focused product leader around a certain element of portfolio.”
Peter has significant decision-making responsibility which he takes very seriously
and desires to pass to the next leaders. He said:
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I would say it happens almost every day. A lot of it comes down to, I
think, intuition and judgment because I do think if I take a step a back, one
of our biggest problems in our workforce today is not making decisions.
We're ineffective at making decisions… what is the information that’s
necessary at what fidelity level to make a decision and once you agree that
this is the information and the fidelity, making the decision is easy.
Making sure that it encompasses everybody’s stakeholders requirements
around it… Not all of them were successful but you can always recover
from a decision, you can't recover from no decision.

Peter sees a host of interaction uncertainty sources that other participants did not
mention: commodity prices, foreign exchange issues, locations suitable for
manufacturing, and the customers in their own contexts. He said: “Do we really
understand how and what products and services they need for them to make and be
competitive in their market space. A lot of our customers compete against each other
which makes it even more difficult.” Global and political events are also uncertain:
There's ambiguity. There's volatility. There's churn… Understanding the
markets, understanding the pending strength of the dollar, understanding
the talent of our individuals in the region for the region… ambiguity
around that because who could’ve ever said that from [country4], which
was growing at 15%, is now really they say 7 but it’s really around 2… the
president would say and tax business people that use business jets… don’t
know what the workforce demographics are going to be.
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Peter sees design as far as 20 years away that may become high priority because it
has been matured by designers 3 to 5 years away from delivery. He said:
On the technology front I don’t think we have as much as a challenge as
people may think… what is in the incubation state and really
understanding what are those platform agnostic technologies that we see
that eventually could lead to some differentiation in our product field. And
you have to invest in those also so there's a wide lens of looking at kind of
what's really emerging and how those things really trend itself into our
product portfolio or adjacent markets that we’d be interested in. They
could be 10, 15, 20 years out… product infusion in the next 3 to 5 years
and then making sure that you're investing appropriately to mature the
technology and the manufacturing at the point where the business decision
is needed.

Peter sees long term aspects of the business that allows him to predict the
significance of a trend, especially related to economic cycles and disruptions:
I’m a big believer if you missed that window, and they're cyclic windows,
what you invested in today is probably obsolete by the time you get the
next opportunity… Once you get the product into the workplace and
industry it usually stays there… it’s very hard to displace an incumbent, it
really is. You have to beat the incumbent by more than just the baseline
cost price… logistics, everything that goes along with once you have that
infrastructure in place… purposing and making sure that our decisions and
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our investments are aligned with buying decisions and timelines
associated with our key customers’ decisions are really the element that
we continue to push on… how do you get in front of that market…
investing in new products as the cycle is coming down and then when it
bottoms out you're on the incline and the inflection point that we start to
bring new products in as that market recovers.

4.3.5.2 Team Engagement
For Resilient engineers, immediate distribution of work to several teams of
engineers is the primary design process they follow. The projects and objectives are
simply too large for one person or a small team to have all the necessary specialties.
Resilient engineers are different from Robust engineers in that Resilient engineers have a
positive and confident view that they have the best people working the design problems
to provide them the data they need to make decisions. Resilient engineers have the added
responsibility of interacting with outside stakeholders, so they apply their intuition, built
from years of experience, on those interactions.
Alonso immediately planned a team effort to investigate several possible
influencing factors simultaneously. He expected that these parallel efforts would provide
indicators of relative influence and then he could provide further direction to the team.
He said: “it was my decision in the end on how to proceed in this. My specific role was to
develop separately with every separate functions… To develop a path on how much
going deeper and how to go in deeper on these aspects”:
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How many other aspects of the same problem you have to look…They see
was this the worst of the worst cases. Trying to define a limit of the
variable coming from something that is not totally realistic…We put this
cases and that was something very idealistic because you didn't consider
all the feedback from the other disciplines…That was something that
allow us to see at least where were moving… I let it go, this person
reiterating on his design. Only at the end, I did the merging of these two
world that this point have done quite separate work only towards the end
that they were merged to demonstrate that everything made sense.

Alonso’s main responsibility is to keep his team talking to each other until there is
enough actionable data for him to make a decision: “they need to continuously to
exchange their information. You have to drive this and you have to actually to take the
information and give the information... Making sure that this was happening and actually
that all these areas were talking to each other. Then decide when to stop that was the
important part because this could go forever, it could never stop.”
Alonso described his parallel team efforts in another way: “I knew that I had a
couple of weeks just to investigate every different area and see all the different
problems…In the beginning my team was good to have everything going on separately
and then I started to close the loop and continuing with two or three big items.” Alonso
noted carefully about having Subject Matter Experts on his team: “if you don’t have with
you I mean good people you don’t go anywhere.”
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Alonso remembers his prescribed requirements but also expands the list
depending on the new knowledge his team gained, and continues to demand proof of
meeting the requirements: “I have demonstrated that what I’ve designed satisfies some
objective that I have decided… I've also found that what was designed before didn’t
satisfy something else that I didn’t know. I had to put another 20 percent of requirement
before I didn’t have… I have to re-verify that everything that I had done before wasn’t
changed.”
Duncan’s strategy is to gather evidence right away, even if it is just an indicator,
so that he does not experience the “gotcha” moment that Stephen mentioned. He also
advocates assembling a supportive team:
The big thing is you're always trying to get yourself educated enough and
rescope the problem… You never want to get into any meeting where your
answer is, ‘I don't know.’… so that it doesn't get to the point where you're
just coming in and you don't know. Part of it is trying to minimize that. If
you don't know, then you're setting up things that do let you know. That's
why you may do some outside analysis... Getting as well versed as you
can on what it is you're working on and then certainly trying to surround
yourself with people who are like-minded.

Duncan has a team of specialists and that includes his customers. His design
specialists, like Nathaniel noted, can remove a few cycles of iteration. He also maintains
communications with the customer as a means of reaffirming the requirements, but he
does not describe it confrontationally as Frank did:
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You have the formal requirements and everybody goes through and so
that's been formally issued… certain people in the company who
specialize in dissecting that… it's also working with the customer to make
sure you're still on the same page with them… you can get "the older"
engineers who've seen a lot of things and know a lot of things… have
enough experience that they could look at it and probably give you a
pretty good estimate of what it could and couldn't do and tell you whether
they think it will pass muster… If you're seeing it from them and you're
seeing it from your A-team of people then they feel pretty confident.

Duncan sees internal and external interaction uncertainty within the company’s
hierarchy and with the customer, where the priorities of each party may be in conflict:
Prior to probably coming from a customer, you've probably been told a
few things as to what they want… there's a little bit of a hierarchy…
program manager wields a lot of power…management has certain
expectations… our plan as a corporation on how we want to solve this…
what the customer told you in the requirements… That one pretty much
overrides anything… You're juggling both of those.

Malcolm’s team experienced significant schedule uncertainty that tied closely
with performance uncertainty, which would ultimately negatively affect the customer:
“One of the problems we've experienced recently is there's been problems on the jet as far
as [company3] providing us the time we need to be able to test. And it's impacting the
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way we can execute because we're not getting the flight data and that feedback loop,
we're not able to incorporate the changes and do the verification we need… fleet was
going to be grounded for a period of 4 months.”
Malcolm’s response was broad coordination on a plan: “We had to make some
decisions. We ended up working closely with my [company3] team, their program
manager came out, we sat down with my team, some of my counterparts within
[company4]. We developed a plan of recovery, we vetted with [company3]. We
presented it to the executive management. They gave us feedback and adjustments.” The
secret to successful execution of the plan is: “It’s all about getting, within this span of
authority, you have to find the decision maker who has the stand of authority to truly
make and own that task. And you got to put it at the right level.” The success was
obvious to the customer: “they heralded that meeting as an example of supplier-prime
contractor, meaning, [company3], [company4], this is how we should be working. We’re
finding answers.”
Malcolm again emphasized his lateral and vertical team providing him the
knowledge he needs to make decisions:
Usually the key here is, if decisions are going to hold, you have to vet
them. A lot of junior PMs move and make decisions very quickly and if
they're not vetted… looks like you're an idiot. So it's usually best to have a
very broad coordination, make sure everybody's aligned before it ever gets
to that executive review. Then you're presenting a cohesive team review
that's been fully vetted by all parties… what's the appropriate level. If this
decision is going to be elevated all the way to the vice president level, for
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example, I can't just engage the lower level stakeholders, I’ve also got to
engage their management chains all the way up that will be reporting to
that vice president.

Malcolm’s attitude to managing others’ uncertainty is one of partnership:
The suppliers will say ‘it's not my problem. I have this statement of work,
this is your problem, it's not my problem.’ And they have very rigid
boundaries… really want them not to be so rigid. You really want them to
work closely with you. You want them to have some level of flexibility to
give and take. It makes the process much easier… show that we were in a
partnership, not in a supplier relationship… things don't go according to
plan… So we've had to do adjustments to that plan along the way in order
to be flexible, in order to come up with an option.

Peter sees his teammates as stakeholders, quality leaders, manufacturing leaders,
engineering leaders, research centers, and the sales force. He especially relies on his
sales force for actionable data about the customer: “our customers are becoming much
more educated on the overall lifecycle of their product. Our sales people and our
engineers are really working very hard to be very integral to their key relationships with
inside those customers.”
Peter noted the indispensability of his teammates to manage their subject matter in
order to provide him actionable and reliable data: “the biggest element in the product
design cycle today is that we don’t have all the right people at the right time ensuring that
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the product portfolio is moving at the pace it needs to… really makes you think a lot
different for where you put people and where you're going to invest in your product and
how do you get more stability in the currency exchange where you can insure that you
don’t have the volatility.”
Like Joel, Peter sees design happening over such a long period of time that
engineers may become attached to the work, like Nathaniel and Duncan point out, “I'm
pregnant with the idea, it’s my baby” that Peter must face his team’s attachment:
“engineers will fight to the end to maintain and give you every argument why they should
continue… you have to make the decision where do you get the best return for that
investment… you have to get past a personal part of the decision.” However, Peter has a
high level vision of repurposing designs for which there has already been investment:
“I'm a big believer is that at some point some of the things that we worked on it just may
not be the right time and some of the technologies that we work on may be applied
somewhere else… we don’t throw everything out… We shelf it, make sure we know
where it’s at.”
Even though Peter said he relied on judgment and intuition for some decisions,
there are decisions for which there is evidence, and he reflects on the quality of that
evidence in order to enhance his intuition:
I think you'll find in industry that the depth of the information that’s
actually being looked at is probably not the depth of the information that
really needs to be looked at… I’m a big one on lessons learned… you start
to look for an inflection point when the program starts to look like there is
something going wrong, you stop and you pause there and you really start
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to look at what information were people looking at at that time period…
looking for inflection points and looking for the information that was
actually being viewed… That’s usually our biggest problem, I think, in the
industry is that we don’t focus on the information and the people that is
necessary at the time to insure that we're at the level that we need to be
during the program.

4.3.5.3 Personal Response to Uncertainty
Resilient engineers tend to formalize and externalize their thought processes for
design and managing uncertainty. They have an altruistic motive to preserve the hardearned knowledge they have. It also allows for these thought processes and data to be
examined and evaluated by others for further refinement, a welcome step of the design
process. Resilient engineers are even optimistic about uncertainties in design because
they have decade-long views of products being matured.
Duncan’s approach to managing uncertainty is to stay abreast of the current
published data and new possibilities, especially coming from his teammates:
Come in as prepped as you can… knowing the literature. Look at what has
been done with what's out there… you also want to be flexible enough to
flex with something that may not be exactly what you think it might be…
Then when we get to the different people in different disciplines and
different specialties and they're certainly keeping up with their particular
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field… To be in that particular role you had to be versed enough to be able
to talk to the discipline specific person.

Because of the volume of data and uncertainty that Malcolm encounters, he
applies limits and boundaries of what is acceptable:
As long as you're inside the upper bound and lower bound, you're ok. If
you aren't and you have a deviation, that's when you have to go and make
changes… anything that's critical, we have boundaries for what's
acceptable or not. What that does is it makes, whenever you do the
analysis, it eliminates the decision…you identify your critical parameters,
your engineering parameters, and what the margins are for those, so that
you know if you have success or failure. The other uncertainty comes in,
the cost and schedule, is a bit more amorphous. It’s usually managed
through the risk process.

Malcolm has several tools at his disposal for formalizing risk, like Abraham, Joel,
and Frank had mentioned. Like Curtis and Edmund, there are costs associated with
continuing to reduce risk, so Malcolm has responsibility to determine the stop point, like
Alonso had to do:
There will be company guidelines. The company will write a risk policy,
and their risk policy is heavily influenced by their corporate culture…
variety of tools. Some companies have homegrown tools…. we take a
look at everything we've learned over the last quarter and we do a
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bottoms-up estimate-at-complete... you typically use what they call a risk
cube… plots consequence, the impact if it happens, versus probability… It
costs money any time you do a mitigation plan or anything about it, it
costs money to maintain this process. And they recognize they don't just
want to throw money at it and do everything. When you have a moderate
risk, most companies require that you have a mitigation plan in place.

Malcolm anticipates uncertainty and has plans in place for the unexpected:
“You’re always going to be getting surprised… When you're in the design and
development side of the house, you have to be prepared. You're working in a very
different environment. You're going to have surprises… if you have a robust risk process,
you can hopefully, if your risk process is working, what should happen, you should
identify these potential scenarios before they occur… you identify contingencies.”
Malcolm has a history of relative success in predicting the consequences of uncertainties:
“probably 60% of the things that have happened, have happened within the risk process
and we have been able to execute those contingencies… 40% have come up where either
we simply didn't think of them, or the risk plan didn't fully foresee the magnitude of what
could happen, or the contingency wasn't sufficient enough to be able to deal with it.”
Malcolm’s personal approach to uncertainty has been tested by failure and he
recovered:
They're not doing their job if they're not having failures as well as
successes…we ended up crashing both of [prototypes]. And that was even
with all the plans we had, all the contingencies… we executed to the best
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of our ability…I took a lot of responsibility for that failure, I really did,
and it took me a while to get over it… you're measured on how you react
and how you handle them. You also want to be as proactive as you can…
you need to be as transparent as you can, you need to identify the correct
level of risk… you shouldn't be taking it personally. You have to end up
taking the cards you're dealt, you do the best job, you make sure your
communication is crystal clear as you can. What happens, happens… They
have to recognize you cannot do this all on your own. You need to be
reaching out, networking, have allies, have mentors in place.

Peter noted his personal approach to uncertainty as a balance between intuition on
risky decisions and getting his team to provide the right data to make a decision:
Very carefully. It’s hard. At some point you have to go with intuition on
some of those ambiguous ones… You can't be risk-averse on everything
and I think there is this balance on risk-averse and intuition and judgment
and making sure that you're not waiting for the market to come and you're
leading the market to get to a place that you think is going to be viable…
but there is so much ambiguity but you have to at some point have
intuition, judgment in everything… How do you really insure that you're
asking the right questions at the right time? What questions should you be
asking… are you asking the right questions at the right time at the right
level.

156
4.3.5.4 Reflections on Learning to Manage Uncertainty
Participants in the Resilient category found that their personal response to
uncertainty is not hidden, that others are watching them. They are also watching
themselves and discovering that they have improved both their awareness of forms of
uncertainty they encounter in design and accompanying management strategies. They
have become comfortable managing their own uncertainty and can now help others
manage their feelings and uncertainties.
Alonso noted his personal growth in managing uncertainty: “I learned now how
interconnected things are… when you have to press and when you have to wait… you
have to give some time to the idea to evolve…variables can be even interconnected
between themselves… There are stronger variables and less strong variables but you
don’t know this at the beginning…even if it is uncertain it’s still something that you
manage.” Another aspect is confronting his own assumptions: “spoiled basically by your
own pre-concepts…sometimes you get stuck on something…you leave something
outside just because you don’t have a good relation with the person… so you have to be
open.”
Duncan identified his growth like Frank had: “You go through each one of these
steps, probably fairly systematically, and I think the more experience ... You still follow a
process but you jump to things pretty quickly… iterations internally may go around a lot
quicker… but the more you've done it ... There is a process but you can run through the
steps probably a bit quicker and it probably gets more merged.” Duncan now coaches
younger engineers through design problems:
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We want you to get comfortable with the chaos… You may not know all
the answers, but again, you're comfortable with dealing with it and making
assertions and assumptions and trying to be able to back up those
assumptions so you can move forward… How would you do any real
complex thing? You don't try to solve it all at once. You try to get into
those simpler parts and eventually you get the whole thing solved and
coming together to a solution… If you came in new, you were probably
paired off with somebody who's a bit more senior and you probably are
going to pick up some of the habits that they had. If it's valid and if it
looks like the people are respecting them and it's something that the
company likes, then you make pick up those different habits and you put
your own spin on it too.

Malcolm has also been a teacher of risk management at the corporate level. His
lesson includes the major points summarized in his transcript, particularly one’s personal
response to uncertainty and failure:
Your management is going to be looking at you at how you responding,
and how you're executing once that occurs. They’re not going to be
looking at you and blaming you because it occurred… over communicate,
think broader… you want to be more inclusive… build a broad
consensus… categorize the uncertainty… you have a stoplight chart…
trending lines, is it getting better or is it getting worse… When we talk
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uncertainty, it's measuring versus that baseline… All the customer
deliverables, every piece of it.

Peter learned how to manage his own uncertainty and others’ uncertainty from
observing a mentor in action:
‘What I’m going to teach you about is around dealing with people,
dealing with ambiguity. How to interact and how do you message? What
should you really be paying attention to? What's the depth of, if you're
leading something what's the depth of what you should really
understand?… Don’t ever worry about being an expert in every area but
you have to at least know what quadrant the answer should be in….
messaging and understanding the level of fidelity that I should be paying
attention to’… I shadowed him for quite a bit in a lot of the senior
meetings.

4.4

Differences Between Categories

Since the goal of phenomenography is to find variation of experience, and the
outcomes are logically related, typically by a hierarchy, the differences here imply a
learning trajectory. This learning trajectory answers the second research question in
Section 2.8.
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4.4.1 From Category 1 – Brittle to 2 – Plastic
One of the key differences between Brittle and Plastic engineers is the amount of
fear they discuss; Brittle engineers are considerably more emotional than Plastic
engineers. This may be related to the dimension of teamwork; Brittle engineers describe
mostly their work as individual projects and Plastic engineers are beginning to leverage
knowledge of their teammates, however superficial it may be. Brittle engineers are aware
of the fact that there are subjects they have not learned, but Plastic engineers are aware
that other teammates may know that subject, so Plastic engineers have reduced their
negative emotional response by convincing themselves that someone nearby will know
what they do not know. Brittle engineers, however, have not yet mastered the ability to
ask someone else for help and advice.
Brittle engineers have not made informal peer review a part of their design
process yet. Brittle engineers are trying to perform to summative reviews rather than
formative reviews (Pellegrino, Chudowsky, & Glaser, 2001). Brittle engineers think of
reviews as a pass/fail moment and their emotions are tied to that result; for Margaret and
Philip in particular, they fear that failure will terminate their careers. On the other hand,
Plastic engineers seek peer review regularly with less fear of failure. Rather, Plastic
engineers acknowledge that they may have made a mistake and another perspective is
valuable to catch it.
Because of Brittle engineers’ focus on summative review and the fear of failure
associated with it, they tend to push decision-making to their immediate superiors.
Plastic engineers, on the other hand, have learned to judge themselves first and assemble
a defensible position. Plastic engineers still rely on superiors because they respect their
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superiors’ breadth and length of experience, but their superiors are now teammates
instead of judges to them.
Brittle and Plastic engineers both experience epistemic uncertainty, and if they
gained knowledge, then their uncertainty would be reduced. Brittle engineers tend to
continue to learn individually and suspect that the “whole story” is hidden. Plastic
engineers have a different attitude that they are fairly certain that everything has been
tried before, and now that they are “in the real world”, working for pay, they have the
freedom and responsibility to ask questions of others and expect to get the answers.
Brittle engineers are named thusly because their response to uncertainty is to
break easily emotionally. Plastic engineers are named thusly because their response to
uncertainty is to make design moves in a certain direction, and when they have reached
the end of the checklist, they deem their uncertainty eliminated. The checklist to Plastic
engineers is some process defined by other more experienced engineers as the external
embodiment of knowledge, and that is satisfactory to Plastic engineers.

4.4.2 From Category 2 – Plastic to 3 – Tolerant
The difference between Tolerant engineers and Plastic engineers is not the
difference in years of experience but that Tolerant engineers view themselves in a
network of engineers, with themselves having a systems view or broad view of the design
problem. A Plastic engineer’s view of the design problem is that he is looking up the
hierarchy for people with answers, whereas a Tolerant engineer looks across the
hierarchy and can assemble a team in a day, but it will take the team more than a day to
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converge on a solution. A Plastic engineer’s view is that a design problem could be a
team effort, whereas a Tolerant engineer’s view is that a problem must be a team effort.
Now that a Tolerant engineer must function in a team because of the complexity
of the design tasks, the Tolerant engineer now experiences ambiguity uncertainty in
addition to epistemic uncertainty, where ambiguity comes from the team and their
customers. Ambiguity is present in communicating in oral, written, and visual forms.
The Plastic engineer, on the other hand, is not aware that any communication could be
interpreted in several ways, depending on the speaker and the audience.
A Plastic engineer may feel disconnected from a design task, especially if they are
following a checklist, because they are relying on others’ experience and knowledge. A
Tolerant engineer, on the other hand, feels a significant investment in the design, a sense
of ownership and responsibility. A Tolerant engineer, then, feels empowered to make a
decision and enforce it, whereas a Plastic engineer may not have the strong sense of
wanting to enforce a decision in a design.
It is at this point that a Tolerant engineer may be a Subject Matter Expert in
others’ views. Tolerant engineers have a deep understanding of fundamental principles
of physics and engineering and these principles are their guides. Plastic engineers, on the
other hand, may use what other people simply tell them as their guide. Tolerant
engineers now have a view of at least one system, recognizing that there are many other
systems, but the other systems are not within their purview of responsibility; rather the
Tolerant engineer can and will converse with other system owners, where boundaries
between systems may be negotiable. To a Plastic engineer, boundaries between systems
are non-negotiable.
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Tolerant engineers have an experimental attitude, in that they expect that some
things will fail, whereas Plastic engineers tend to believe that following the checklist will
catch and prevent failures. Tolerant engineers are named thusly because they are tolerant
of the possibility of failure as part of design and the certainty that uncertainty cannot be
eliminated.

4.4.3 From Category 3 – Tolerant to 4 – Robust
Tolerant engineers appear to take on individual work still and mention teams in
general, but without a strong emotional response to team aspects. Robust engineers have
taken a step up to bear responsibility for team performance, and that new responsibility
may be a cause of anxiety. Team performance now refers to teams of teams managing
systems of systems. Robust engineers now have an emotional response to both project
and team, because they view their teammates as responsible for certain systems. Robust
engineers experience conflict between teammates and have the responsibility to manage
that conflict to finish the design task. Robust engineers are named thusly because they
have enough managerial courage to get the design job complete to design requirements
and specifications.
Robust engineers can reach back to the habits of Tolerant engineers and ask for
evidence as a means of confronting another teammate. Sometimes, Robust engineers rely
on their intuition, which they have described as being developed through repeated
experience. Tolerant engineers do not use the word intuition. Tolerant engineers are not
yet completely comfortable with their level of experience, whereas Robust engineers are
very comfortable with their experience, though it may not be entirely reliable.
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Overconfidence, mentioned as part of “bad” decision-making, seems to be part of
intuition. As a comparison point in aviation, it has been shown in Figure 4.4.1 below that
accident rates of pilots with thousands of hours increase at 3,000 to 4,000 flight hours
(Aircraft Owners and Pilot Association, 2007). But beyond 4,000 hours, accident rates
decrease, perhaps indicating a humbling experience that caused the pilot to return to real
data instead of intuition as the evidence for making a decision.

Figure 4.4.1 Accident rates of private pilots as a function of hours of flight time,
reproduced from the Nall Report.

164
From Table 2.3.1 description of expert teams, Robust engineers may have all the
elements except develop a sense of teamness, collective. A Tolerant engineer is also
missing have strong team leadership as a personal characteristic that distinguishes a
Tolerant engineer from a Robust engineer. Either way, the Tolerant and Robust engineer
would be viewed by peers as a good engineer.

4.4.4 From Category 4 – Robust to 5 – Resilient
Resilient engineers have mastered expert teaming in Table 2.3.1 especially by the
trust in Develop a strong sense of “collective,” trust, teamness, and confidence. Resilient
engineers spoke with the plural voice instead of singular; that represents the extent that
they integrated themselves into a team. For Resilient engineers, trusting teamwork is the
only way to manage all the forms of uncertainty that they encounter, whereas Robust
engineers may be sheltered from some forms of interaction uncertainty, such as changing
market demands.
Resilient engineers are named thusly because they have appropriately managed
their teammates to recover from a realized risk item, which in some cases was high
severity and unpredicted. Joel in particular is on the edge between Robust and Resilient,
because the design teams he had were much diversified, but his emotional response was
quite strong, whereas the participants in the Resilient category have a comparatively
subdued emotional response.
Resilient engineers also differ from Robust engineers because Resilient engineers
have almost an optimistic sense of the positive impact of the designs they are delivering,
in that they could “lead the market” and shift their buyers’ opinions. Robust engineers,
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on the other hand, can and do fix the problem to finish the design task, and that is enough
work to handle. To that end, Resilient engineers spend significant time crafting their
message through the ranks and to the customer, whereas Robust engineers concentrate on
what they say instead of how they say it.

4.5

Relationships Among Categories

It is typical in phenomenography to represent the relative comprehensiveness of
outcome categories graphically. While Category 2 is more inclusive of types of
uncertainty than Category 1, Category 2 is exclusive of Category 1 with regard to the
participant’s personal approach to uncertainty and skill in team engagement. Therefore,
Category 2 is represented higher and to the right of Category 1, but not overlapping
Category 1. The same follows for the relationship between Category 2 and 3 and so on.
In Figure 4.5.1 below, a mathematical layout of axes is applied, where higher and
to the right of the origin implies a greater value. The first dimension shown horizontally
is the complexity of the design problem, where the indicators of complexity in the
transcripts are the greater number and greater variety of forms of uncertainty the
participant is aware of. The second dimension shown vertically is the increasing
necessity of team engagement as a significant means of coping with the increasing
uncertainty. The colors of the discrete values of each axis are meant to correlate with the
colors of each category. The third unifying dimension of the five categories could be
read like a typographical map, where a colored outline represents a constant elevation,
and here it represents a constant category.
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For consistency, in Figure 4.5.1 below, the forms of uncertainty are named from
Thunnissen’s taxonomy’s first level, but the details of the second level are not shown for
simplicity’s sake. Epistemic uncertainty is present throughout all the transcripts, so its
stripe goes from origin to the far right. Tolerant, Robust, and Resilient engineers
experience ambiguity, so its stripe goes from Tolerant to the far right. Resilient engineers
are aware of all forms of uncertainty, so there are four stripes of uncertainty along the
independent axis.

Figure 4.5.1 Outcome space for ways of experiencing uncertainty in aerospace design
decisions.
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In Figure 4.5.2 below, the names of the participants are located in the categories
to demonstrate some stretch in either dimension within a category. The skill levels in
team engagement are shown as discrete values and should be interpreted thusly. The
vertical distance between participants within a category represents a small difference in
skill in team engagement. The vertical distance between categories is significant. The
superscript number next to each participant’s name represents the years of experience
listed in Figure 3.10.2 in Section 3.10.1.2.

Figure 4.5.2 Outcome space for ways of experiencing uncertainty in aerospace design
decisions, with participants located in categories.
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4.6

Summary of Categories

A summary of each category appears at the beginning of Section 4.3 above. It is
repeated here in Table 4.6.1 for quick comparison. The colors correspond to the outlined
categories in Figure 4.5.1. The third column represents the horizontal dimension. The
fourth column represents the vertical dimension. The second column represents the
categories, which I have called the third unifying dimension of experience.

Table 4.6.1 Summary of Category descriptions.
Category

Personal Response to
Uncertainty

Design Task
Complexity (Forms
of uncertainty) Axis

Skill in Engaging
Teammates Axis

Brittle

Uncomfortable with
uncertainty or afraid of the
consequences of being found
ignorant by superiors;
strategy or recourse is to
push decisions to someone
else, typically boss or team
lead

Epistemic only; they
are aware that there
is subject matter that
they have not yet
studied

Individual work,
and maybe some
informal peer
review

Plastic

Takes solace in the fact that
most things have been done
before in aerospace and that
there will be someone more
experienced available to
assist; will take some
initiative to gather new
knowledge and to justify
decisions to themselves first,
but also rely on superiors for
decisions

Epistemic
uncertainty as the
Brittle category, but
also including
schedule and budget
constraints

Describes
projects as team
efforts,
acknowledges
that others have
unique and
complementary
knowledge; peer
review is desired
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Table 4.6.1 continued.
Tolerant

Good awareness of
uncertainty in the physical
parts and systems is ever
present and will never be
eliminated, uncertainty also
comes from customers and
teammates in attempting to
understand their goals and
concerns

Epistemic
uncertainty that can
be reduced through
planned and long
term testing and
experimentation;
ambiguity
uncertainty among
teammates

Describes
projects as team
efforts, for which
they feel a
significant
investment or
ownership in a
crucial part of the
project

Robust

Anticipating the unexpected,
willing to try new methods,
processes, solutions, and
looking for data instead of
opinion to validate and verify
new solutions

Epistemic,
ambiguity, and
aleatory
uncertainties;
decisions hinge upon
having real data and
not just SME
opinions

Significant but
possibly
confrontational
engagement with
teammates and
other
stakeholders

Resilient

Uncertainty is a fact of life in
the business, and for the
items within their control, to
get the right data at the right
time at the right fidelity with
the right people to make
decisions and even lead the
market

Epistemic,
ambiguity, aleatory,
and interaction
uncertainties;
interactions could be
global/political,
customer-vendor, or
systems within a
product

Significant and
trusting
engagement with
teammates and
other
stakeholders;
have the
resources,
authority, and
courage to deploy
teammates on
parallel efforts to
investigate
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CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION

Within each category, the demographics of the participants vary, suggesting that
the essence of the experience of uncertainty is deep and broad. Within Category 1, there
are men and women, students and working professionals, those with international
experience and those without. Within Category 2, there are men and women, pilots and
non-pilots, researchers and those in private industry, and one with international
experience. Within Category 3, there is one woman; there are those with greater than 20
years’ experience and those below 10 years’ experience. Within Category 4, there are 4
pilots and 1 raw materials supplier, one with only 6 years’ experience and several with
greater than 20 years’ experience. Within Category 5, there is one with international
experience, and there are at least three tiers of job title represented. While some exposure
and experience of uncertainty may be specific to the job title, there is clear evidence that
an engineer’s personal response to uncertainty is not necessarily linked to the type of
company they work for or the years of experience they have.

5.1

Shape of Outcome Space

Categories 1, 2, 3, and 4 in Figure 4.5.1 have an L shape, implying that engineers
may improve a little in their team engagement or improve a little in their awareness of
forms of uncertainty, but that their personal response remains the same as others in the
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same category. Being able to manage uncertainty better personally does not solely
involve an engineer becoming more proficient at modeling tools and becoming an
individual Subject Matter Expert in multiple subjects. In order to progress between
categories, then, an engineer needs to realize that the strategy for managing increasingly
complex design problems must more deeply involve their teammates. Then, an
engineer’s personal encounter with uncertainty can become less intimidating.
It is clear from the participants’ varied experiences that the aerospace business
delivers complex systems that integrate into systems of systems. Category 2, 3, 4, and 5
participants are very clear on their relative location in systems-of-systems business
hierarchy, knowing that they have customers and suppliers with competing and
conflicting modes of operations and goals. These participants are effectively equating
component systems (e.g., engine, hydraulics, or avionics) to people, engineeringdesigners
who are responsible for those systems. Participants deem that making the owner happy is
equal to making the system functional according to specifications. Therefore,
participants make progress in bringing in larger numbers of people into their design
process.
Because engineers of higher categories see systems as people, there is empty
space in the outcome space. The empty spaces represent that it is not a successful
strategy to improve an engineer’s awareness of teammates’ contributions independent of
increasing awareness of forms of uncertainty in increasingly complex design problems
and vice versa. Rather, an engineer’s understanding of the value of teammates should
improve simultaneously with increased experience of complexity of design problems.
Similarly, as complex problems with increased levels of uncertainty are introduced,
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development of teaming and interpersonal skills is important. It is as if the aerospace
industry with its high level of complexity is indicating that no engineer is expected to be
an individual inventor but rather part of an integrated team in this competitive, global
economy.

5.2

Thresholds Between Categories and Demographics of Variation

It is the personal and internal emotional responses that are the key differentiators
of participants, more than their apparent awareness of types of uncertainty and their skill
at team engagement. This aligns with the concept of “coping strategies”, to suppress
uncertainty, to acknowledge uncertainty, or to reduce uncertainty (Lipshitz & Strauss,
1997), where suppressing, reducing, and acknowledging are internal responses and these
are manifested in outward activities, such as taking a gamble, soliciting advice, or
collecting more information. It is these personal emotional responses that are named
according to the analogy of physical materials’ responses to stress loading.
The boundaries between each category are drawn to represent different personal
emotional responses to uncertainty, and there is something unique about Category 1 that
higher category participants have overcome. Category 1 – Brittle engineers may allow
their strong negative emotion to hinder them from making progress on their design,
hinder them from seeking to learn new information, or hinder them from taking on
decision-making responsibility. Category 2 – Plastic engineers still encounter
uncertainty, but they have developed at least one strategy, such as seeking peer or mentor
review or viewing failure as a learning opportunity, that gives them the confidence to
proceed with the design task. Category 1 – Brittle engineers seem to have the
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fundamental view that others around them are like judges instead of teammates, whereas
the higher category engineers fundamentally view others as teammates instead of judges.
Category 3 – Tolerant engineers displayed almost no emotions in their transcripts.
Whereas Category 2 engineers express their design process as serial, Category 3
engineers described their design process as several parallel efforts, where they are
looking for the biggest influencing factors. Category 3 engineers are expecting that some
factors will be more important than others, but at the beginning, they may not know
which, so they remain open-minded and experimental.
Category 4 – Robust engineers have faced the possibility that there is aleatory
uncertainty, which uncertainty that could not be reduced even with more knowledge.
Engineers that deal with aleatory uncertainty here have operationalized it as risk to flight
safety, cost, or schedule and have defined some acceptable level of risk. Robust
engineers have figured out the inescapable importance of engaging other teammates in
order to manage risk and it manifests in very frequent use of we, whereas Category 3
engineers are not always speaking in the plural. Robust engineers realize the matter of
managing others’ opinions and feelings in order for the others to be motivated enough to
finish high quality work on the task. That is how Robust engineers get the whole design
task completed, but it can be tiring for them.
Category 5 – Resilient engineers, especially Peter, Malcolm, and Duncan, have
taken a step up from seeing only their coworkers as teammates to seeing the customer as
much a player in the execution of the design task, a human-centered design view (IDEO,
2009; Maguire, 2001; Zoltowski et al., 2012). Peter and Malcolm were specific in
reflecting on their switch from technical-centered to customer-centered design. It seems
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that the customer, prime contractor, and supplier interaction uncertainties may dominate
the attention of Resilient engineers, and they know they have teams of capable engineers
and others around the business to attend to technical matters. Resilient engineers have
enough technical knowledge to stay abreast of the evolution of the solution, and they trust
the process and the designers to converge on a solution, whereas Robust engineers may
have some trepidation about converging on a solution. That is what separates a Robust
engineer from a Resilient engineer.
While personal and emotional responses are the primary delineators of categories
of experience, it does not mean that women are concentrated in one or a few particular
categories. It is encouraging to see that although the female participants in this study are
on the younger end of the spectrum, they are spread across three categories. It is a
limitation of this study that I did not successfully recruit women who have been working
20 years and/or have leadership roles in order to confirm that women’s experience of
uncertainty in design decisions is no different than men’s experience. With key
researchers exploring the gendering of professions (Pierce, 1995) and why highly
educated women are opting out of the workforce (Stone, 2007), it would not be
appropriate to make assumptions about what all women would say about their design
experiences.
Some participants with pilot experience brought a user perspective to the design
process but other pilots did not make specific mention of it influencing their design
decisions. Bernard (Category 2 – Plastic) and Curtis (Category 4 – Robust) were very
clear on the impact of their pilot experience on their design process; they considered
where information was coming from and how much information a pilot could take in.
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However, Oliver, Stephen, and Abraham did not talk about it much. Ronald spoke more
about his technician perspective than his pilot perspective. Joel talked about pilot
experience from the perspective of considering flight safety of paramount importance
because of personal friendships within the pilot community. However, pilot experience
by itself was not a sufficiently distinct category for experiencing uncertainty in design
and decision-making.
Participants with international experience made comparisons between cultures
and they are spread across most of the categories of experience. Miranda and Alonso
were specific in their awareness of cultural differences having an impact on their style
and frequency of communication, which in turn affected how they manage the design
process. Silvia and Jacques were specific about moving between cultures as having a
positive impact on their confidence to engage in new circumstances. Margaret, on the
other hand, compared the culture of private industry to the culture of research and
academic environments, saying that her industry experience was more certain and
comfortable than her research experience, primarily because in industry, she had a
supervisor with a defined process. Peter did not make claims of global experience in the
same manner as Miranda and Alonso, but Peter made specific reference to gaining a more
global view as he moved from a prime contractor environment to a supplier environment.
In all these transcripts, it is clear that cross-cultural experiences had noticeable impacts
on the participants’ awareness of uncertainty, a desirable trait for the next generation of
engineers (Downey et al., 2006; Jamieson & Lohmann, 2009; K. Sheppard et al., 2004).
There is a fairly consistent correlation between job title (an indicator of level of
responsibility) and category, where Category 4 and Category 5 participants had explicit
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leadership roles and Category 1 and Category 2 participants did not have leadership roles.
Category 3 participants described responsibilities for which they have final authority, but
they did not describe these as leadership roles. This correlation may be the result of
participant self-selection, where they may have accounted themselves successful in the
roles they have, and thus feel confident in disclosing their experiences for research
purposes (note that no participant in this study described themselves as having been
unsuccessful to the point of being removed from the job). Alternatively, those engineers
that develop and demonstrate desired professional skills receive more responsibilities
through promotion, which would lead to an expected correlation. These job titles,
however, were not sufficient to predict categories and participants with similar job titles
spanned categories.
Another expected correlation is between years of experience and category. All of
the participants were still in the aerospace field so those who were not successful and left
the field or were fired were not included in this study. It would be expected, therefore,
that more years of experience would lead to more experience with mastery of uncertainty.
This is shown in the data with a cluster of participants with 4 or less years’ experience at
the bottom left of Figure 4.5.2 and a cluster of participants with greater than 20 years’
experience at the top right. Yet there are exceptions; Abraham and Bertram at greater
than 25 years’ experience are in the same Category 3 - Tolerant as Viola, with 3 years’
experience. Ronald with six years’ experience is in Category 4 – Robust with Joel at 26
years’ experience. Somewhere in the middle between Category 1 and Category 5, the
participants demonstrate a certain level of willingness to take on increasingly complex
design tasks, and that internal willingness is the differentiator.
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5.3

Expert Teams and Ways of Experiencing Uncertainty

While phenomenography investigates an individual’s experience of a
phenomenon, there is value to considering the teaming aspects that the participants in this
study are aware of and mentioned, even though teams were not specifically investigated
or observed in action. Referring back to the conceptual framework of expert teaming in
Table 2.3.1 illuminates key differences for managing uncertainty in teams as shown in
Table 5.3.1. Because no teammates from the same project were included in this study, it
is not possible to uncover the outcome of hold shared mental models beyond the culture
of aerospace in general as described in Section 4.2 Common Themes. For future research
work, it is important to consider these aspects of teaming for identifying skills that
students may intercoordinate (Fischer, 1980) in order to develop the higher level skill of
managing uncertainty.

Table 5.3.1 Categories of experiencing uncertainty in design decisions compared to
expert teams' outcomes and behaviors.
Expert teams…
Hold shared mental
models
Optimize resources by
learning and adapting
Have clear roles and
responsibilities
Have a clear, valued, and
shared vision
Engage in a cycle or
discipline of prebrief →
performance → debrief
Have strong team
leadership

Ways of Experiencing Uncertainty in Design
Brittle
Plastic
Tolerant
Robust
NA
NA
NA
NA

Resilient
NA

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
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Table 5.3.1 continued.
Develop a strong sense
of “collective,” trust,
teamness, and
confidence
Manage and optimize
performance outcomes
Cooperate and
coordinate

5.4

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Design Expertise and Ways of Experiencing Uncertainty

Because this study focuses on decisions in design, it is appropriate to compare this
new model of design in Table 5.4.1 with established models of design expertise as shown
in Table 2.4.1 as part of the validation of the new model. While phenomenography
demands the bracketing of one’s own understanding of the phenomenon, including the
bracketing of results from other literature, during analysis of the transcripts (Ashworth &
Lucas, 1998), it is desired for validity purposes to triangulate new results with other
published results.
Category 2 – Plastic correlates with Dreyfus’ Novice level of expertise in the
aspect of following strict rules, where Category 2 – Plastic engineers follow procedures
and they deem their work is complete at the end of the checklist. By default, then, the
Category 1 – Brittle engineer may be equivalent to the Naïve level of expertise, where
Ross and Philip described having one choice or another, and either seemed to be good
enough, so they picked one because of their relative familiarity with the selection.
There is a close comparison of Category 3 – Tolerant engineers and Competent
level of expertise because of the aspect of trial-and-error, which in Category 3 is an
experimental attitude. The Competent level of expertise shows an emotional attachment,
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which is similar to a Category 3 engineer having a deep sense of responsibility as a
growing Subject Matter Expert and/or system owner.
Category 4 – Robust engineers, like Proficient level of expertise, seek reasons or
evidence to justify a decision and can quickly set up well-coordinated plans to execute
their decisions. But there is also a layer in Robust engineers of Expert level of expertise,
especially in the matter of intuition. So, it seems appropriate to blend a Proficient and
Expert level of expertise with Category 4 - Robust engineers. Lawson and Dorst (2009)
point out that many professionals do not progress beyond Expert Level.
Category 5 – Resilient engineers have Expert and Master behaviors of reflecting
on successes and failures and having an acute sense of context as it affects the design. It
is the analogy of resilient materials being able to recover quickly that names the
categories, and the matter of dwelling on success and failure is closely linked to
recovering quickly. For Category 2 and above, failure is a teacher instead of a fright.

Table 5.4.1 Categories of experiencing uncertainty in design decisions compared to the
Dreyfus model of expertise in design.
Level of
Expertise

Approach to Design
Practice

Naïve
Novice

Choice based
Convention based

Advanced
Beginner

Situation based

Competent

Strategy based

Approach to Design Practice
Description
Consider objective features of
situation, follow strict rules
Situational aspects important,
sensitivity to exceptions to ‘hard
rules’
Emotional attachment, trial-anderror, learning and reflecting,
selects relevant elements, makes
plan

Category of
Experiencing
Uncertainty
Brittle
Plastic

Tolerant
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Table 5.4.1 continued.
(Proficient)
Expert

Experience based

Master

Create new schemata

Visionary

Redefine field

Immediately see most important
issues, appropriate plan, reasons
what to do
Respond intuitively, perform
appropriate action straightaway
Dwell on success and failure,
acute sense of context, openness
to subtle cues
New ways of doing things, new
definitions of the issues,
operating on margins of domain,
paying attention to other
domains

Robust

Resilient
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CHAPTER 6. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

One of the key implications of this outcome space and its summary is that
designers in aerospace engineering rely on their peers as their primary strategy for
managing uncertainty. The participants acknowledge formalized tools such as software
packages and design and planning methodologies and of course engineering
fundamentals and analysis. These technical aspects are the core of an engineer and they
are very important within an engineering curriculum. However, it is significant that the
ability to work across teams and an appreciation for the work of others is related to the
advancement of the categories and the participants’ ability to manage ever increasing
uncertainty. The study was not probing teamwork in the research questions nor did the
protocol explicitly probe this area but it emerged from the data analysis. As noted earlier
the outcomes space has empty areas. An approach that guided students down one axis
emphasizing the technical aspects solely with a plan to add teamwork later appears to be
counter to how the engineers develop and would therefore have limits on its
effectiveness. It would be more effective if these were linked with activities involving
teams when they are learning how to handle design challenges with uncertainty.
The participants with significant responsibilities in industry (senior program
managers, directors, and above) have described teamwork as the foremost strategy and
have integrated it with their technical decision making. If the undergraduate curriculum
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seeks to prepare students to enter this environment, an integrated approach appears more
effective. Because this outcome space shows a progression, it is recommended that
students are not just put into teams in a design class, such as capstone design. Rather
they should have multiple experiences where they can revisit teamwork and uncertainty
in several progressively more challenging classroom experiences rather than to be
confronted with one capstone design experience, as recommended by Grinter (1955).
This is not to say that the traditional engineering disciplines have stagnated in the 1950s;
on the contrary, efforts continue to update the engineering curriculum (Clough & et al.,
2004). Rather, this work provides a focused lens on what development of the skill of
managing uncertainty may look like as a comparison point for curriculum developers to
assess their programs.
The higher category participants had learned how to respect and verify to their
satisfaction the work of others. If teams were introduced early in traditional design teams
of say four students, basic teaming skills could be taught. As students progress through
their curriculum, more complex problems could be given to students where they are
expected to work across teams in systems of teams. These experiences in a classroom
where they can be processed by a mentoring faculty member would allow students the
opportunity to progress in the model developed in this study.

6.1

For Educators

In order to be valuable in the aerospace engineering business, an engineer must be
proficient in teaming and in designing complex systems. The engineer must also have a
grip on their own personal feelings, which is not to be devoid of feeling, but to recognize
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that feelings could hinder their progress, whether it is related to how they feel about their
teammates or how they feel about the scale of complexity of the design. The complexity
and scale of Large Scale Complex Engineered Systems is insurmountable for an
individual engineer, but can only be controlled by a team of “the right people with the
right information at the right time”, like Peter remarked.
As several participants indicated, they discovered the perspective of failure as a
teachable moment rather than a fearsome event. It is this coping strategy among several
that child development researchers describe as “resilient” (Luthar, Cicchetti, & Becker,
2000). In this study, some Robust and Resilient engineers note the unfortunate demise of
younger engineers who could not overcome their fears and grow their understanding of
the business. As Malcolm said: “They’re not going to be looking at you and blaming you
because it occurred… you're measured on how you react and how you handle them.”
So, aerospace engineering education curricula need to provide multiple learning
opportunities, including design, of reasonable complexity and personal investment that
the student has opportunity to encounter these types of uncertainty and face their own
fears. The instructor, with the knowledge of a growth in emotional responses, can be
better equipped to coach students through this growth, knowing that there will be
uncomfortable feelings for a while. At the same time, the design environment needs
teammates (Smith, Sheppard, Johnson, & Johnson, 2005), mentors, maintainers or
mechanics (a notable experience for the majority of participants), and customers. There
is evidence that these experiences do not have to involve an aerospace application to
develop these skills and can include activities such as community-engaged learning and
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service-learning (J. Huff, Zoltowski, Oakes, & Adams; J. L. Huff, Zoltowski, & Oakes,
2014).
From this study and others, educators can develop authentic design tasks for the
classroom, within senior design as well as several semesters before, isolating and
amplifying critical elements for students to develop “patterns of recognition”, like Joel
remarked. Authentic tasks have key characteristics: 1) realistically contextualized; 2)
require judgment and innovation; 3) ask student to “do” the subject; 4) replicate key
challenging situations in which professionals are truly “tested” in their field; 5) assess
student’s ability to use a repertoire of knowledge and skill; and 6) allow opportunities to
rehearse, practice, and get feedback (Hansen, 2011). This study in particular uncovered
some of that repertoire of knowledge and skill, particularly managing uncertainty in
design decisions with teammates and stakeholders.
This study and others confirm that teaming in class projects needs to be
strategically organized and that the students need to be aware of and participating in team
construction, whether in an aerospace-centric course or in another design course. Several
examples of design projects throughout the undergraduate curriculum have been
developed, assessed, and disseminated. Aircraft design has been implemented at the
sophomore level (R. M. Cummings & Hall, 2005). Project-based service learning in
EPICS (Coyle, Jamieson, & Oakes, 2005) is a design course that could be leveraged over
several semesters. EPICS is particularly attractive because the students who return for
multiple semesters are expected to take on more leadership roles, and, by extension,
would have more exposure to more forms of uncertainty. The Learning Factory
(Lamancusa, Zayas, Soyster, Morell, & Jorgensen, 2008) is another prize-winning
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concept of multidisciplinary teaming design projects. Completely re-envisioned designcentric programs include Iron Range Engineering in Minnesota and Olin College in
Franklin, Massachusetts. If laboratory-based design courses are unsustainable for
administrators, then design projects in typical underclassmen engineering science courses
like statics (Atadero, Rambo-Hernandez, & Balgopal, 2015) can be employed.
In any case, the overarching goal is to get students comfortable interacting as
teams and with other teams in a larger system. In this way, they can become proficient in
Systems Thinking in advance of industrial work that deals with Systems-of-Systems.
Educators may find certain itemized behaviors and tasks in Table 2.3.1 that can be
implemented or re-emphasized as part of project-based learning (Barron et al., 1998;
Bielefeldt, Paterson, & Swan, 2010; Dym et al., 2005) environments.
Because I am advocating the changing of education systems, some examination of
instructors as part of an academic complex system is necessary. An instructor may have
the view of classes as individual systems that the instructor “owns” or has responsibility
and authority for that class. But, one class affects another class, the most obvious
example of that being prerequisite classes. So, it would be more effective for instructors
to have a least a Tolerant perspective on uncertainty, where a person has a deep
conceptual understanding of the system (class) and a sense of ownership, but also that the
boundaries between classes are negotiable for the sake of the performance of the entire
complex system. In other words, the boundaries between classes refers to the content,
where a design project in a heat transfer class may be of similar content to the
prerequisite thermodynamics class’ design project, but with increased complexity. In
order to negotiate well, instructors need to have some sense of teamwork.
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The second aspect of students having an awareness of their personal response to
uncertainty may be uncovered and explored through reflective writing (Kalman, 2007;
Schön, 1983). Reflective thinking enhances learning and a student may self-identify
areas for improvement. Based on the vertical dimension of the outcome space, and
especially the depth of reflection from the Robust and Resilient participants in Sections
4.3.4.4 and 4.3.5.4, an instructor may pose reflection questions to students about
uncertainty, such as those primary questions I asked in the interviews:


Were there things in this design experience that you did not know?



Where was there uncertainty?



How was the uncertainty treated?



How did the uncertainty affect the decisions you made about the design?



Did you learn anything about uncertainty in design from your experience?

6.2

For Future Research

Future research questions first posed in Section 2.8 are revisited here. Skill
Theory, first shown in Section 2.6 in Figure 2.6.1 and Table 2.6.1, can assist in a logical
and hierarchically related set of tasks and skills discovered in this study. Revisiting the
theory, a learner intercoordinates sets of skills into a higher level skill, which is induced
by the environment and the task. This will be a significant addition to content,
assessment, and pedagogy of the higher level skills of managing uncertainty, making
decisions, designing, and teaming. With the content and tasks defined, then the
assessment schemes for those tasks should be developed with ease and assurance of
relevance. The pedagogy follows that the teams of students should be allotted time to
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accomplish their design tasks and that the teams of students should be encouraged and
coached to seek feedback from mentors and customers.
From each of the categories, key skills and tasks can be identified as a first step in
developing new and improved curricula. Since the outcome space of this study is
hierarchical, it follows that a hierarchy or progression of skills learned can be extracted
from the outcome space. A progression of skills through each of the categories should be
apparent. This preliminary description can serve as a starting point for future research on
appropriate classroom interventions for managing uncertainty in design decisions.
In Category 1 – Brittle, the participants indicated that they were still learning to 1)
solicit feedback informally; 2) to become more information-literate; and 3) to model the
different engineering phenomena they were assigned to contribute to the design. In each
of these developing skills, epistemic uncertainty is a subset.
In Category 2 – Plastic, the participants indicated that they were still learning to
1) solicit feedback from mentors; 2) justify decisions to themselves first and then present
to others; 3) validate and verify models of engineering phenomena; and 4) manage a
schedule and budget for their project. In each of these developing skills, epistemic
uncertainty is a subset. This category of participants appears to have attained the skill of
soliciting peer feedback, and are compounding or substituting mentor feedback now.
These participants appear to have increased their proficiency in information literacy, and
are now intercoordinating information literacy with modeling knowledge to create
validation and verification schemes. Simultaneously, they are intercoordinating
information literacy and feedback from peers and mentors to develop the skill of
justifying decisions. Though schedule and budget representations are a lower level skill,
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it seems that the participants did not intercoordinate schedule and budget with design
until they were required by the task, just as Skill Theory predicts.
In Category 3 – Tolerant, participants have developed the skills of 1) deep
conceptual understanding of a particular phenomenon or system; 2) valid experiment
design; 3) reframing phenomena as trade-offs and risks; and 4) tempering one’s personal
response to uncertainty. In this category, participants have intercoordinated feedback
from mentors and justification of decisions to develop deep conceptual understanding.
They have compounded justification of decisions with valid experiments, schedule and
budget, trade-offs and risks, to develop a mental model (Lehrer & Schauble, 2000;
Magnani, 1999) of a whole system. Mentors and peers are also part of the mental model
of a system, especially where a peer “owns” another interacting system. In these skills,
aleatory, ambiguity, and epistemic forms of uncertainty are subsets. Trade-offs could
have ambiguous choices and outcomes. Viewing aleatory uncertainty as risk allows an
engineer to manage risk instead of attempt to eliminate or reduce uncertainty.
In Category 4 – Robust, participants have developed their mental models of
systems further to master 1) systems of systems thinking and 2) develop new methods,
processes, and solutions. Understanding a person as a customer is a lower level skill, but
differentiating customer feedback from peer and mentor feedback is a skill more apparent
in this category. Participants here have compounded their understanding of customer
feedback with their understanding of systems-of-systems in order to develop a robust
design. Participants here also see peers and subordinates as “owners” of a system as part
of their mental model, and they see uncertainty in interaction between these systems.
Participants here also have mastered the skill of experiments, deep conceptual
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understanding, risks, and trade-offs, in order to develop and implement new methods and
solutions. In these skills, uncertainty in developing new methods is phenomenological
epistemic uncertainty, which can be reduced when the method is implemented.
Uncertainty with the customer can take the form of behavioral, ambiguous, and/or
interaction. In this category, the quantity and quality of uncertainty are increasing
compared to the lower categories.
In Category 5 – Resilient, participants have developed the skills of 1) building
trust and a sense of “collective” in teaming; 2) delegating tasks and responsibilities; 3)
tempering one’s personal response to others’ uncertainties; and 4) investigating and
understanding the customer’s needs and feedback within a larger context. In this
category, interaction uncertainty is a subset of teaming and understanding the customer.
There are also all the other forms of uncertainty that Category 4 engineers experience.
A second branch of research could expand this work with different populations
and different contexts. For example, the same study could be conducted with
underclassmen undergraduates to discover progress made in managing uncertainty over
the typical four to five years of study. Also, the same study could be conducted within a
single aerospace company, or in a non-aerospace engineering industry. Would the results
presented here be replicated, or would there be other strategies for managing uncertainty
discovered in other contexts? If so, how would the new results be applicable to the
undergraduate curriculum?
A third branch of study, stemming from the unexpected results here, is to examine
teams of teams, in order to corroborate the participants’ perceptions of teamwork with
researchers’ observations of teams of teams in action. A different research methodology
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might be employed here to study groups instead of studying individuals. This branch of
research questions aligns with Deshmukh and Collopy’s (2010) questions about
organizations and teams: “how does the adaptability of an engineering design
organization impact the large complex systems it develops? … what attributes of a design
team must be expressed in a useful and rigorous model of design team behavior?”
Perhaps the expert team behavior models I showed in Table 5.3.1 partially answer their
second research question.

6.3

Conclusions

Managing uncertainty in design decisions has been shown in this study to be an
acquired skill, not just an innate or unteachable skill. This skill is a system of connected
lower level skills, and increasing connections between lower level skills indicates a path
of development that allows for teaching these skills within a student’s zone of proximal
development (Vygotsky, 1986). At first, a student developing a skill will mimic or
imitate an instructor or mentor, but given multiple tasks where a student focuses on
certain content moment by moment, and given assessments that can also serve as a cycle
of learning, a student will gradually develop the higher level skills being sought (Fischer,
1980). This study has shown that it could be years of gradual development for a skill in
the workplace.
The major contribution of this study is the uncovering of the key elements in
varying levels of awareness of uncertainty in design decisions that allows for future work
in developing learning simulations and interventions for the undergraduate curriculum.
While the context of this study was specifically the aerospace engineering because of the
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industries’ commitments to safety and to expanding the boundaries of knowledge, the
elements of the skills here are applicable to other engineering disciplines engaged in
design of complex systems. The discoveries in this study of key behaviors and cognition
will ultimately assist educators in better preparing the next generation of engineering
leaders in aerospace and students who will help solve the world’s Grand Challenges
("Introduction to the Grand Challenges for Engineering," 2013).
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Appendix A

Informed Consent and Recruiting

IRB approved the study with Dr. William Oakes as the primary investigator under
Exemption 45 CFR 46.101(b)(2) (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Sep
24, 2004). The study here is human research, governed by 45 CFR part 46. The research
involves the use of interview procedures only. The research does not involve children.
The final condition “is the information obtained recorded in such a manner that human
subjects can be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and could
any disclosure of the human subjects’ responses outside the research reasonably place the
subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects’ financial
standing, employability, or reputation?” is not met, thereby exempting the research from
45 CFR part 46 requirements. The subjects are not being placed at risk because they are
simply being asked about their professional experience, a matter of common knowledge
within their employing companies.
Required forms for IRB under these conditions are:


Exemption 2-3 Form v1-13

Optional forms for IRB under these conditions are:


Participant Information Sheet



Recruiting email

The Purdue University Human Research Protection Program Institutional Review
Board granted my exemption request on Nov 25, 2014. The exemption document
includes a requirement “when human subjects research will be conducted in schools or
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places of business, investigators must obtain written permission from an appropriate
authority within the organization. If the written permission was not submitted with the
study application at the time of IRB review… the investigator must submit written
permission to the IRB prior to engaging in the research activities”. Data was collected
after the participants’ regular work hours when they were in the comfort of their own
homes.
Secondly, IRB has two rules for recruiting students. To meet those requirements,
students were emailed instead of using classtime to announce recruiting efforts, a cash
incentive was offered instead of offering any sort of class credit, and the confidentiality
of the students was maintained just like other participants by not informing their
instructor about any students’ responses or participation. The rules specifically are:
1. To recruit from Purdue University classrooms, the instructor and all others associated
with conduct of the course (e.g., teaching assistants) must not be present during
announcement of the research opportunity or any recruitment activity. This may be
accomplished by announcing, in advance, that class will either start later than usual or
end earlier than usual so this activity may occur. It should be emphasized that
attendance at the announcement and recruitment are voluntary and the student’s
attendance and enrollment decision will not be shared with those administering the
course.
2. If students earn extra credit towards their course grade through participation in a
research project conducted by someone other than the course instructor(s), such as in
the example above, the students participation should only be shared with the course
instructor(s) at the end of the semester. Additionally, instructors who allow extra
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credit to be earned through participation in research must also provide an opportunity
for students to earn comparable extra credit through a non-research activity requiring
an amount of time and effort comparable to the research option.

Recruiting Email:
[Potential participant’s name],
You are receiving this email you have been identified as a good designer and a
good decision-maker. We are recruiting participants for a research study on how
aerospace engineers manage uncertainty when making design decisions. The information
you provide will be used to inform the undergraduate engineering curriculum to improve
students’ awareness of uncertainty in design and decision-making processes. The data
you provide by your participating in this study will increase the effectiveness of
undergraduate education, especially making new graduates more prepared for the
professional, competitive, high-stakes workforce that you are currently employed in.
The study will consist of an interview over Skype (or other video chat service) for
no more than 2 hours. Questions will focus only on your educational background and
your design experiences. You will have an opportunity after the interview to check and
edit the information that you provided before we include it in any analysis.
For your peace of mind, please know that there is absolutely no obligation for you
to participate in this study. In future publications from this study, there will be no
identifying information about you, your employer/school, or the projects you have
worked on. No proprietary or confidential company information will be revealed in
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publications from this study. No one, including your employer/professors, will know that
you participated in this study.
If you are interested in participating, please email Toni at cumming3@purdue.edu
for further information or to set up an appointment. Alternatively, you may contact the
sponsor of this research, Dr William Oakes, at oakes@purdue.edu.
Thanks,
Antonette (Toni) Cummings, P.E.
cumming3@purdue.edu
http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~cumming3
PhD Candidate, Engineering Education

There were some modifications to recruit senior design aerospace engineering
students, including compensation of $15 for their time. The first two paragraphs of the
email above have been modified (changes emphasized in italics):

You are receiving this email because you have been identified as an aerospace
engineering student with design experience. We are recruiting participants for a research
study on how aerospace engineers manage uncertainty when making design decisions.
The information you provide will be used to inform the undergraduate engineering
curriculum to improve students’ awareness of uncertainty in design and decision-making
processes. The data you provide by your participating in this study will increase the
effectiveness of undergraduate education, especially making new graduates more
prepared for the professional, competitive, high-stakes workforce.
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The study will consist of an interview over Skype (or other video chat service) for
no more than 2 hours. Questions will focus only on your educational background and
your design experiences. You will have an opportunity after the interview to check and
edit the information that you provided before we include it in any analysis. You will be
compensated $15 for your participation.

As a side note, when a reminder email was sent to the recruits, a more casual tone
was used, saying, “Hi! Just following up with the email I sent you two weeks ago. Am
hoping you can help me. I'm interviewing people who have done aerospace engineering
design work for my dissertation. Do you have about an hour in the next two weeks that
we could talk? I would very much appreciate it. I completely understand if an interview
is not possible, but I hope to hear from you!” At least two of my personal said that the
first email sounded like spam email to them and that is why they did not respond to the
first email. Even though many of the initial recruits were friends, the first recruiting
email volley did not sound personal enough to merit a response.
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Appendix B

Interview Protocol

Thanks for agreeing to be interviewed. Before we start, I want you to know that
your participation is entirely voluntary and you can stop at any time for any reason. You
should not feel obligated in any way to participate. I will not reveal to anyone that you
did or did not complete the interview. Are you still comfortable participating?
I will make every effort to make your interview anonymous and unidentifiable in
published papers. I will de-identify you, your company, and your projects/products. I
will also provide you the opportunity to check and edit the conversation afterwards. I
will only include what you are comfortable including.
You have been identified by your peers as a good engineering designer and
decision-maker. The purpose of this study is to understand how you deal with
uncertainty as it arises in design and decision-making in your career. From there, we
hope to use the results of this study to inform the undergraduate curriculum to help
students become better decision-makers earlier in their careers.
First, let me ask you about you.
Interviewee Background Information


What is your education background?



What engineering positions have you held with other companies before this
one?



What department/unit/section are you employed in now?



How long have you worked as an engineer for this company?



What is your current job title?
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What is your current range of responsibilities?

Company Background Information


What kind of company, agency, or organization do you work for? (private
industry, state agency, federal agency, military)



How many employees are in your department? Location?



How many other professional, technicians, or other employees are in your
department, section/unit?



Who are suppliers to your company?



To whom does your company supply products and services?

Primary questions on decision-making in design


Can you tell me about a time when you had to make a decision on a design?



What did that experience involve?
o What was the goal?
o What were you designing?
o Who were you designing it for?
o Where were you designing?
o Who else was involved in the design experience?
o What was your specific role in the experience? What were your
responsibilities?



What were the decisions that needed to be made in the design?



What was your process for making those decisions?
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How did you go about determining possible solutions? What methods of
analysis were used?



How did you represent the design?
o Formulae
o Prototypes
o Model
o Functional description



What criteria were used to determine the best decision/solution?



How well received were the solutions/decisions?



To what degree have the solutions/decisions been implemented?

Primary Questions on Experiencing Uncertainty


Were there things in this design experience that you did not know?



Where was there uncertainty?



How was the uncertainty treated?



How did the uncertainty affect the decisions you made about the design?



Did you learn anything about uncertainty in design from your experience?

Word choices


Could you tell me what it means to you when you use the word “uncertainty”?



Is there another word or phrase that you would use that describes uncertainty
in your field?
o Uncertainty that is reducible if you gain more knowledge


Models
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Human or organization behaviors



Natural phenomena

o Uncertainty that cannot be reduced, even with more knowledge
o Ambiguity in word choices and vocabulary
o Interactions of organizations


What formal training do you have in uncertainty?

Primary questions on learning about uncertainty


Can you tell me about previous experience from similar or dissimilar tasks
that affected your decision-making?



How do you think this is different from the experience we talked about
earlier?



Did you approach the project in the same way as your approached the
previous one we just discussed?



What experiences do you believe contributed the most to your understanding
of uncertainty in design decisions?



What advice would you give to undergraduate students about uncertainty in
design decisions?

Closing questions


Anything that you want to add about your experiences with uncertainty in
design decisions that we haven’t discussed yet?



Any questions for me?
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Appendix C

Iterations of Analysis

The steps are listed below, having been documented in a research notebook and
replicated in an nVivo 10 project.
1. Moments after each interview, I memoed my thoughts in my research notebook,
typically one page of handwritten notes.
2. After receiving a transcript of an interview from a third party service, I listened to the
audio recording and corrected the transcript.
3. I de-identified each transcript, removing university names, business names, and
project or aircraft names. Listening to the audio and de-identifying the transcripts is
the first cycle of familiarizing myself with the data.
4. Each participant received a de-identified transcript for a member check. I declared
that I would respect and include any and all edits they wanted to make. I asked for
any edits to be returned to me within two weeks. I also promised to return the results
of my study to the participants as to avoid the researcher’s “seduction and
abandonment” (National Commission for the Proptection of Human Subjects of
Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 1978).
5. As I approached 20 interviews completed, I thought I was beginning to hear the same
sentiments from new participants. However, I did not have enough females or
enough voices from subsystem companies, so I continued to recruit.
6. When I completed 25 interviews, I was reasonably certain that I reached saturation
after I had gained more female voices and subsystem voices.
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7. As Iteration 2 of familiarizing myself with the data, I printed and read 3 transcripts
per day, noting decisions, design, and uncertainty quotes on notecards. I grouped the
notecards by these topics without regard to the clustering of participants. Purple
notes were design topics; yellow notes were decision topics; orange notes were
uncertainty topics. Left side was before creating categories; right side is after.

Iteration 2 – 2015 08 02

Figure C.1 Iteration 2 of creating categories.

Categories


Fear and frustration – need external motivation
o Margaret, Edmund, Silvia, Miranda, Viola, Philip, Luciana
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Ignorance or uncertainty of technical phenomena and analysis tools
o Silvia, Ross, Viola, Miranda, Diana



Rely on historical data, what has been done before
o Diana, Vincent, Oliver, Curtis, Ross, Ronald, Bertram



Base on fundamental principles
o Bernard, Abraham, Viola



Measure risk
o Stephen, Abraham, Alonso, Curtis, Malcolm



Have contingency or back-up plans
o Joel, Edmund, Jacques, Malcolm, Stephen



Rely on more experienced engineers
o Viola, Nathaniel, Bertram, Bernard, Edmund, Frank, Duncan, Vincent,
Diana, Jacques



Optimization
o Nathaniel, Silvia, Vincent, Luciana



Cycles and trends
o Abraham, Peter, Stephen, Curtis



Repeatability in experiments
o Frank, Oliver, Miranda, Stephen, Edmund, Ronald



Demand evidence now
o Joel, Curtis, Alonso, Oliver, Jacques
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Common themes


Intuition is developed from experience



Iteration occurs with internal and external customers



Teamwork helps find distributed expertise



Teamwork helps review the design for missing work or errors



Proof of concept is desired



Evidence can be a Subject Matter Expert opinion or it can be written and
measured data



Everybody wants to do a good job

8. I copied these quotes into nVivo per participant, making it easier to move whole
transcripts into or out of categories.
9. I kept notes of my dreams where categories seemed to coalesce and make memories
(Blakeslee, 2000).

Iteration 3 – 2015 08 04
Categories


Ignorance – will the technology work? Fear and anxiety; External motivation



Trial and error



Single cycle – diminishing returns for iteration
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Repeatability and consistency – experiments, standardization, provide evidence;
technology does indeed work and I can prove it



Cycles or trends – temporal, schedule, cost; technology will work, just need to get
it at the right time

Common themes


Emotional component



Recent events  spotlight memories or Law of Recency?

10. I continued to memo my thoughts as I read quotes in nVivo.
11. I moved back and forth between 20” x 30” paper spaces and nVivo, grouping printed
sheets of quotes and electronic quotes. I was able to share printed notes with another
researcher familiar with aerospace and phenomenography.

Iteration 4 – 2015 08 06
Categories – Forms of Uncertainty


Looking forward (outcomes)



At start line
o Who to ask
o What to ask
o What path to take



Looking backward (do not know that something exists)
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Looking sideways (simultaneous)



Looking upstairs (decisions in a business hierarchy)



Controllable and uncontrollable (Robust Design ideas)
o Controllable uncertainties require evidence and repeatability
o Uncontrollable uncertainties require intuition and judgment from prior
experience



Republican mindset
o Rumsfeld: known knowns, known unknowns, unknown unknowns
o Reagan: trust and verify

Categories – Management Strategies


Assume



Ignore



Break into smaller pieces (but not a systems thinking view)



Due diligence (personal, individual)
o Calculations, analysis tools
o Prior documentation by others



Informal peer review
o Solicit many opinions
o Decide which ones are valid (an emotional decision)



Formal review board, direct supervisor as your spokesperson
o Systems view of the design problem



Tools for decision-making like 6 Sigma are rare
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Subject Matter Expert opinion



Direct hierarchy opinion or decision (HIPPO = highest paid person’s opinion)



Margins, boundaries, conservatism

Categories of Key Learning Experiences or Interventions


Design projects in school – mandatory



Design projects outside of school – voluntary



Internships – responsibility and consequences



Failures – aircraft loss, loss of life



Going to factory and talking with mechanics – having to build something



Mentors



Home grown decision-making simulations and courses
o Project management courses, university sponsored
o 6 sigma courses

Common Themes


Flight safety



Due diligence, including peer review



Cost



Schedule



Teamwork



Evidence
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Communication

Iteration 5 – 2015 08 07
Category 1 – Bertram, Luciana, Margaret, Silvia
There are answers (technical solutions) for somebody else prior. Reliance on external
confirmation of decisions. Reliance on patterns of previous successful projects from
others. Ignorant of product history of a private company.
Category 2 – Bernard, Diana, Edmund, Miranda, Philip, Ross, Vincent
Some demonstration of personal ability and previous knowledge. Apply personal due
diligence. In a new task, transfer some skills and develop new skills. While developing
new skills, they are unsure if there is an answer or solution.
Category 3 – Abraham, Nathaniel, Stephen, Viola
There is an answer or a solution; it is a compromise of technical parameters. Includes
more parameters than Category2. Not yet including users' larger context.
Category 4 – Curtis, Frank, Jacques, Oliver, Ronald
Seeking repeatability of results, which implies rigorous testing and good planning ahead
of test. Consideration of applying margin or conservatism on top of repeatable results.
Technical answer or solution definitely exists.
Category 5 – Alonso, Duncan, Malcolm
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Company wide systems view of teams solving problems. Relying on "intuition" as
developed by much personal experience.
Category 6 – Joel, Peter
Customers' larger context and priorities considered. Identifying controllable versus
uncontrollable factors. Relying on evidence, not intuition: what information, what
person, what fidelity.

Management Strategy

Learning intervention (Critical experience)
to develop “patterns of recognition”

Form of Uncertainty
Figure C.2 Iteration 5 possible outcome space graphic.

Iteration 6 – 2015 08 17
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Figure C.3 Iteration 6 hierarchical outcome space.

Table C.1 Iteration 6 category description.
Task

strategy

Uncertainty

6

External
customers first

Controllable evidence needs “right”
person, “right” fidelity;
uncontrollable factors have
“intuition” applied

Uncontrollable
market trends,
cycles

5

Program
management

Early and broad coordination;
“intuition” from experience; systems
view

“right” level of
task ownership

4

Flight test, safetycritical

Find biggest factors
Stop and examine trends
Examine all factors simultaneously
first

Margins and
conservatism on
repeatable results

3

System
conceptual design

Invite criticism
Re-use existing technology
Underlying principles
Start from known

Answer or
solution is some
compromise

2

Accountability
for schedule and
budget

Peer review
Due diligence – break into smaller
pieces, justify to self first

Unsure if
technical solution
exists

1

Individual
project,
conceptual design

External decision makers
Explicit decision tools
Guess and check

Answers in
someone else’s
prior efforts
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12. In Iteration 7, I reviewed the transcripts again just for emotions and created
categories.

Iteration 7 – 2015 09 06
Categories of Emotion
1. Will it work – Philip, Ross, Silvia
a. Participants are unsure if their designs will perform to the specifications.
Punishment may follow a failed design. Participant makes choices of
what work to do based on their prior knowledge that they have confidence
in, or reject a task because of unfamiliarity. Not much sense of being
responsible to a team. Needs some confirmation from management in
order to be more confidence in their own ideas.
2. Managers Influence Intense Emotions – Edmund, Luciana, Margaret
a. Emotions of participants correlate with their managers' involvement. Lack
of external leadership leads to fear, low confidence, confusion, doubt,
worry, lack of trust. Managers' encouragement is very much appreciated
and is the motivator to make the next steps of the project succeed.
b. Thrown Into the Deep End – Diana, Vincent
i. New job or new product, unfamiliar with the rest of the product
line, being given responsibility and accountability. Gain
confidence after seeing onesself succeed with this first
task/responsibility. Learning to coordinate with others.
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3. Experimental Attitude – Curtis, Oliver, Stephen, Viola
a. Participants have experienced some surprises in design. Participants have
had a few panic moments within themselves or with their intended users.
They have separated failure in design from failure in themselves. But they
may have had previous design experiences where they felt
guilty/responsible for a design failure. They have resolved to be better
prepared and not to take things personally. They are getting better
prepared by planning experiments logically and efficiently.
4. Managing Teammates’ Emotions – Jacques, Joel, Miranda
a. Decisions are difficult because they are primarily trying to overcome
teammates' resistance to change or progress. Participants are trying to
identify the right time to introduce the decisions and are particularly
sensitive to their teammates' reactions. The participants here acknowledge
that their own feelings get hurt when they feel that others are blaming
them. Doubt and stress are palpable, but there is a likely positive outcome
happening soon.
b. Resolving Conflicts in Design – Abraham, Alonso, Bernard, Bertram,
Nathaniel, Ronald
i. Conflicts exist among physical parameters, such as forces,
temperatures, materials, aircraft performance. These parameters
may be "owned" by other departments or groups, so resolution of
physical parameter trade-offs can be described as "making
everybody happy". However, participants do not have a sense of
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panic or a fear that the conflict will not be resolved. Some
acknowledge their own bias towards their ideas and are willing to
seek critique.
5. Over It Now – Duncan, Frank, Malcolm, Peter
a. Participants have almost no intense or negative emotions as they make
business-shifting decisions.

Over It Now

Managing
Teammates
Emotions

Resolving
Conflicts in
Design

Experimental
Attitude

Experimental
Attitude

Manager
Influence Intense
Emotions

Thrown into the
Deep End

Will It Work?

Figure C.4 Iteration 7 hierarchical outcome space.

13. I reviewed the transcripts again, attempting to bracket out the job-specific language
the participants use to find the “essence” of their experience of uncertainty, regardless
of the task they have been assigned.
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14. I reviewed the emotion categories with another researcher. The other researcher
suggested that an outcome space that moves up and/or to the right is the convention
for “more comprehensive”.
15. In Iterations 8, 9, and 10, I reviewed the literature again, looking for vocabulary to
describe categories in one or two words. Also, I completed a closer read of key
works and their bibliographies, such as the Expertise Handbook (Ericsson, 2006) and
the several scales for tolerance for ambiguity (Herman et al., 2010; MacDonald,
1970; McLain, 1993). I considered other literature of ambiguity, decision-making,
and risk (Hollnagel, 2011; Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997; Philippo et al., 2013).

Iteration 8 – 2015 09 09
Another researcher suggested that I place two names together and describe the
similarities and differences between them. Then I should take another name and describe
the similarities and differences among the three, and place the names in some position
relative to each other to express some measure of comprehensiveness of experience. I
completed this exercise on paper. The second step was to draw groups around these
names and to describe the groups. The result is in Figure C.5 below.
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Figure C.5 Iteration 8 hierarchical outcome space.

I considered the nature of the design tasks that the participants described apart
from their description of their experiences of uncertainty. I applied a framework of
sensemaking (Daft & Lengel, 1986) in organizations to the participants to see if any
patterns emerged in Figure C.6 below:
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Figure C.6 Iteration 8 Daft (1986) organizational uncertainty.

Iteration 9 – 2015 09 11
An alternative is to consider the literature and see if groups emerge as a result of
overlaying previously published literature on to the names above. I considered literature
on coping mechanisms (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). I removed my groups and applied the
codes from Lipshitz’s table below into Figure C.7 below:

Table C.2 Reproduction of Lipshitz & Strauss (1997) tactics of coping with uncertainty.
Tactic
1. Collect additional
information
2. Delay action

Definition
Tactics of reduction
Conduct an active search for factual information.
Postpone decision-making or action taking until additional
information clarifies the decision problem.
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3. Solicit advice
4. Follow SOPs, norms, etc.
5. Assumption-based reasoning

1. Preempting
2. Improve readiness
3. Avoid irreversible action
4. Weighing pros & cons

1. Ignore uncertainty
2. Rely on “intuition”
3. Take a gamble

Solicit advice/opinion of experts, superiors, friends or
colleagues.
Act according to formal and informal rules of conduct.
Construct a mental model of the situation based on beliefs
that are (1) constrained by (though going beyond) what is
more firmly known, and (2) subject to retraction when and if
they conflict with new evidence or with lines of reasoning
supported by other assumptions.
Tactics of acknowledgment
Generate specific responses to possible negative outcomes.
Develop a general capability to respond to unanticipated
negative developments (e.g., put forces on the alert, leave
some resources unused).
Prefer or develop reversible course of action, prepare
contingencies.
Choose among alternatives in terms of potential gains and
losses.
Tactics of suppression
Act as if under certainty.
Use hunches, informed guesses, etc., without sufficient
justification.
“Take a chance,” throw a coin, etc.
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Figure C.7 Iteration 9 outcome space with Lipshitz's coping mechanisms applied.

Iteration 10 – 2015 09 16
A participant provided me a book chapter that she thought would be relevant to
my study. I agreed it was relevant to talk about Resilient Engineering (Hollnagel, 2011).
However, in the outcome space in Figure C.8 below, there appear to be a few outliers.
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Figure C.8 Iteration 10 hierarchical outcome space.

Table C.3 Iteration 10 categories description.
Category

Uncertainty
Management
Strategy

Emotional Responses

Design Tasks

Brittle

Frustrating
engagement of
stakeholders

Managers‘ attitude
highly influential on
participants’ attitude

Design may not have
much progress,
depending on
managers

Plastic

Trial and error

Emotions (confidence)
tied to whether design
works or not

Design makes progress
when participant finds
that something has
worked

248
Classic

Follow defined
procedures

Feels like “being
thrown into the deep
end”, confidence from
following someone
else who has been
successful

design makes progress
because the checklist
has been followed

Tolerant

Plan an experiment
and test

Experimental attitude;
accept that some things
will not work

Design has some
parallel efforts, some
may terminate, and
some sequential
efforts; all is
considered progress

Robust

Early engagement
of stakeholders

Now having to manage
other teammates’
emotions; decisions
feel personal

Designs may have
short and long term
solution packages

Resilient

Fast-acting,
sustained, trusting
engagement of
stakeholders &
team

Have gotten over the
likely criticism and
resistance to decisions.

Systems level design
tasks must be parsed
appropriately

16. Another researcher read several transcripts that I selected as having significant
variation among them, one that I thought was an expert at managing uncertainty,
mostly driven by a high-ranking job title, and one who specifically used a number of
negative emotions throughout the transcript.
17. I went through four more rounds of category description and differences, expressed in
paper and electronic formats. The fourth round mentioned here is the final result of
this entire document.

Iteration 11 – 2015 09 18
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Figure C.9 Iteration 11 hierarchical outcome space.

Iteration 12 – 2015 09 28
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Figure C.10 Iteration 12 hierarchical outcome space.

Table C.4 Iteration 12 category description.
Category

General Description

Team Axis

Forms of
Uncertainty Axis

Brittle

Uncomfortable with
uncertainty or afraid of
the consequences of
being found ignorant
by superiors; strategy
or recourse is to push
decisions to someone
else, typically boss or
team lead

Individual work, and
maybe some informal
peer review;

Epistemic only; they
are aware that there is
subject matter that
they have not yet
studied

Plastic

Takes solace in the
fact that most things
have been done before
in aerospace and that
there will be someone
more experienced

Describes projects as
team efforts,
acknowledges that
others have unique
and complementary
knowledge; peer

Epistemic uncertainty
as the brittle category,
but also including
schedule and budget
constraints;
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available to assist; will
take some initiative to
gather new knowledge
and to justify decisions
to themselves first, but
also rely on superiors
for decisions

review is desired

Tolerant

Good awareness of
uncertainty in the
physical parts and
systems is ever present
and will never be
eliminated, uncertainty
also comes from
customers and
teammates in
attempting to
understand their goals
and concerns

Describes projects as
team efforts, for
which they feel a
significant
investment or
ownership in a
crucial part of the
project;

Epistemic uncertainty
that can be reduced
through planned and
long term testing and
experimentation;
ambiguity uncertainty
among teammates

Robust

Anticipating the
unexpected, willing to
try new methods,
processes, solutions,
and looking for data
instead of opinion to
validate and verify
new solutions

Significant but
possibly
confrontational
engagement with
teammates and other
stakeholders

Epistemic, ambiguity,
and aleatory
uncertainties;
decisions hinge upon
having real data and
not just SME opinions

Resilient

Uncertainty is a fact of
life in the business,
and for the items
within their control, to
get the right data at the
right time at the right
fidelity with the right
people to make
decisions and even
lead the market

Significant and
trusting engagement
with teammates and
other stakeholders;
have the resources,
authority, and
courage to deploy
teammates on
parallel efforts to
investigate

Epistemic, ambiguity,
aleatory, and
interaction
uncertainties;
interactions could be
global/political,
customer-vendor, or
systems within a
product
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Iteration 13 – 2015 10 07

Figure C.11 Iteration 13 hierarchical outcome space.

Table C.5 Iteration 13 category description.
Category

General Description

Attitude Toward
Team Axis

Problem Complexity
Axis

Brittle

Uncomfortable with
uncertainty or afraid of
the consequences of
being found ignorant
by superiors; strategy
or recourse is to push
decisions to someone
else, typically boss or
team lead

Individual work, and
maybe some informal
peer review;

Epistemic only; they
are aware that there is
subject matter that
they have not yet
studied

Plastic

Takes solace in the
fact that most things
have been done before
in aerospace and that

Describes projects as
team efforts,
acknowledges that
others have unique

Epistemic uncertainty
as the brittle category,
but also including
schedule and budget
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there will be someone
more experienced
available to assist; will
take some initiative to
gather new knowledge
and to justify decisions
to themselves first, but
also rely on superiors
for decisions

and complementary
knowledge; peer
review is desired,
also subject matter
expert opinion is
solicited and not
questioned

constraints;

Tolerant

Good awareness of
uncertainty in the
physical parts and
systems is ever present
and will never be
eliminated, uncertainty
also comes from
customers and
teammates in
attempting to
understand their goals
and concerns

Describes projects as
team efforts
generally but not
specifically, for
which they feel a
significant
investment or
ownership in a
crucial part of the
project;

Epistemic uncertainty
that can be reduced
through planned and
long term testing and
experimentation;
ambiguity uncertainty
among teammates

Robust

Anticipating the
unexpected, willing to
try new methods,
processes, solutions,
and looking for data
instead of opinion to
validate and verify
new solutions

Significant but
possibly
confrontational
engagement with
teammates and other
stakeholders

Epistemic, ambiguity,
and aleatory
uncertainties;
decisions hinge upon
having real data and
not just SME opinions

Resilient

Uncertainty is a fact of
life in the business,
and for the items
within their control, to
get the right data at the
right time at the right
fidelity with the right
people to make
decisions and even
lead the market

Significant and
trusting engagement
with teammates and
other stakeholders;
have the resources,
authority, and
courage to deploy
teammates on
parallel efforts to
investigate

Epistemic, ambiguity,
aleatory, and
interaction
uncertainties;
interactions could be
global/political,
customer-vendor, or
systems within a
product
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